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Abstract 
 
International outsourcing has been widely analysed in the context of 
developed country firms. However a small number of studies have addressed 
the phenomenon from the perspective of supplier firms in developing 
countries. 
This thesis aims to fill the gap in the existing literature by exploring to what 
extent the integration in global production networks through outsourcing and 
off-shoring benefits producers in developing countries opening channels for 
upgrading. In order to attempt to fill the gap in the literature, this thesis looks 
at different theories such as Global Value Chains, Foreign Direct Investment 
and Learning by exporting, to understand the opportunities that off-shoring 
and outsourcing collaborations can open in terms of spill-over effects and 
upgrading.  
The research uses firm-level data from the National Survey of Employment, 
Wages, Technology and Training  (ENESTyC) covering 52 manufacturing 
activities at a four-digit level in 1992, 1999 and 2001. Outsourcing is measured 
as the ratio of the income received by a firm for performing other firm’s 
production to total revenues.  
Results show that outsourcing is significant in Mexico and in 2002 it 
accounted 33 percent of Mexico’s Manufacturing output. The econometric 
analysis suggests that supplier firms involved in outsourcing are: foreign, 
exporters, large and medium sized firms, and firms that tend to rely on 
imported raw materials. Similarly, firms participating in outsourcing as 
suppliers are more concentrated in labour intensive industries such as textile 
and wearing apparel manufacturing, plastic products and basic metals. 
In addition, results show that firms involved in outsourcing are more likely to 
use low skilled labour and pay lower salaries than non-outsourcing firms. This 
is consistent with the labour cost saving motive of outsourcing from the 
leading firm’s perspective. Labour productivity tends to be considerably lower 
for the firms engaged in outsourcing than for the firms with lower outsourcing 
ratios. This result is surprising, as it was anticipated that firms participating in 
outsourcing were more productive than non-outsourcing firms.  
Finally, we find that outsourcing does not promote R & D; it does not 
encourage in-plant training, and it does not increases the number of 
organizational techniques used by firms involved in outsourcing. These results 
are very revealing and reflect that in the case of Mexico outsourcing and off-
shoring does not have a positive effect on local producers engaged in these 
activities. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The globalisation process has triggered the physical fragmentation of 
production also known as “outsourcing and off-shoring”, in which the various 
stages of the production process have been optimally located across the globe 
as firms find advantages to source more of their inputs (OECD, 2007a).  
Despite the perceptions that outsourcing and off-shoring have now become 
much more significant in the world economy, it has been difficult to quantify 
their magnitude and growth due to the limited availability of relevant data. 
Generally, outsourcing and off-shoring decisions are normally taken at the 
micro-level of plants or firms; while official data are collected at the sectoral 
and national level and do not capture the extent of outsourcing. Current 
statistical concepts do not allow us to distinguish between trade in parts and 
components and fully fabricated goods, and this distinction is essential to 
capture the items that are shipped from one country for further processing 
(Yeats, 2001; Jones et al., 2005).  
Increasingly, scholars and policy makers are concerned with this problem and 
have attempted to measure the magnitude of the phenomenon at the global 
level. Since trade in intermediate inputs1 has been steadily growing, research 
has shown that multinational companies (MNCs) are more dependent on 
international sourcing than domestic firms. Therefore, intra-firm trade 
between affiliates and parent companies within the multinational network 
has promoted higher trade flows of intermediate inputs and higher ratios of 
use of foreign inputs over domestic inputs (OECD, 2010). For this reason, the 
                                                 
1 An intermediate input is broadly defined as an input to the production process that has itself 
been produced and used in production. 
2 
 
first approach measures outsourcing using trade data in intermediate goods 
which include primary goods, parts and components and semi-finished goods 
(see Yeats, 2001; Lall et al., 2004; Jones et al., 2005), and input-output tables 
(Hummels et al, 2001; OECD, 2007a, 2007b and 2008a). More recently new 
methodologies have emerged to capture the significance of the phenomenon 
using firm-level data in specific countries (Girma and Görg, 2004; Diaz-Mora et 
al., 2007; Diaz Mora, 2008; Holl, 2008; Cusmano et al., 2010). 
 
Using trade data, results show that between 1995 and 2006 trade in 
intermediate goods grew at an average annual rate of 6.2 per cent for goods 
and 7 percent for services (in volume terms). In 2006, intermediate inputs 
represented 56 percent of goods trade and 73 percent of services trade. 
These figures suggest that trade flows are dominated by goods that are not 
consumed but rather used in the production of other goods and services. 
In addition, at the country level, the OECD recently presented a report where 
outsourcing indexes2 are calculated for OECD member countries. Results 
suggest that off-shoring and outsourcing abroad have increased in almost all 
countries from 2000 to 2005. Smaller countries are typically more 
internationally oriented and are more likely to import more intermediates 
from abroad (e.g. Luxembourg 59%, Ireland 49%, Hungary 43 per cent, and 
Denmark 31%). Countries with a lesser degree of outsourcing are Spain 19 per 
cent, Italy 18 per cent, United Kingdom 18 per cent; and the United States 10 
per cent (OECD, 2010).   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 The outsourcing index is calculated as the share of intermediate inputs that are imported.  
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By contrast, in the Latin American and the Caribbean developing countries, 
statistics reflect the overall significance of off-shoring and outsourcing, since 
over  40% of the total manufactures exports of Mexico, Jamaica, Haiti, 
Dominican Republic and El Salvador encompass assembly operations  (Yeats, 
1998). 
Thus, statistics indicate that the phenomenon is very significant and that it 
deserves much more research, specifically in developing countries where little 
evidence is available. 
 
1.2. Motivation and Justification 
 
The topic addressed in this thesis forms part of the current effects of 
globalisation on the disintegration of the production process. In this sense, 
outsourcing and off-shoring have played a significant role not only by gaining 
importance in terms of share of international trade but also because they 
have opened up new opportunities for developing country firms to participate 
in global production networks. In other words, if developing countries could 
not supply a whole product competitively, with the international 
fragmentation of production they could capture and specialize in the 
production of certain segments and components (Jones, et al. 2005). 
Over the course of recent years, our understanding of outsourcing and off-
shoring has been enriched by studies providing the conceptual grounds of the 
phenomenon (Jones and Kierzkowski, 1990; Arndt, 1997; Feenstra, 1998; 
Venables, 1999; Deardorff, 2001; Antras and Helpman, 2004) as well as 
empirical evidence pre-occupied with the determinants and potential impacts 
of off-shoring using large sets of quantitative data in developed countries 
(Tomiura, 2005; Girma and Görg, 2004; Görg et al. , 2004; Diaz-Mora, 2006 
and 2008; Holl, 2008; Cusmano, 2010). While these studies have provided a 
sounder footing for the causes and effects of internationalisation of 
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production in developed countries particularly analysing lead firms, a small 
number of studies have empirically addressed the phenomenon from the 
perspective of suppliers in developing countries (Ajayi, 2003; Taymaz & 
Kilicaslan, 2005; Morrison and Yasar, 2009).  
This gap in the literature is unfortunate from a theoretical point of view as 
outsourcing agreements presumably consist of a dichotomic relationship 
where buyers and suppliers of outsourcing embark on a supportive 
relationship. Therefore, it is not sufficient to analyze and understand one side 
of the relationship. Several bodies of literature indirectly shed light on 
outsourcing and off-shoring from the perspective of suppliers in developing 
countries, but they are typically approaching the topic from an industry level 
perspective and rarely provide evidence at the firm level perspective (Gereffi, 
1994; Gereffi et al., 2003). Besides, most of these studies are based on case 
study analysis, and do not allow for generalisation of results. 
In order to attempt to fill the gap in the literature, this thesis looks at different 
theories (Global Value Chains, Foreign Direct Investment and Learning by 
exporting) to understand the opportunities that outsourcing collaborations for 
developing countries can open in terms of upgrading, using firm level data. 
Therefore, this thesis contributes to the current literature on off-shoring and 
outsourcing by providing evidence of the phenomenon in the context of 
suppliers in a developing country using firm level data. 
Mexico constitutes a good case study because a number of trade and foreign 
direct investment reforms have been implemented by the Mexican 
government since the 1980s, with the aim of stimulating domestic economic 
growth by increasing productivity and competitiveness of export-oriented 
manufacturing. As a result, Mexico has become the country with the largest 
number of free trade agreements in the world. In 2009, Mexico was the 
world’s sixteenth largest merchandise exporter and fourteenth largest 
merchandise importer with a nine percent annual percentage increase in 
overall trade (WTO, 2009). From 1991 to 2009, Mexican exports increased 
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fivefold. In fact, Mexico is the biggest exporter and importer in Latin America. 
However, Mexican trade is fully integrated with that of its North American 
partners. In 2009, 84 percent of Mexican exports and 51 percent of imports 
were traded with the United States and Canada (Secretaria de Economia).  
The recent growth in off-shoring and outsourcing has become an important 
part of the trade relationship between the United States and Mexico. In fact, 
Mexico is among the most important locations for off-shoring by US firms. 
From 2000 to 2003, it was estimated that the US was the source of 73.4 
percent of inputs imported by Mexican assembly plants. Generally, US firms 
produce parts and components and export these intermediate inputs to 
Mexico to be assembled and processed into final goods, and then they re-
import the finished goods. US firms normally specialise in R & D activities, 
component production, marketing and other logistics activities, while Mexican 
plants tend to specialise in assembly services (Bergin et al., 2009). Off-shoring 
and outsourcing activities have been carried out by assembly plants known as 
Maquiladoras, where employment  has increased tenfold from 119,546 in 
1980 to 1,191,554 in 2006 (INEGI). The sector accounts for 20 percent of 
manufacturing value added, and 55 percent of the country’s manufacturing 
exports which constitutes 2.8 per cent of Mexico’s GDP.  
Despite the dynamism in Maquiladora’s exports and production performance, 
Mexico’s economy has failed to generate significant growth in recent years. 
Figure  1.1 shows annual average growth rates of selected economic 
indicators. From a macroeconomic point of view, the rate of GDP is the most 
telling indicator of how the liberalisation strategy failed to generate 
sustainable industrial development in Mexico.  
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Figure  1.1 Mexico’s performance indicators 
 
Source: Author’s calculations with data from INEGI.  
 
Some authors suggest that Mexico’s paradox of successful foreign direct 
investment and export growth with poor economic performance may be 
explained by the lack of linkages between foreign firms and the domestic 
economy; low levels of technological capacity building; low value added 
exports of the Maquiladora sector; poor quality of the jobs created by 
Maquiladoras; and overdependence on the US economy (Puyana and Romero; 
2005; De la Garza Toledo, 2007; Gallagher and Shafaeddin, 2010).  
Thus, off-shoring and outsourcing through the Maquiladoras deserve a closer 
analysis to understand the characteristics of the firms involved in the 
agreements and to examine whether, by engaging in outsourcing, firms are 
likely to receive benefits in terms of upgrading. 
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1.3. Research Questions 
 
The thesis aims to provide a better understanding of outsourcing and off-
shoring in the context of suppliers in developing countries. Therefore, the 
central research question focuses on answering the following question: 
 
“To what extent does the integration in global production networks through 
outsourcing and off-shoring benefits producers in developing countries 
opening channels for upgrading?”  
 
In attempting to answer this question, some specific questions arise that need 
to be answered, and they are listed below:  
 
Research question 1: 
How significant is outsourcing in the Mexican Manufacturing Industry? 
Research question 2: 
What are the characteristics of the supplier firms involved in outsourcing in the 
Mexican Manufacturing Industry? 
Research question 3: 
 Does the engagement in outsourcing increase R & T, training and improve the 
organizational techniques of the supplier firms involved in outsourcing?  
A series of questions can be derived from question 3: 
a. Does outsourcing foster R & D activities of supplier firms involved 
in outsourcing? 
b. Does outsourcing encourage in-firm training of supplier firms 
involved in outsourcing? 
c. Does outsourcing promote better organizational techniques of 
supplier firms involved in outsourcing? 
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1.4. Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 presents the conceptual 
framework and literature review exploring different bodies of literature that 
help to understand the phenomenon from the perspective of the lead firms in 
developed economies and suppliers in developing countries. 
Particularly, the review of literature in this chapter aims to address the 
following issues: 
 How can/should outsourcing be measured?  
 What are the characteristics of the supplier firms involved in 
outsourcing? 
 Which theories help us to understand likely benefits for the supplier 
firms involved in outsourcing? 
 
One of the challenges found in this thesis was that there was not a single 
theory focusing on the benefits of off-shoring and outsourcing on supplier 
firms. Therefore, I looked at different bodies of literature such as global value 
chains, learning-by-exporting and foreign direct investment, which are more 
concerned with explaining the upgrading and spill-over effects in developing 
countries. 
Chapter 3 looks at the origins, driving forces and trends of off-shoring, and the 
significance of outsourcing in the global economy.  
Chapter 4 presents the evolution of the trade and FDI liberalisation policies 
implemented in Mexico, that make the country into an attractive location for 
foreign firms to source their parts and components. Since the Maquiladora 
firms are the main type of firms involved in off-shoring and outsourcing, the 
chapter also presents an overview of the history of Maquiladoras and some 
descriptive statistics showing the significance of the sector in the Mexican 
Manufacturing Industry.  
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Chapter 5 presents the methodology and explains the data management 
techniques implemented in the empirical analysis of the thesis. The chapter 
also presents descriptive statistics of the characteristics of the firms involved 
in outsourcing using firm level data in Mexico. 
Chapter 6 tests empirically the characteristics that are associated to 
outsourcing using a probit and a tobit model.  
Chapter 7 looks at the likely upgrading effects for supplier firms engaged in 
outsourcing. Particularly, three potential benefits on supplier firms are 
addressed: a) if outsourcing agreements encourage research and 
development of the supplier firms; b) if outsourcing increases human capital 
training; and c) if outsourcing improves organizational techniques of supplier 
firms. In order to answer these questions, econometric techniques are used.  
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes with an overview of the results from the previous 
chapters. It then presents the limitations arising from the empirical results of 
the thesis and ends with suggestions for further research.  
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Chapter 2 Conceptual Framework and 
Literature Review 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
During the last two decades the world economy has witnessed a rapid pace of 
the globalisation process which is associated with the physical fragmentation 
of production in which the various stages of the production process are 
optimally located across different places as firms find advantages to source 
more of their inputs (OECD, 2007a). The fragmentation of the production 
process across countries has opened up more opportunities for the 
restructuring of firms including the outsourcing and off-shoring of certain 
functions. While implications of the phenomenon have been studied and 
analysed under the perspective of firms in developed countries, less attention 
has been given to the developing country supplier firms participating in the 
outsourcing agreement (Hansen et al, 2008).  
Therefore, the aim of the chapter is to present the main concepts, theories 
and empirical studies that directly or indirectly deal with the developing 
country perspective of outsourcing in order to build a framework that will 
help us to understand the phenomenon and the implications for the supplier 
firms involved in outsourcing.  
Particularly, the review of literature in this chapter aims to address the 
following issues: 
 How to measure outsourcing?  
 What are the characteristics of the supplier firms involved in 
outsourcing? 
 Which theories help us to understand likely benefits for the supplier 
firms involved in outsourcing?  
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The first part of the 
chapter presents the concepts of outsourcing and off-shoring. These concepts 
are useful to understand the phenomenon from the perspective of the lead 
firm. We also introduce the concept of subcontracting and a typology which 
addresses the relationship between both supplier and buyer. Then, taking into 
account these concepts and the data available for our research we present a 
definition for outsourcing from the perspective of the supplier. 
The following section of the chapter presents an overview of the theoretical 
perspectives on outsourcing from the viewpoint of the supplier firms. Then 
we present a review of literature related to the measurements of outsourcing 
followed by a review of the characteristics of firms involved in outsourcing 
(lead firms and suppliers) in both developed and developing countries.  
One of the challenges we find in this research is that there is not a single 
theory focusing on how outsourcing benefits supplier firms. Different theories 
have addressed different issues, for instance FDI literature refers to the spill-
over effects and GVC literature to the upgrading effects  or the theory of 
learning by exporting. Therefore, through the combination of these three 
theoretical approaches section seven aims to build up an approach to analyse 
the benefits of outsourcing to supplier firms. Finally, the last section presents 
the conclusions. 
 
2.2.  Concepts of Outsourcing and Off-shoring  
 
The internationalization of the production process across different countries 
has given rise to the restructuring of firms to include outsourcing and off-
shoring. In the outsourcing and off-shoring relationship two different actor 
are involved (see Table  2.1). On the one hand, the “lead” firms (e.g. retailers, 
marketers, brand manufacturers, etc.) that source out their production or 
assembly of goods or services either to a domestic or foreign firm and on the 
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other hand, the “supplier” firm takes the contract to produce or assemble a 
good or service.  
To have a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon we present the 
definition from both perspectives. However, one of the problems 
encountered while reviewing the literature, was that studies in the field only 
take into account the perspective of the lead firms. Hence, we start by 
presenting the concepts of outsourcing and off-shoring and then we present 
our concept of outsourcing from the supplier point of view.  
The terms off-shoring and outsourcing have been used in a number of 
different ways in the academic and public debate. Furthermore a variety of 
alternative terms3 have being used to refer to the phenomenon.  
To clarify the differences between these two concepts, the OECD (2005, 
2007a, 2007b, and 2008a) presents in different reports a clear and in-depth 
conceptualization of outsourcing and off-shoring from the perspective of the 
lead firm.  
The OECD defines outsourcing as the purchase of intermediate goods and 
services from unaffiliated specialist provider. It can happen within the country 
where the firm is located (domestic outsourcing) or abroad (outsourcing 
abroad).  
In contrast, off-shoring happens when private firms or governments decide to 
purchase intermediate goods and services from foreign providers or to 
transfer particular tasks within the firm to a foreign location. It is therefore 
about sourcing decisions which involve: imports, displacement of domestic 
                                                 
3
 Offshore sourcing (Arndt, 1997); outsourcing (Feenstra and Hanson 1999; Ragan and 
Lawrence, 1999; Grossman and Helpman 2005), delocalization (Leamer, 1996), disintegration 
of production (Feenstra, 1998); vertical specialization (Hummels, Rapoport and Yi, 2001 and 
Irwin 2002), slicing the value chain (Krugman, 1995), international production sharing  (Ng 
Yeats 2001; Yeats, 1998). 
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production and sometimes FDI outflows if sourcing happe ns from overseas 
affiliates.  Off-shoring comprises two different situations. 
a) International subcontracting to non-affiliated firms through arm’s-
length contract (offshore outsourcing): involves the partial or 
complete transfer of goods or services overseas to a non-affiliated 
enterprise. The non-affiliated foreign enterprise could be either: i) a 
firm controlled by domestic firms of the country; ii) foreign affiliate 
controlled by a third party, or iii) an affiliate of the outsourcing country 
controlled by another group.    
b) International relocation through the corporation’s own affiliates 
(international in-sourcing): is the partial or complete transfer of the 
production of goods or services abroad within the same group of 
enterprises (affiliates). These affiliates may already exist or have been 
just created (Greenfield affiliates). Table  2.1   summarizes the different 
situations. 
Table  2.1 Outsourcing and Off-shoring 
  National  International  
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Domestic Outsourcing 
(Production outside the fi rm 
but within the country 
domestic). 
International Outsourcing  
(Production outside the enterprise 
(or the group) and outside the 
country by non-affiliated fi rms. 
This involves  foreign 
subcontracting (offshore 
outsourcing or subcontracting 
abroad). 
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Domestic Supply 
(Production within the fi rm 
and the country domestic-in 
house) 
International Insourcing 
(Production within the group to 
which the enterprise belong but 
abroad (by i ts  own affiliates) 
(offshore in-house sourcing in the 
sense of relocation abroad). 
Source: OECD, 2007a, 2007b and 2008a.  
 
An interesting point that the OECD raises is the distinction between a firm off-
shoring to its own affiliates called “off-shoring in strict sense” and to non-
affiliated firms “off-shoring in the broad sense”. This distinction is relevant to 
this research because it help us to understand closely the nature of 
phenomenon in both, the countries relocating its production and the ones 
OFF-
SHORING 
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receiving the production. Table ‎2.2 shows the characteristics of both types of 
off-shoring in the home county and abroad.  
Table  2.2 Characteristics of off-shoring in strict and broad sense 
Off-shoring Type Home Abroad 
In strict sense 
(Offshore in-house sourcing) 
 Total  or partial  closure of the 
enterprise’s  production units 
with labour reduction. 
 The enterprise imports 
goods  and services  from i ts 
own affiliates abroad. 
 Opening of affiliates which 
produce the same goods 
and services . 
In broad sense 
(International 
subcontracting) 
 Partial or total cessation of 
the production of goods  or 
services  with a  reduction in 
the workforce. 
 The fi rm imports  the goods 
or services  that previously 
produced within the 
enterprise. 
 The activi ty is 
subcontracted on a  regular 
basis with a  non-affiliated 
fi rm. 
 The fi rm producing in the 
recipient country may 
subcontract abroad the 
activi ties in question and 
then import the 
subcontracted goods and 
services , then delivering 
them to the fi rm which 
fi rs t placed the order. 
   Source: OECD 2007b. 
 
It is important to remark that in the case of off-shoring in strict sense 
(offshore in-house sourcing) it always concerns multinationals and FDI. On the 
other hand, off-shoring in the broad sense or international subcontracting 
does not involve FDI but it entails multinationals, and may also engage SME 
which do not have operations abroad (OECD, 2005, 2007b, c). 
Another concept that is important to include in the analysis is subcontracting. 
Some papers in the field use the term outsourcing and subcontracting 
indistinctly (UNIDO, 2003), but as we can observe from the previous 
conceptualization outsourcing is broader than subcontracting.   
Nevertheless, we consider important to include the concept of 
subcontracting, because it has some elements that are more suitable to 
analyse the phenomenon from the perspective of the supplier firm.  
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According to UNIDO (2003), subcontracting refers to the agreement between 
two parties (the lead firm and the supplier firm). In the relationship, the main 
lead places an order with one or several firms for the production, or 
processing, or transformation and/or finishing of parts, components or sub-
assemblies and/or provision of industrial services necessary for the 
manufacture of its final product. The supplier on the other hand, executes the 
work as per the specifications provided by the lead. The output is generally 
integrated into the principal’s final products .  
In terms of the types of subcontracting a conventional classification of 
outsourcing is provided by UNIDO (2003), and is based on the lead’s 
motivation to subcontract distinguishing the following forms of 
subcontracting: 
 Subcontracting based on capacity: describes the situation in which the 
available production capacity of the lead firm is not enough to cope 
with the total volume of production necessary to satisfy an order and 
when additional creation of an in-house capacity is neither feasible nor 
desirable. In such case, the lead firm has to rely on an external supplier 
to satisfy the excess of demand. The relationship between the lead 
and supplier takes place under a temporary period of time or until the 
demand is satisfied. 
 Subcontracting based on specialization: in this case the main lead firm 
delegates the subcontractor or a set of subcontractors, who have 
specialized equipment or machinery and skilled labour with the 
execution of certain manufacturing operations. This kind of 
subcontracting may comprise either finished products or specialized 
components or supplies that require a higher level of technical 
expertise, which the main lead firm does not have or can not meet. 
The relationship is not associated with fluctuations of orders and 
hence tends to be on a long-term or structural basis. In view of its 
specialised knowledge of production facilities, sometimes the 
subcontractors may be in a controlling position. 
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This classification is interesting from the lead’s  firm stand point. It describes 
some of the drivers of subcontracting, and captures the length of the 
agreement between the parties involved. However, for the purpose of this 
research we are looking for a kind of classification that captures , from a 
developing country perspective, the characteristics of the outsourcing 
agreements reached between the Mexican firms and foreign firms. For this 
reason, Nanjundan (1987) classification is more suitable to describe 
subcontracting from the perspective of supplier firms. According to the author 
four types of subcontracting can be distinguished: 
 Component subcontracting: this type is similar to the specialized 
subcontracting classification by UNIDO. It refers to the phenomenon 
where the lead firm specialises in a limited range of technology 
intensive segments of the final product and on the assembling, 
marketing post-sales service and research and development activities. 
Therefore suppliers specialize in the production of components or 
intermediate inputs needed for the production of the final good. Such 
component subcontracting takes place in the metalworking and 
machinery industries.  
 Activity subcontracting: takes place where an entire process or activity 
could be subcontracted. 
 Assembly subcontracting: occurs when the supplier (in most of the 
cases SME) assemble the final product in a highly-labour and skill-
intensive manner. An example of this type of subcontracting 
corresponds to the electronics industry, where the production of 
components includes high-technology capital-intensive processing 
(e.g. chips, transistors, etc.) is performed by large specialized 
enterprises, while assembling of the final product is performed by 
small enterprises. 
 Product subcontracting: takes place when a complete product is 
produced by the supplier firm and the lead firm only performs 
marketing activities. This type of outsourcing prevails in sectors such 
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as apparel and clothing, footwear, leather goods, small motors, 
transformers, electrical appliances, etc. 
 
So far, we have presented different definitions of outsourcing, off-shoring and 
subcontracting but they do not conceptualize the phenomenon from the 
supplier perspective. To fill this gap in the literature we propose a definition of 
outsourcing, based on the ideas of the previous concepts and on the 
information that we have available for our empirical analysis.  
Thus, we define outsourcing as the agreement between a supplier firm and a 
lead firm within the country or abroad in which the supplier firm produces 
one or more of the different stages of the production process of the lead firm. 
It is based on the firm’s competitive advantage as compared to other firms, 
which allow them to increase its technical experience and productive 
efficiency. Table  2.3 describes the type of relationship that outsourcing and 
off-shoring may entail.  
Table  2.3 Relationship between the lead firm and subcontractor 
Type of relationship between the lead firm and subcontractor 
 Lead firm may provide some of the materials and components 
 Lead firm may provide detailed design or specification 
 Lead firm may provide finance, e.g. loan capital 
 Lead firm may provide machinery and equipment 
 Lead firm may provide technical and/or general assistance and advice 
 Lead firm is responsible for all marketing arrangements 
Source: Dicken, 2007 
Finally, although the type of production that Mexican supplier firms are 
engaged in, may refer more to off-shoring we will use the terms off-shoring 
and outsourcing indistinctly in this thesis . 
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2.3. Theoretical perspectives on outsourcing: a developing country 
perspective 
 
In the last few decades, one of the most significant impacts of globalisation on 
the patterns of production and trade is the phenomenon of international 
outsourcing. While the literature on outsourcing has proliferated, it has drawn 
too much attention on the strategies that firms follow when they consider off-
shoring and outsourcing of their activities to suppliers in the domestic country 
or abroad. Only small number of researches have conceptualized the 
phenomenon from the perspective of the supplier in developing countries 
(Hansen, et al. 2008; and Taymaz and Kiliςaslan, 2005).  
Taymaz and Kiliςaslan, (2005) propose three different theoretical approaches 
to conceptualize and understand the main drivers of outsourcing from the 
lead firm and supplier perspectives (see Table ‎2.4). We complement the 
conceptualization of the authors by including the transaction costs approach, 
as the firm’s make or buy decision is not only a matter of differences in 
production  costs it is also determined by the costs of setting up and 
maintaining a subcontracting relationship (Holl, 2008). 
The dualistic economic approach, expresses that the outsourcing relationship 
is an uneven relationship between two different types of firms, mainly large 
multinational corporations and small firms (Taylor and Thrift, 1982). I n this 
relationship, lead firms outsource mainly for two reasons: to reduce 
production costs and to smooth production cycles at the expense of small 
subcontractors. However, the typical supplier is a technologically backward 
small firm with a weak bargaining position. Large firms benefit as they can 
minimize fluctuations in demand by contracting out the unstable part to small 
firms. The second advantage relates outsourcing to a cost reduction strategy, 
where large firms subcontract out their unskilled labour-intensive production 
to take advantage of lower wages in small firms and developing countries.  
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The second approach was proposed by development economists, and offers a 
more positive view of outsourcing. It advocates outsourcing as a tool of 
development, modern technology diffusion and employment generation 
(Watanabe, 1971, UNIDO, 1974).  The main idea is that small suppliers or 
subcontractors benefit from large firms in the form of guaranteed markets, 
secured raw materials, and technical assistance.  Large firms that adopt 
modern technology would diffuse modern production techniques both to 
improve production processes and product quality of subcontractors.  
In addition, lead firms improve their competitiveness by focusing only on their 
core competencies; also they can have access to world-class capabilities and 
share risks.  This approach also introduces the idea that if the size of the 
market is not enough or if there is a lack or non-existence of potential 
subcontractors, firms can make use of international subcontracting. Firms can 
benefit recipient countries (most of the times developing countries) by 
transferring knowledge, designs, production techniques, quality control 
methods, promoting employment, and export promotion.  
This approach is more suitable to adopt in the research in order to explain the 
benefits of outsourcing to suppliers in terms of productivity spill-overs.  
The third approach emphasises networking and clusters. Basically this 
approach is focused on SMEs. Outsourcing is considered as a means of 
knowledge and technology transfer, where cooperation plays an important 
role to achieve collective efficiency4 (Humphrey, 1995; Nadvi and Schmitz, 
1999; Rabellotti, 1997). These studies show that small firms located in 
clusters, both in developed and developing countries are able to overcome 
some of the major difficulties they usually face: lack of specialized skills, 
difficult access to technology, inputs, market, information, credit, and external 
                                                 
4
 Collective efficiency means the combination of incidental external economies and the effects of joint actions that 
help to explain the efficiency gains of firms located in clusters, and their increased capability to up-grade and grow.  
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services. Firms benefit from each other, outsourcing is one of the main types 
of networking on which clusters could be established (Taymaz and Kiliςaslan, 
2005). 
The last approach is based on the theory of industrial organization, and its 
origins are embedded in the transaction costs approach (Coase, 1937; and 
Williamson, 1975 and 1985). The theory states that the boundary of a firm is 
determined so as to minimize transaction costs. In this approach, outsourcing 
is feasible as long as the costs of related asset specific investments, 
contractual incompleteness, and search efforts are lower than the expected 
cost advantage (Olsen, 2006). Many of the recent studies of outsourcing 
adopt this approach to study the decisions of whether an intermediate input  
or component is produced within a vertically integrated agreement or through 
subcontracting. Also this literature deals with the problems that may arise 
from this decision (incomplete contracts) (Antras, 2003 and 2005, Antras and 
Helpman, 2004, Spencer 2005).  
Table ‎2.4 Theoretical approaches of outsourcing 
 
Dualistic 
Approach 
Development Approach Networks/Clusters 
Transaction 
costs 
Unit of Analysis 
Contractor-
Subcontractor 
Contractor-Subcontractor 
Group of interacting 
firms 
Contractor-
Subcontractor 
Nature of the 
outsourcing 
Exploitation/ 
Subordination 
Dependence/ 
Developmental 
Equal benefits Dependence 
Size of the Firm 
Contractor Large Large Small/Large Large 
Subcontractor Small Small Small/Large 
Small/Medium/ 
Large 
Bargaining power 
Contractor Active Active Active Active 
Subcontractor Passive Passive Active Active 
Technological Level 
Contractor High High High/Medium High/Medium 
Subcontractor Low Low, but raised by the client High/Medium High/Medium 
Driven forces of subcontracting 
Contractor 
Flexibility, risk 
and cost transfer 
Focus on core business 
Collective efficiency 
and flexibility 
Reduction of 
costs 
(transaction 
costs), compete 
in global markets 
Subcontractor 
Market survival 
strategy 
Access to markets and  
technology 
Collective efficiency 
and flexibility 
 
Product/process 
design 
Driven by the 
client 
Driven by the client Client/subcontractor 
Client/ 
Subcontractor 
Source: Adapted from Taymaz and Kiliςaslan, 2005.  
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2.4. Measurement of Outsourcing 
 
In the last decades, one of the most significant impacts of globalisation on the 
patterns of production and trade is the phenomenon of international 
outsourcing. Although outsourcing has increased at a rapid pace and has 
shown a dynamic performance, it has been hard for researchers to assess its 
magnitude. To a large extent, this is because trade data generally does not 
differentiate between trade in components and assembled products. 
Identification of trade in parts and components is crucial, since it reflects the 
items that are shipped from one country to another for further processing 
due to international outsourcing. 
However, different methodologies have been proposed in the academic 
literature and can be classified into two categories according to the level of 
data used: macro-data measures of outsourcing such as in Campa and 
Goldberg, (1997); Feenstra and Hanson, (1997); Geishecker and Görg, (2003); 
Hummels, et al, (1997); Athukorala, (2003); Yeats, (2001); Lall, et al, (2004); 
and Kimura et al, (2005), and micro-data at the firm level, like in Jones (1998); 
(Diaz-Mora, 2005); and Tomiura, (2005).  
The methodologies within the first group make use of aggregated trade data 
sets such as Standard International Trade Classification (SITC Rev 2 and 3), 
Harmonized System (HS); Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) and Input-
output tables. Annex 1 summarizes various measures of foreign outsourcing. 
The use of these industry-level measures has contributed enormously to our 
understanding of international outsourcing, especially for comparisons across 
different countries and periods. However, there are several shortcomings 
from the above measures. For instance, trade data generally have not 
differentiated between components and finished products (Yeats 2001).  
Separating finished products from parts and components (P & C) does give an 
indication, but it is partial and sometimes is misleading.   Outside of the SITC 7 
(Rev 3), the SITC still fails to differentiate sufficiently between assembled 
22 
 
goods and components, therefore meaningful tabulations of the magnitude of 
trade in parts cannot be made.  Trade data also do not show different stages 
of manufacture of a given product; this is a major gap, since outsourcing often 
comprises the same product undergoing different processes in different 
locations (Lall, et al, 2004). 
In addition, the majority of the above methodologies often measure 
outsourcing by the ratio of material intermediate inputs to output, but this is 
a broad measure because it includes raw material purchases as well as arms -
length purchases of standardized components in the market.  As Grossman 
and Helpman, (2005) point out,  “outsourcing means more than just the  
purchases of raw materials and standardized intermediate goods”. At the 
same time, this measure is narrow since foreign outsourcing does not 
necessarily involve the export of parts and components, and could include 
processing of final products, assembly or specific production tasks and trade 
in services, which is hard to identify from trade statistics.  
To overcome these pitfalls we need to obtain more direct evidence of 
outsourcing such as studies using micro-level data. To date evidence of this 
kind has been limited, (Jones, 1998; Diaz-Mora, 2005; Tomiura, 2005) and has 
focused only on developed countries such as Japan, Spain and the United 
States. 
Jones (1998), provides the first attempt to measure outsourcing using firm-
level data. The methodology consists in the identification of the purchaser of 
the imports in the men’s dress shirt market, to draw inferences about the 
value-added on to the imports that occurs in the U.S. The data was collected 
by the U.S. customs service (Top 100 apparel importers) in 1993.  The author 
argues that outsourcing strategies have become one of the key elements for 
the large apparel and retail companies.  
Alternatively Diaz-Mora (2005), provides an indicator for outsourcing derived 
from the Industrial Companies Survey (Encuesta Industrial de Empresas). This 
survey contains annual data since 1993 on employment, wages, hours 
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worked, sales, intermediate inputs, external services and more variables for 
93 manufacturing industries at the 3-digit level of NACE (Rev 1). One 
characteristic that makes this survey particularly interesting is that it includes 
outsourcing as a variable, where outsourcing is defined as the production 
performed by other firms. It comprises contracting out manufacturing as well 
as activities at any stage of the production process like product design or even 
final assembly. However, it does not include the subcontracting of services 
such as accounting, consulting and cleaning.  
In the model, outsourcing is measured as the ratio of the production tasks 
carried by other firms to gross output. If the ratio increases it expresses that 
manufacturing firms are substituting in-house production for external 
production. The study finds that outsourcing is higher in the textile sector, 
wearing and apparel, footwear, publishing and printing, fabricated metal 
products and shipbuilding and aerospace industry. This outcome is expected 
considering that Spain is a developed country, and the theory predicts that 
the fragmented sectors are those in which labour intensity is higher as in 
apparel or footwear, etc.  
Finally, Tomiura (2005), used firm-level data derived from the Basic Survey of 
Commercial and Manufacturing Structure and Activity. The survey includes 
118,300 Japanese manufacturers and is highly representative of the entire 
manufacturing sector in Japan. One of the main characteristics of the survey is 
that it directly asks “contracting out” of manufacturing processes to other 
firms.  Therefore, outsourcing in the survey comprises any activities in the 
production process, and final assembly. However, outsourcing of non-
production overhead services is not covered, contracting-out to own 
subsidiaries is not separated, and arm’s-length purchases of standardized 
components are not included. If the firm decides to replace in-house parts 
production by components regularly available in marketplace, this kind of 
outsourcing is not covered in the survey. Also contracting out by 
wholesalers/retailers is not included in the data. Although this data set has 
several constraints, it is a good attempt to capture outsourcing. In the results 
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it is found that the industries with a relatively high percentage of outsourcing 
overseas include leather products, rubber products, apparel, electric 
machinery and precision instruments. An important outcome is that less than 
three percent of the firms are outsourcing their production across national 
borders and firms more prone to have outsourcing practices are the ones with 
higher productivity or those who outsource more-labour intensive activities. 
Having a broad overview of the existing measures of outsourcing, it can be 
noted that firm-level measures capture better the extent of outsourcing.  For 
this reason, our empirical analysis in Chapter 6 and 7 is based on firm-level 
data and is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
 
2.5. Review of literature of the characteristics of Outsourcing lead firms in 
developed countries 
 
To date, empirical evidence using firm-level data remains limited and has 
focused on the buyer’s decision to outsource in developed countries: Girma 
and Görg, (2004) for some UK manufacturing industries,  Tomiura, (2005)  for 
Japan, Holl (2008) and Diaz-Mora (2006 & 2008) for Spain and Cusmano et al., 
(2010) for Italy (see ‎0). 
Girma and Görg (2004), study empirically the firm’s decision to outsource and 
the effect of outsourcing on that firm’s productivity 5. Outsourcing is defined 
as the contracting out of activities that were previously performed within the 
firm, to subcontractors outside the boundaries of the firm6. The analysis is 
performed using establishment-level data from 1980 to 1992 for three broad 
UK manufacturing industries: chemicals, mechanical and instrument 
                                                 
5
 The study does not make any differentiation between foreign or domestic outsourcing 
because the authors are more interested in the firm’s specific characteristics that determine 
outsourcing. 
6
 This definition does not include non-industrial services such as accounting, consulting, 
cleaning or transportation. 
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engineering, and electronics7. Each of the three industries is analysed 
separately, due to the degree of heterogeneity that may exist across firms and 
sectors. 
The authors proposed a model to assess the determinants of outsourcing 
arguing that the three main reasons which may affect firm’s decision to 
outsource are wage cost savings, output cyclicality and economies of scale. 
Outsourcing is measured as the logarithm of cost of industrial services 
received by establishment at time t. In the model three variables capture the 
cost saving reasons for outsourcing: logarithm of wage rates for skilled and 
unskilled workers; and the degree of unionization at the four-digit industry 
level. It is expected that high-wage firms do more outsourcing than other 
firms.  The variable size captures the economies of scale motive for 
outsourcing, and is measured in terms of employment. Since the dependent 
variable is measured in absolute terms, it controls for the fact that large firms 
may do more outsourcing (in absolute terms) than smaller firms. The variable 
foreign is included to control the ownership of the establishment. It is 
expected a positive coefficient if foreign firms are more intensive users of 
outsourcing. The cyclicality is controlled by using sectoral time dummies in the 
four-digit industries. Finally, three dummy variables are included to control for 
sectors; time and region. The equation is calibrated using OLS estimation for 
each of the broad sectors separately. Results show that high wages, foreign 
ownership and productivity are positively related to the firm’s outsourcing 
intensity. 
Tomiura (2005), uses a cross-section firm-level data for 118,300 Japanese 
manufacturers. One of the main characteristics of the survey is that it directly 
asks about “contracting out” of manufacturing processes to other firms. 
However, outsourcing of non-production overhead services is not covered, 
contracting-out to own subsidiaries is not separated, and arm’s -length 
purchases of standardized components are not included. If the firm decides to 
                                                 
7
 This is the first paper that analyses the determinants of outsourcing at the firm level. 
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replace in-house parts production by components regularly available in 
marketplace, this kind of outsourcing is not covered in the survey. Also 
contracting out by wholesalers/retailers is not included in the data. The 
author analyses the determinants of foreign outsourcing intensity using as 
explanatory variables the log of productivity, the intensity of computer usage 
(this tests for cost-reduction effect of IT), physical-capital ratio and human-
capital ratio, the R & D intensity, size of the firm and industry dummies to 
control for industry-specific factors. The author finds that less than three 
percent of the firms in the sample are outsourcing their production overseas 
and about half of the firms outsource in the domestic market. The results 
show that firms are more likely to outsource overseas when their productivity 
is higher and when their products are more labour intensive.  Finally, 
industries such as leather products, rubber products, apparel, electric 
machinery and precision instruments have a relatively high percentage of 
outsourcing overseas.  
Diaz-Mora and Triguero (2008) analyse the determinants of outsourcing 
production using a panel of 93 Spanish manufacturing industries at the 3-digit 
level of NACE (Rev 1) from 1993 to 2002. One characteristic that makes this 
survey particularly interesting is that it includes outsourcing as a variable and 
is defined as the production performed by other firms. It comprises 
contracting out manufacturing as well as activities at any stage of the 
production process like product design or even final assembly.  
Outsourcing intensity is calculated dividing the production works carried by 
other firms over the output.  The dependent variables considered in the 
model are unit labour costs, percentage of small firms (firms with less than 20 
employees), national ownership, export propensity ratio, a dummy variable 
controlling for skills and 10 dummy variables to control for period-specific 
effects. The export propensity ratio test the hypothesis that exporting firms 
are more likely to outsource. The dummy variable “skills” is included and 
takes value of 1 for sectors with high skill requirements and 0 otherwise.  
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Finally, the dependant variable is lagged because today’s outsourcing decision 
may be related to the level of outsourcing in period t-1.  
Results show that higher unit labour costs are related to higher levels of 
outsourcing. This result refers to the cost saving reason for outsourcing and is 
consistent to the results obtained by Girma and Görg (2004). The dummy 
variable high skills, exhibits a positive and significant coefficient, showing that 
the likelihood of high-skilled labour industries to contract out internal 
production is higher. The authors find positive correlation between firm s ize 
and outsourcing decisions, which can be explained due to the fact that large 
firms face lower fixed entry costs for outsourcing.  
The results also show that outsourcing is higher in labour intensive industries 
such as the textile sector, wearing and apparel, footwear, publishing and 
printing, fabricated metal products and shipbuilding and aerospace industry.  
Previous studies suggest that the main drivers for outsourcing are related to 
the reduction of production costs as well as higher flexibility for the firm to 
face changes in demand. However, Holl (2008) argues that the firm’s decision 
to outsource is also associated with higher agglomeration economies. The 
author uses a panel for Spanish manufacturing and includes characteristics of 
the firm such as wages, size, age, foreign ownership, demand fluctuations, 
agglomeration variables and industry dummies. The results suggest that the 
firm’s decision to subcontract is not only associated with characteristics like 
size, labour costs, age, fluctuations in demand and industry dummies but also 
with agglomeration. In other words, firms located in larger industrial areas 
have higher probabilities to outsource. The model also includes interaction 
variables between wages, size of the firm and the location show that industry 
agglomeration makes subcontracting more attractive for smaller and lower 
wage firms. Table ‎2.5 shows a summary of the studies mentioned above. 
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 Table  2.5 Determinants of outsourcing and expected signs 
Variables Expected Sign Authors  
Labour costs + 
Girma and Görg (2004), 
Diaz-Mora et. al  (2007), 
Diaz Mora (2008), 
Holl (2008) 
and Cusmano, et. al (2010) 
Labour Productivi ty + 
Tomiura (2005), 
Diaz Mora (2008), 
Cusmano, et. Al (2010). 
Degree of 
unionization 
(Not 
signi ficant) 
Girma and Görg (2004) 
Fi rm Size + 
Girma and Görg (2004), 
Tomiura (2005), 
Holl (2008) and 
Cusmano, et. al (2010). 
Market Changes + 
Girma and Görg (2004), 
Diaz-Mora et. Al  (2007). 
Skill requirement + Diaz Mora (2008). 
Physical  capital ratio - Tomiura (2005). 
Human Capital  Ratio - Tomiura (2005). 
Product Innovation + Diaz-Mora et. al  (2007) 
Process Innovation + Diaz-Mora et. al  (2007). 
R & D + 
Tomiura (2005), 
Diaz-Mora et. al  (2007). 
Product 
Standardization 
- Diaz Mora (2008). 
Industry Size + Diaz-Mora et. Al  (2007). 
Export Propensity + 
Diaz-Mora et. al  (2007) and 
Cusmano, et. al (2010). 
Age + Diaz-Mora et. al  (2007). 
Subcontract t-1 + 
Diaz-Mora et. Al  (2007); 
Diaz Mora (2008). 
Market competition + Diaz-Mora et. al  (2007). 
Foreign Ownership 
+ 
- 
Girma and Görg (2004), 
Diaz-Mora et. al  (2006) 
Holl (2008) 
National Ownership + 
Diaz-Mora et. Al  (2006), 
Holl (2008). 
Agglomeration + Holl (2008). 
Source: Author 
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2.6. Review of literature on the characteristics of outsourcing from a 
supplier’s perspective in developing countries 
 
Despite evidence suggesting that outsourcing is gaining importance in less 
developed countries (UNCTAD, 2004 and 2005), some empirical evidence has 
been produced to analyse the characteristics of the firms engaged in 
outsourcing, its determinants and impacts not only from the demand side but 
also from the perspective of the supplier in LDC. 
 In this section we review the empirical evidence of the characteristics of firms 
involved in outsourcing in LDC.   
Ajayi (2003), Taymaz & Kilicaslan (2005), and Morrison and Yasar (2009), are 
among the first to provide original contributions of outsourcing in Nigeria and 
Turkey respectively. Ajayi (2003), presents a qualitative study of the nature 
and scope of subcontracting linkages in Nigeria. In the study, 68 contracting 
firms were interviewed in 15 industrial estates in Lagos. To analyse the nature 
of outsourcing, the author distinguishes two types: specialised outsourcing 
and complementary outsourcing. The former arises to the lack or inadequate 
technological know-how or equipment from the lead firm’s side. The later 
occurs because of low production capacity of the lead firm to meet delivery 
times. The author finds that 97 percent of the surveyed firms are involved in 
speciality outsourcing by independent subcontractors. Moreover 
subcontracting practices are more frequent in the Chemical and 
pharmaceutical industry and textiles,  
In this sense, Taymaz and Kiliςaslan, (2005), offer an interesting quantitative 
analysis of the determinants of subcontracting from the perspective of both 
lead and supplier firms in Turkey for the electronics and textile industry. This 
research is more applied to the present study and some variables considered 
in the empirical model will be taken into account for our analysis. 
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The authors estimate two models, one for the share of subcontracted inputs 
(subcontract offering firms), and other for subcontracting output 
(subcontracting receiving firms). The data is at the firm-level from 1993 to 
2000, and the analysis uses a random-effects Tobit model.  
Following the literature on subcontracting the authors include several 
variables (see Table ‎2.6). For instance, the dualistic economy and 
developmental subcontracting approaches point that wages and size are 
among the main determinants of subcontracting. In the case of size, large 
firms are more likely to offer subcontracting to small firms. Hence, the 
coefficient of size is expected to be positive for the subcontract offering firms 
and negative for the subcontract-receiving firms. On the other hand, wages is 
included to test the hypothesis that high wage firms are more likely to 
subcontract a larger part of their production to firms paying lower wages. 
The model also includes the number of hours worked in the second and third 
shifts in total of number of hours worked, to control for the rapid growth of 
the demand of the products. The intuition behind this variable is that if a 
firm’s demand increases it will have to increase the number of hours worked 
by employees. But, if its installed capacity reaches to its maximum capacity it 
may decide to subcontract a part of its production to a third party firm.  
Annual output growth is used to capture the effects of the production 
constraints on the firms subcontracting behaviour.  
Networks and cluster approaches stress the importance of networks and 
clusters in promoting subcontracting relationships between firms that own 
complementary assets. For this reason, the authors use the logarithm of the 
number of firms operating in the same sector and province to test the effects 
of regional clusters on subcontracting behaviour. The model also includes the 
proportion of expenditures on communications services to total sales 
revenues, the advertising intensity of the firm, annual depreciation 
allowances per employee.  
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Three variables are included to control the effects of composition of the 
labour force on subcontracting: female, administrative personnel and skilled 
personnel. Finally, a time variable is included to control the exogenous shifts 
in subcontracting not explained by the other variables. 
Table  2.6 Determinants of Outsourcing in Turkish Textile Industry 
Variables Sub. Receiving Sub. Offering 
Wages - + 
Size - + 
Number of hours worked in the 
second and third shifts 
+ - 
 Output Growth rate - + 
Number of the firms operating in the 
same sector 
+ + 
Proportion of expenditures on 
communication services to total sales 
revenue 
+ + 
Advertisement expenses + + 
Annual depreciation allowances - + 
Female + + 
Administrative - + 
Skilled - - 
Time - - 
Source: Taymaz and Kiliςaslan, (2005) 
One of the strongest results that the authors find is that the existence of local 
clusters seems to be an important determinant of the outsourcing decision for 
both subcontracting offering and receiving firms. In addition, results show 
that capital-intensive firms are more likely to offer subcontracting contracts, 
whereas labour-intensive firms in the textile industry are more likely to 
receive contracts. 
In the case of wages and size of the firms, in the textile industry results show 
that large firms tend to subcontract out their production, while small firms are 
more likely to receive more subcontract orders. In contracts, in the 
engineering industries results show that size has a positive relationship for 
both subcontracting receiving and offering firms. 
Finally, the authors point that in the textile industry the subcontracting 
relations entail unequal power relations as suggested by the dualistic 
32 
 
approach, while firms in the engineering sector subcontracting is established 
between equals like the cluster/networks approach suggests. 
 
2.7. Theoretical approaches exploring the benefits of outsourcing to 
suppliers 
 
According to UNIDO (2003), by engaging in outsourcing agreements with 
specific customers, both suppliers and subcontractors benefit from a large 
amount of technology transfer8. In this sense, to guarantee that the parts and 
components meet the requirements of the home market, contractors 
(including large multinational firms) can provide suppliers not only with the 
specifications but also with the assistance in raising their technological 
capabilities (UNCTAD, 2001).  
For instance, supplier firms involved in outsourcing might be forced to search 
for new technologies, use existing technology more efficiently, copy 
technology used by the lead firms, lead firms may also introduce new know-
how by demonstrating new technologies and training workers, lead firms may 
transfer techniques for inventory and quality control and standardization to 
their suppliers. 
 On the other hand, there can be adverse effects such as the increasing 
competition from foreign supplier may lead to the crowding out of domestic 
supplier firms. The Trade and Development Report, 2002 (UNCTAD, 2002:74-
76) highlights that developing countries involved in international production 
networks generally are not involved in the skill- and technology-intensive 
parts of the production. Hence, the following dangers have been identified: 
                                                 
8
 Technology transfer refers to all forms of physical assets, knowledge and human learning 
and capabilities that enable the efficient organization and production of goods and services 
(Dunning, 1993). 
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 The relocation of labour-intensive or unskilled assembly to developing 
countries may not increase overall skill requirements. In turn, this not 
only reduces the benefits in terms of incomes, but also diminishes the 
potential for technological spill-overs. 
 Firms in developing countries that are part of an international 
production network (or GVC) depend upon the decisions of the lead 
firms within the network. This in turn, may reduce policy autonomy 
about the formulation of development strategies that put emphasis in 
national capabilities and goals. 
 The increasing competition among developing countries to attract FDI 
in order to enter international production chains may lead to a race to 
the bottom. 
 Technological upgrading can also be more difficult for economies that 
are used by TNCs as bases for exports to third markets than for 
economies where FDI is more of the market-seeking, tariff jumping 
kind. Since the latter form is more dependent on the domestic 
economy, it offers to the host country government greater bargaining 
power opportunities for using FDI selectively to ensure that it will 
generate spill-overs and linkages with domestic industry. 
The micro-economic literature has identified three channels for the 
international transmission of knowledge: imports of new capital and 
differenciated intermediate goods (Feenstra, Markusen and Zeile, 1992; 
Grossmand and Helpman, 1995); learning by exporting (Clerides, Lach and 
Tybout, 1998; Crespi, Criosculo and Haskel, 2008); and foreign direct 
investment (Blomström and Kokko, 1997; Kokko, Tansani and Zejan, 2001). 
In fact, the conventional wisdom is that FDI is the main channel through which 
technology is transfer to developing countries (Djankov and Hoekman, 2002). 
However, during the last decades, a rapidly growing number of studies within 
the GVC perspective have focused on how buyers, suppliers and different 
actors are linked together and how different types of value chains can 
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contribute to industrial upgrading for exporters in developing countries 
(Gereffi, 1999; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002; Humphrey, 2004). 
Therefore, based on the literature surveyed,  the FDI, learning by exporting 
and GVC approaches are helpful in analysing the channels which suppliers 
firms engaged in outsourcing may benefit in terms of transmission of 
knowledge such as technology transfer, training, and organizational 
techniques (see Figure  2.1).  
 
Figure  2.1 Theoretical Approaches to analyse the benefits of outsourcing to 
suppliers in developing countries. 
Source: Author 
The FDI literature provides an explanation of the spill-over effects of FDI on 
developing country firms (Blomström and Kokko, 1996; Haskel, Pereira and 
Slaughter, 2002). However, it fails to explain the effects of other entry modes 
or contractual relations as it only takes into account fully owned subsidiaries 
and equity joint ventures. 
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On the other hand, the GVC approach is a useful tool that helps us to 
understand how international linkages can play a key role to access 
knowledge and increase learning and innovation for firms in developing 
countries (Gerefi, 1999, Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000, 2002a and 2002b, 
Schmitz, 2005).  
 
2.7.1. The theory of FDI and Spill-overs 
 
The theory of FDI is one of the core concepts of the global development 
paradigm. Many academics and policy makers argue that FDI can be a source 
of valuable productivity externalities (Markusen, 1995; Caves, 1996; 
Blomtröm and Kokko, 1998; Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare, 2004).  In this sense, 
affiliates of MNCs may exert some influence on the economic welfare of their 
suppliers of raw materials and intermediate inputs in different ways. Firstly, 
by the quantity of goods and services they buy from them, second they can 
influence the terms of procurement; and finally they can have an impact on 
the technological capability, managerial initiative and organizational 
competence of suppliers (Dunning, 1993).  
Due to the availability of data, we specifically aim to identify if suppliers can 
benefit from technology transfer, increase training of human capital or 
improve organizational their techniques by engaging in outsourcing. 
The literature of the role of MNCs in international technology transfer, 
suggests that the most common channel for the diffusion of modern, 
advanced technology is the external effects or spill-overs from FDI, rather than 
formal technology agreements (Blomström ,1989). 
Spill-overs happen when local firms have access to superior knowledge of 
product or process technologies or markets from MNCs without incurring a 
cost. However, a linkage with a MNC does not always generate spill-overs, but 
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it may increase the probability that spill-overs exist (Blomström and 
Kokko,1998; Moran 2001).  
Host-country spill-overs from FDI can be captured by MNC subsidiaries, by 
other firms in the same industry as the MNC (horizontal spill-overs) and by 
downstream suppliers to the MNCs (vertical spill-overs) or by firms in 
upstream or other industries. 
Except for MNCs subsidiaries that have direct access to knowledge through 
their parent firm, the literature suggests that spill-overs may occur through 
the following channels (see Figure ‎2.2): 
Human capital spill-overs occur when MNCs hire and train both skilled and 
unskilled workers and when they leave the MNCs, skilled workers can use 
their knowledge to start a new firm or to work for domestic firms in the same 
industry. If their knowledge improves productivity in their new environment 
the spill-over has occurred. 
Demonstration effects happen when domestic firms adopt and produce 
technologies introduced by MNCs through imitation and or reverse 
engineering. They also occur when domestic firms adopt higher technical 
standards of MNCs such as ISO 9000, ISO 14000, QS 9000, etc.  
Competition effects, the entry of MNCs may exert price pressures on domestic 
firms, pushing them to adopt new technologies or to use existing technology 
more efficiently. 
Forward linkages stem from contact with customers  and MNCs. With the 
vertical disintegration of the production process, MNCs tend to focus on core 
activities and outsource many other non-core activities. Distributional and 
after-sales services are among the services most frequently transferred to 
independent firms. Outsourcing these activities involve lot of benefits for the 
MNCs, since they can rapidly cover more markets while minimizing the risks 
and investment of distributional channels. As MNCs want to keep the 
homogeneous and standards in their downstream activities, they often 
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provide comprehensive training for their distributors. Therefore, distributors 
in developing countries benefit from an extensive use of the brand, and 
training (Altenburg, 2000; Galagher and Zarsky, 2007). 
Backward linkages arise from the relationship between MNC affiliates with 
suppliers. They have traditionally been considered as the main instrument to 
promote technological spill-overs from MNCs. In fact, many developing 
countries have established domestic-content requirements on MNCs to 
trigger backward linkages and develop local supplier industries.  
 In an empirical study, Lall (1980) finds that MNCs can contribute to the 
increase supplier’s productivity and efficiency as they: help potential suppliers 
(both domestic and foreign) to set up production facilities; provide technical 
assistance or information to increase the quality of suppliers’ products; offer 
assistance in purchasing raw materials and intermediaries; provide training to 
suppliers; and help suppliers to diversify by finding more customers. Thus, 
backward linkages lead to the transfer of knowledge and technology to local 
suppliers and subcontractors (Giroud, 2003).  
However, spill-overs are not an automatic result of the linkages between 
MNCs and their suppliers as they depend among other things on the quantity 
and types of inputs supplied, the terms of procurement, and most importantly 
on the willingness of MNCs to transfer knowledge and build long term 
relationships with suppliers (Altenburg, 2000). 
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Figure  2.2 Spill-over channels 
 
Source: Author 
The following section presents the literature review of some empirical 
evidence on the spill-over effects from the activities of MNCs. It does not 
pretend to be an exhaustive review of the literature; instead we aim to 
present an overview of some of relevant studies related to spill-overs on the 
host country.  
 
2.7.2. A survey of evidence of the spill-over effects of FDI 
 
Empirical evidence is not conclusive and suggests both positive and negative 
effects of the existence of spill-overs of MNCs on local firms. We can identify 
two kinds of academic literature in developing and developed countries 
looking at the spill-over effects: industry-level studies using cross-section data 
and firm-level panel data studies (see Table  2.7). 
Most of the firm-level studies show positive correlation between foreign 
presence and the average value added per worker in the sector. These 
empirical econometric studies focus on productivity measures as a proxy 
measure for technology diffusion.  
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The first generation or cross-section studies generally find positive correlation 
between foreign presence and sectoral productivity. For instance, Blomström 
and Persson (1983) determine whether differences in technical efficiency of 
Mexican plants result from spill-over efficiency related to foreign investment.  
The authors find that labour productivity is positively influenced by foreign 
presence in an industry.  
In addition, Blomström and Wolf (1994), look at the productivity spill-overs 
between domestic and foreign firms in Mexico in 1970 and 1975. Their results 
suggest that an increase in the share of multinationals in an industry increases 
the total productivity level of the whole industry. This might be simply the 
effect of greater presence of MNCs as they have higher productivity than local 
firms. 
Sjöholm (1999) analyses the effect of FDI on productivity using micro-data 
from the Indonesian Manufacturing sector in 1980 and 1991. Results show 
that spill-overs effects of FDI are positive in industries with high degree of 
competition and sectors with high-technology gaps.  
 However, because of most of these studies use cross-section data the 
disadvantage is that we cannot make inferences of the direction of causality. 
For instance, it is likely that the positive correlation can be associated with the 
fact that multinationals tend to concentrate in high-productive industries 
rather than by genuine productivity spill-overs. In addition, the presence of 
MNC in the host economy may force less productive firms to exit and MNCs 
may increase their market share and as a result the average productivity in 
the industry will increase. 
The second type of studies looking at the spill-overs of FDI on local firms use 
firm-level panel data. These studies analyse whether the productivity of 
domestic firms is correlated with the extent of foreign presence in the sector 
(Hadad and Harrison, 1993; Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Djankov and 
Hoekman, 2000). These studies cast doubt on the existence of spill-overs of 
FDI in developing countries as they find negative horizontal spill-overs.  
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Hadadd and Harrison (1993) examined whether differences in technology gap 
between locally-owned firms and foreign plants have an impact on spill-overs 
in Morocco. The authors find that higher levels of foreign investment are not 
associated with high productivity levels among domestic firms.  
Similarly, Aitken and Harrison (1999) provide another test of the spill-over 
hypothesis and analyse a panel of more than 4,000 plants from 1976-1984 in 
Venezuela. The authors find that foreign ownership is negatively correlated to 
productivity of domestic plants.  
Djankov and Hoekman (2000), analyse firm-level data in the Czech Republic 
from 1992-1996 and conclude that FDI has a positive effect on recipients 
firms’ total factor productivity growth. However, the positive effect is only for 
affiliates of MNCs and not for joint ventures and firms that do not have any 
foreign partnership. 
Lopez-Cordoba (2003) uses a panel of Mexican plants from 1993-1999 to 
estimate the impact of NAFTA on total factor productivity. The author finds 
that FDI, increased import competition and more access to the US market has 
a positive impact on TFP. However, intra-industry spill-overs are negative. 
Empirical evidence for industrialized economies tends to be more positive. For 
instance, Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter (2007), use a plant-level panel data 
for the UK manufacturing industries from 1973 to 1992 and find that FDI is 
positively correlated to TFP growth of UK plants. The authors note that there 
can be little doubt that local firms in the United Kingdom have enough 
absorptive capacity to benefit from the introduction of newer technologies by 
multinationals, so if spill-overs do not occur, they can not be attributed to the 
limitations of domestic firms. Finally the authors make some interesting 
predictions suggesting that a 10 percent-point increase in foreign presence in 
a UK industry raises the TFP of that industry’s domestic plants by nearly 5 
percent. 
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As we can observe from previous empirical evidence, there are both positive 
and negative impacts of FDI of on the domestic economy. The likelihood of 
positive effects on the domestic economy depends on specific elements such 
as: the size of the technological gap between MNCs and the economic 
activities in the host country, the nature of competition in the industry, the 
geographical proximity between MNCs and local firms, market size, the 
absorptive capacity of the domestic firms, the local content regulations 
(Blomströng and Kokko, 1998; Navarretti and Venables, 2004; Hoekman, 
Maskus and Saggi, 2005). For this reason it is difficult to identify generalized 
positive effects on domestic activities. 
Javorcik (2004), criticized previous authors who found negative spill-over 
effects and argued that they might have been looking at the wrong place as 
spill-overs of FDI are more likely to be vertical than horizontal (eg. backward 
linkages through contracts between domestic suppliers of intermediate inputs 
and MNCs). The author stresses that in these studies it is not possible to 
distinguish between indigenous and foreign owned suppliers, with follow-
source suppliers because data sets do not include such information. For this 
reason, vertical linkages have received more attention in the recent academic 
literature, with increasing number of studies analysing the spill-overs 
generated through vertical linkages (Javorcik, 2004; Ivarsson and Alvstam, 
2005; Giroud, 2007). 
Javorcik (2004), examined backward linkages and technology spill-overs using 
data from Lithuanian manufacturing firms from 1996 to 2000. The results 
show that productivity is positively affected by a sector’s contracts with 
multinational customers but not by the presence of MNCs in the same 
industries. Thus, her results support the existence of vertical spill-overs from 
FDI. 
On the other hand, qualitative studies have also been conducted using semi-
structured questionnaires to analyse the vertical linkages of MNCs on 
domestic supplier firms in different developing countries. Ivarsson and Alvtam 
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(2005), use firm-level data from the heavy truck and bus plants of AB Volvo in 
Brazil, China, India and Mexico to analyse the extent in which domestic 
suppliers are able to compete with international follow-source suppliers and 
improve their operations through technological assistance from their 
transnational corporations buyers. The authors conclude that a significant 
proportion of the domestic suppliers, with the exception of Mexico have been 
provided with technological assistance by Volvo as part of the business 
relationships. In the case of Mexico, the relatively low level of technological 
upgrading can be explained by two reasons. Firstly, the short period that 
Volvo was operating in Mexico by the time the research was conducted. 
Secondly, Volvo was established in 1998 in Mexico through 100 percent 
acquisition of the country’s largest bus and truck producer (MASA). The main 
product consisted of an upgraded version of a former MASA model, in which 
domestic suppliers hold cost and skill advantages. Therefore, Volvo continued 
using around 80 percent of the previous MASA suppliers and the managers 
even indicated that due to the long experience of the suppliers it was rather 
domestic suppliers who transfer technological competence to Volvo.  
Similarly, Giroud (2007), looks at the vertical linkages of MNCs operating in 
either the electronics/electrical sector or in the textiles and garment s ectors 
in Vietnam and Malaysia. Results show that locally-owned suppliers in 
Vietnam did not benefit from foreign firms’ superior technology and 
managerial expertise, to the same degree as Malaysian firms. One of the 
explanations the author provides is that foreign firms recently entered to 
Vietnam and have not fully developed their network of local suppliers . 
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Table  2.7 Evidence on the Spill-overs from FDI on host economies 
Authors  Sample Main Results Issues 
Cross-section 
Cross sectional 
data  do not 
control  for time 
invariant 
di fferences in 
productivi ty 
across sectors, 
which might be 
correlated with, 
but not caused by, 
foreign presence. 
Blomström and 
Persson,  
(1983) 
Mexico 
1973 
 Labour productivi ty is posi tively 
correlated by foreign presence in an 
industry. 
Blomström and 
Wolff, (1994) 
Mexico  
1970 
 Higher foreign shares are associated 
with positive spill-overs . 
Sjöholm 
(1999) 
Indonesia 
1980, 1991 
 FDI has positive spill-over effects on 
productivi ty of domestic plants . 
Posi tive spill-overs to local  plants are 
higher in industries with high 
competi tion and possibly in industries  
with high technology gaps. 
Panel Data  
Haddad and 
Harrison 
(1994) 
Morocco 
1985-1989 
 There is not significant evidence that 
foreign presence has an impact on 
productivi ty growth of domestic fi rms 
in the sector. 
Fixed-effects 
es timation does 
not deal with the 
simultanei ty 
biased that result 
from the 
dependence of 
factor inputs  on 
productivi ty levels 
and exi t decisions . 
Ai tken and 
Harrison 
(1999) 
Venezuela 
1976-1989 
 
 Foreign ownership has a  posi tive 
relationship with plant productivi ty 
but only in small enterprises. 
 Productivi ty in domestically owned 
plant decreases when foreign 
investment rises. 
 Overall  the net effect of foreign 
ownership on the economy is small. 
Djankov and 
Hoekman  
(2000) 
Czech 
Republic 
1992-1996 
 Posi tive spill-overs of FDI on local 
fi rms’ productivi ty. But there is a  
negative effect of FDI on joint 
ventures  and on fi rms  that do not 
have foreign ownership. 
Lopez-Cordoba 
(2003) 
 
Mexico 
1993-2000 
 FDI has a  posi tive impact on TFP, 
however there are negative intra -
industry spill-overs . 
Javorcik 
(2004) 
Li thuania 
 Posi tive spill-overs of FDI on 
productivi ty taking place through 
contract between foreign affiliates and 
their local suppliers in upstream 
sectors . 
Source: Alfaro and Rodriguez Clare, 2004, pp. 118-119. 
Finally, recent changes in MNCs strategies9 have reduced the opportunities 
for many suppliers in developing countries to improve their technological 
competence through local linkages with foreign affiliates and even to 
participate in GVC (UNCTAD, 1999, 2001; Humphrey, 2000; Humphrey and 
Salerno, 2000; Humphrey and Memedovic, 2003; Ivarsson and Alvstam, 2005). 
As a result, domestic suppliers face a tougher competition from follow-source 
suppliers. Ivarsson and Alvtam (2005), found that almost all international TNC 
                                                 
9
 For instance some automobile producers prefer to use the same suppliers in different 
countries (follow-sourcing).  
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suppliers are also follow source suppliers in Brazil and India, while non-follow 
source suppliers have taken small shares of local purchases in Mexico and 
China respectively. Although we can not generalize their results, we have to 
keep in mind that follow-source suppliers hamper the opportunities of 
domestic suppliers in first instance to engage in outsourcing agreements and 
also to gain technology and knowledge from the lead firm.  
 
2.7.3.  Global Value Chains  
 
 
Drawing on GVC10 literature this section tries to identify the key concepts and 
channels that help us to understand how suppliers in the developing world 
engaged in outsourcing can upgrade their technology and organizational 
practices, as Schmitz (2005) pointed out: 
“Enterprises are not exporting into an anonymous global 
market; often they feed into supply chains that are governed by 
powerful global actors. Value chain analysis demonstrates that 
the relationships with these global actors exert a major 
influence on upgrading and earning opportunities of local 
enterprises, (pag.3-4)” 
 In this sense, this approach is useful as it analyses the alliances and 
interactions between lead firms (buyers) at one end of the chain and suppliers 
at the different levels of the value chain. These alliances create different kinds 
of “governance” structures within the value chain, and upgrading is possible 
according to the governance structure.  Governance is defined as the non-
market coordination of economic activity and reflects the balance of power 
                                                 
10
 The GVC framework was developed by researchers at the Institute of Development Studies 
(Sussex). One of the main concerns of the GVC analysis is to investigate the governance 
structures in different global industries. It also attempts to understand the varying 
governance structures both within, and between different sectors in terms of varying 
knowledge characteristics. 
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between buyers and suppliers (Schmitz, 1999; Humphrey, 2000; Gereffi, 2001; 
Kaplinsky and Sturgeon, 2001; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002b).  
Under the global value chain there is a lead firm that in most of the cases is 
established in a developed country and comprises not only multinational firms 
but also large retailers, and brand-name firms. These firms play an important 
role organizing the production chain and deciding what is to be produced, 
how and by whom (Gereffi, et. al, 2001). The main question underlying GVC’s 
literature is how participation in value chains can facilitate upgrading for 
developing country firms.  
Upgrading is one of the main concepts in the GVC approach and refers to the 
process in which local producers have the opportunity to learn and improve 
the product or the process from global leaders of the chain that may be 
buyers or producers. Four types of upgrading are distinguished in the 
literature:  
Process upgrading: firms can increase the efficiency of internal processes by 
re-organizing the production system or introducing more modern technology 
to attain consistent and high quality, and increase the speed of response (e.g. 
footwear producers in the Sinos Valley: Schmitz, 1999). 
Product upgrading: occurs when firms move into more sophisticated products 
or introduce new products. For instance, Dolan and Humphrey (2000) argue 
that in the fresh vegetable sector, supermarkets drive product upgrading by 
introducing more sophisticated processing and packing, as well as completely 
new product lines. 
Functional upgrading: is increasing value added in the chain by introducing 
superior functions, such as design or marketing or abandoning existing low-
value added functions to focus on higher value added activities (e.g. Torreon’s 
blue jeans industry upgrading from maquila to “full-package” manufacturing: 
Bair and Gereffi, 2001). 
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Intersectoral upgrading:  by applying the know-how acquired in a specific 
function to move into a new sector. For example, in Taiwanese firms use their 
competence in producing TVs to make monitors and therefore move into the 
computer sector (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002b).  
Humphrey, 2004 distinguishes four stages of the upgrading trajectory that has 
been drawn from the successful experience of East Asia (see Figure  2.3). 
According to the author, the upgrading trajectory is seen as a process in which 
firms acquire capabilities and once they have reached a certain level, the firms 
are able to find foreign buyers wishing to buy products embedding these 
capabilities.   
Figure  2.3 Upgrading Trajectory 
 
Source: Adapted from Kaplinsky and Morris  2002, p. 40; and Humprey 2004, p. 8. 
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Although the analysis of GVC mainly focuses on case studies based in specific 
industries (e.g. garments, leather, and footwear) and countries; it has offered 
a deep perspective to understand the interrelations between suppliers and 
buyers within the value chain. These interactions are very important, because 
they play a key role in determining the level of upgrading to domestic 
suppliers. The GVC literature identifies a whole range of relationships 
between local producers and global lead firms in the value chain spanning 
from arm’s length to hierarchy (see Table ‎2.8) 
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Table  2.8 Firm relationships in GVC 
1.  Arm’s length or market: in this relationship the buyer and supplier do 
not need to develop a close relationship because the product is 
standardized, or is ordered on a made-to-order on the basis of 
predefined options, or the buyer provides the drawings. In this case, 
the supplier has the capacity to produce the product ordered by the 
buyer implying that the supplier will meet the requirements 
established such as quality, reliability, time of delivery, etc. The export 
of primary commodities like coffee and steel is an example of 
relationship. 
2. Networks: firms co-operate in a closer information intensive 
relationship, and divide the essential value chain competences 
between them. In this type of relationship, the buyer may specify 
certain process standards to be reached, and the supplier must be 
confident enough to work out how to meet them.  
3. Quasi-hierarchical relationships: occurs when the two parties are not 
joined by ownership, but engage in a long-term relationship. One firm 
exerts a high degree of control over the firms in the chain “governor”, 
in most of the cases this firm specifies the characteristics of the 
product to be produced, and sometimes it can even indicate the 
process to be followed and the control mechanisms to enforce them. 
The governor sometimes helps producers to meet the standards and 
audits the performance of producers.  
4. Hierarchy: the lead firm or buyer takes direct ownership of developing 
country operations of the chain.  
Source: Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002a; UNIDO 2004; Schmitz, 2005. 
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As it was mentioned above, the upgrading prospects of the local suppliers 
differ according to the type of value chain they feed into.  This implies that 
different forms of chain governance have different upgrading impacts 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002a).  
In a systematic and comparative study to determine the implications for 
developing country producers, Humphrey and Schmitz (2000), conclude that: 
 The participation in a quasi-hierarchical chain offers more favourable 
conditions for fast process and product upgrading but hampers 
functional upgrading. 
 Chains characterized by market-based relationships, process and 
product upgrading tend to be slower (not encouraged by global 
buyers), but there are greater chances for functional upgrading.  
 Finally, chains characterized by even networks offer the ideal 
conditions for upgrading; they are less likely for developing country 
producers because of the high level of competences required.  
A rather different classification of governance is proposed by Gereffi (1994) 
under the context of Global Commodity Chains11 (GCC). The author identifies 
two types of governance structures: producer-driven and buyer-driven chains.  
  
                                                 
11
 The Global Commodity Chain (GCC) framework was proposed by Gereffi  in 1994. Like the 
GVC approach, the GCC framework tries to understand how global industries are organized 
identifying the full  list of actors that are involved in the production and distribution of a 
particular good or service. It tries to map the different kinds of relationships that exist 
between the different actors involved in the chain. However, the GCC approach does not 
differentiate between different network forms, and fails to capture the diversity of i nter-firm 
relationships that exist. It is also unable to model how the possibilities for coordination 
between links in the chain are affected by dynamic processes of technological change and 
learning at the firm and industry level (Bair, 2009). Therefore, the GVC approach tries to 
overcome these limitations by delineating the varying governance structures both within, and 
between different sectors in terms of varying knowledge characteristics (Coe, Dicken and 
Hess, 2008). 
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Producer-driven chains are characterized by vertical integration and refer to 
those industries in which TNCs or large integrated industrial enterprises play 
the central role in controlling the production system (including its backward 
and forward linkages). They are more prevalent in capital and technology-
intensive industries such as automobiles, aircraft, electrical machinery, 
software, etc.  
Whereas buyer-driven chains highlight the global sourcing networks 
established by retailers, brand-name merchandisers and marketers and rely a 
lot on sophisticated logistics and performance trust between numerous 
contractors. Buyer-driven chains dominate in relatively low-labour intensive 
activities (e.g. garments and footwear, toys, consumer electronics, etc.) and 
production is generally carried out by independent Third World factories that 
make finished goods rather than components or parts  under OEM 
agreements. The specifications and designs are provided by the buyers and 
the supplier firms have to meet all the requirements.  
 
2.7.4. Case Studies of Upgrading effects in GVC 
 
The previous section outlined the main concepts of the GVC literature, this 
section aims to examine some relevant empirical papers in the area in four 
key-sectors – textile and apparel, fresh fruit and vegetables, home-furnishing, 
and automotive and components sector. We have selected these sectors 
because producers in low-income countries are increasingly participating in 
GVC in these sectors, which are regulated predominantly by external global 
firms. One of the main shortcomings of the GVC approach is that it offers 
evidence of few countries and industries. Therefore, results cannot be 
generalized, but they are helpful to understand the governance between the 
different actors participating in the GVC and the channels for industrial 
upgrading.  
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A commonly sector analysed in the GVC literature corresponds to the apparel 
value chain. This GVC is governed by three types of lead firms: retailers12, 
marketers and brand manufacturers established in developed countries 
mainly the United States and European countries (United Kingdom, Germany, 
Spain, etc). In a study of the apparel value chain in the North American 
market, Gereffi and Memedovic (2003) distinguish two models of 
competition: the East Asian New Industrialized Economies (NIEs), Mexican and 
Caribbean basin model. Each model offers different opportunities and 
challenges for industrial innovation and learning. However, the East Asian 
NIEs13 countries are generally taken as the archetype for industrial upgrading 
in developing countries, since firms in these countries became full -range 
package14 suppliers for foreign buyers, and developed an innovative 
entrepreneurial capability. Hence, the East Asian NIEs economies turned from 
assemblers into Original Equipment Manufacturers and some firms are even 
pushing beyond the OEM to OBM by integrating their manufacturing expertise 
to design and sell their own branded goods. One of the key elements for their 
success is that they build up trust through successful business transactions 
with the United States’ buyers which enabled them to use their OEM 
expertise internationally via triangle manufacturing 15. The creation of these 
global sourcing networks helped East Asian NIEs countries to maintain their 
competitiveness and to go beyond OEM by shifting to higher-value upstream 
products (e.g. exports of textiles and fibres rather than apparel). 
In the case of Mexico and the Caribbean basin the authors point that 
production sharing is centred on the region’s low wages and proximity to the 
                                                 
12
 In the United States the five largest retailers are Wal-Mart, Sears, Kmart, Dayton Hudson 
Corporation and JC Penney which in 1995 concentrated 68 percent of all the apparel sales  in 
the country. In contrast, in the United Kingdom Marks & Spencer and the Burton Group 
controlled over the 25 percent of the market in 1994 (Gereffi  and Memedovic, 2003). 
13
 Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan Province of China, Republic ok Korea and China. 
14
 Full-package production changes the relationship between buyers and suppliers in a way 
that it is more beneficial for suppliers because it increases their bargaining power and 
learning potential for industrial upgrading. 
15Triangle manufacturing developed, because East Asian manufacturers became 
intermediaries between the United States’ buyers and apparel factories in Asia a nd other 
developing regions in order to take advantage of lower labour costs and quotas. 
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United States. In fact, most of the production is low value-added, which is a 
direct result of the establishment of the offshore assembly scheme (806/807). 
Under this scheme companies engaged in production sharing have the 
incentive to minimize locally sourced inputs, because only components made 
in the United States are exempt from import duties provided the finished 
product is shipped back to the US.  
For instance, Mexico introduced the Maquiladora programme and domestic 
suppliers have to use United States’ raw materials in order to gain duty-free 
access to the United States’ market. A more detailed discussion of the 
Maquiladora programme is presented in Chapter 4.  
In addition, the Caribbean Basin model has concentrated in the Export 
processing zones assembly using the 807/9802 trade-regime. Although 
countries of the Caribbean basin are expanding their position in the United 
States’ market, basically through large assembly plants linked to the 
production sharing operations of United States’ TNCs, these countries are 
losing ground to Mexican firms that can produce the same products at a 
cheaper price and with faster delivery times. Hence, countries in the 
Caribbean Basin have to develop new and stronger networks with United 
States’ retailers and marketers if they want to move up to full-package 
production. 
As we can observe, Mexico and the Caribbean basin countries are facing big 
challenges and different policies needs to be implemented if they want to 
compete with the East Asian NIEs. Probably, one of the main obstacles to 
increasing the integration between the export activity and the local economy 
has been the 806/807 scheme, since it has limited the benefits of production 
sharing as a stepping-stone to higher stages of industrialization. 
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Dolan and Tewai (2001) analyse the horticulture sector in Kenya and the 
textile/apparel sector in India. Both cases correspond to buyer-driven 
commodity chains where the product and quality standards  are set by the 
buyers and retailers who also keep control of the brands, retail and 
distribution. The authors find that the governance structure of these two 
value-chains offers opportunities for learning and skill acquisition for the 
producers who participate in the chain. For instance, the close interaction 
with the buyers has allowed the firms to improve their quality, reliability and 
innovation. In fact, the imposition of food, safety and environmental 
standards, have promoted product, process and functional upgrading allowing 
suppliers in developing countries to reposition themselves in global markets. 
However, these opportunities do not involve firms outside the chain. This can 
be a major problem for other small firms who do not have the competences 
and knowledge to meet the requirements of the global buyers.  
Fromm (2007), reaches the same conclusion in a study of 102 small producers 
participating in agro-food chains in Honduras. The author finds that producers 
not complying with the standards are excluded from participating in GVCs. 
However, those firms fulfilling the requirements set by the buyers have 
implemented product and process upgrading activities and a small number of 
them have undergone functional upgrading.  
The conclusions drawn by Fromm (2007); and Dolan and Tewai (2001), enrich 
the arguments on the debate of “winners and losers of globalisation”, which is 
one of the main concerns in developing countries where there were high 
expectations to take advantage of GVC as a channel for local upgrading and 
industrialisation. But as we can see SME have been excluded. This concern has 
recently been raised by the UNCTAD and in 2010 it published a report in 
which analyses how to integrate developing countries SME’s into GVC . The 
results aim to draw some policy recommendations to enhance the role of 
SME’s in GVC. The study includes three economic sectors: software, 
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automotive components sector16 and the cinema and audiovisual sector. We 
present only results of the automotive components sector as the analysis 
focuses on one case study of Mexico. 
In the automotive component sector, the report argues that over the last 
decade TNC car manufacturers have adopted a policy to significantly reduce 
their number of suppliers to increase their competitiveness. TNCs tend to rely 
more on global first-tier suppliers that organize the downstream activities of 
the value chain and that can supply OEM. In this sense, the study finds that in 
South Africa and Mexico many independent suppliers have not managed to 
either link with global sourcing partners or upgrade their own capabilities to 
reach OEM standards. Suppliers in both countries argued that their role in 
GVC was further limited by three factors: lack of appropriate skilled labour, 
lack of infrastructure (particularly roads and electricity), and lack of finance to 
upgrade to meet international standards. In Mexico, most of the second-tier 
and third-tier suppliers asserted that it was very hard to supply TNCs since in 
most of the cases they import inputs from abroad17, using little raw materials 
produced in the country.  
A rather more positive perspective of the upgrading effects of GVC is 
presented by Ivarsson and Alvstam (2010), who analysed the upgrading 
opportunities offered by IKEA to its suppliers in China and South East Asia  in 
2008. The authors show that IKEA, provides its suppliers in China and South 
                                                 
16
 For the case study of the automobile sector, UNCTAD interviewed suppliers of Toyota in 
South Africa and of Volkswagen in Mexico. 
17
 During my fieldwork in Mexico (Aguascalientes) I conducted a few interviews with first-tier 
and second-tier Nissan’s suppliers and I visited Nissan’s assembly plant. The results that I 
obtained from the interviews were similar to the ones of the UNCTAD. For instance, all  of the 
first-tier suppliers I interviewed, expressed that most of their raw materials were i mported 
(e.g. glass for the windshields  was imported from United States, steel and painting for the car 
came from Japan). The few raw materials acquired in Mexico have a very low technological 
content (eg. packing boxes, screws, etc.). In addition, in an interview with one of the Nissan’s 
managers, I asked the number of Mexican suppliers that they were working with. This person 
expressed that they were working only with one Mexica n supplier which supplied the 
uniforms for the factory workers. We can observe also a lack of linkages between Mexican 
firms and Nissan. In fact, one of the interesting points raised by one of the suppliers when I 
asked about the key factor to establish a supplier relationship with Nissan was that: “You have 
to be a Japanese company if you want to make business with Nissan”. 
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East Asia with significant technological support to improve their products and 
processes. Moreover, the authors suggest an additional governance structure 
called “developmental” which falls between market and hierarchy. In this 
structure, GVC are governed by large buyers whose outsourcing strategy is 
deliberately designed to promote technological upgrading among less capable 
suppliers. This also is more likely to occur when product specification for 
products can partly be codified, when the complexity of the business 
transaction is higher than the capability of the suppliers, and when the lead 
firm wishes to closely monitor the cost development, product quality, and 
production processes of the suppliers. However, the results of the upgrading 
effects to IKEA suppliers cannot be generalized as it is based in one case study. 
But it is interesting to note that the company has an approach to develop its 
suppliers. 
 
2.7.5.  Learning by Exporting 
“When local goods are exported the foreign purchasing agents 
may suggest ways to improve the manufacturing process 
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991, p. 166).”  
An extensive number of theoretical and empirical papers have attempted to 
understand the relationship between productivity growth and exporting 
(Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Bernard and Wagner, 1997; Clerides, Lach and 
Tybout, 1998; Wagner 2007 and Crespi, Greenaway and Kneller, 2007, 
Criscuolo and Haskel, 2008). These papers have centred attention to analyse: 
a) the relationship between productivity and exporting and the direction of 
the causality in this relationship; b) the self-selection argument which states 
that more productive firms tend to go into export markets; and c) the 
“learning by exporting” hypothesis arguing that exporting is a channel for 
firms and plants to increase productivity by exposing producers to new 
technologies.  In this sense, foreign customers will suggest ways to improve 
the manufacturing process product design, and the quality of the good.  
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The evidence is quite clear and shows in most of the cases that exporters have 
higher productivity, and very often a higher productivity growth than non-
exporting firms (see Table  2.9). These results are consistent even after 
controlling for firms’ specific observed characteristics like industry and size. It 
has also been found that exporters tend to be larger, more capital-intensive, 
and pay higher salaries than non-exporters, but this may be a cause and not a 
consequence of their participation in the export markets (Fernandes and 
Isgut, 2005). 
Many authors argue that the strong positive correlation between productivity 
and participation with the export markets reflects the self selection of better 
firms into export markets rather than the effect of exporting on productivity 
(Clerides, et al., 1998; Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Alvarez and Lopez, 2004).  
In this sense studies analysing the self selection hypothesis generally find that 
future export starters tend to be more productive than future non-exporters, 
years before they decide to export, and very often firms/plants have higher 
ex-ante productivity growth rates. In other words, the good firms move 
abroad. These results have been consistent in several empirical studies , eg. 
Aw and Hwang (1995) on Taiwanese data; Clerides et al. (1998) on data for 
Colombia, Morocco and Mexico; Bernard and Jensen (1999) on US data; 
Roberts and Tybout (1997) on a sample of Colombian enterprises; Bernard 
and Wagner (1997) on German data; Girma et al. (2005) on UK firms, Damijan 
et al. (2004) on Slovenian data; and Alvarez and Lopez (2005) on data for 
Chilean plants. 
In contrast, evidence regarding the post-entry mechanisms such as learning-
by-exporting hypothesis is more mixed. Wagner (2007) provides a review of 
54 empirical studies covering 34 countries and finds that exporters are more 
productive than non-exporters, and that more efficient firms self-select into 
exports markets. But in the case of the learning-by-exporting hypothesis the 
author finds that post-entry differences in the performance between export-
starters and non-exporters are usually not statistically significant; suggesting 
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that exporting does not necessary promote learning. This is particularly 
evident in developed countries18 where firms are already on the technological 
frontier, using advanced technology and operate in an efficient context.  
Therefore, the learning effect is hard to take place in such environment. While 
in developing countries the scope for learning through exports is greater. For 
instance, developing country firms can take advantage of export activity 
through technology transfers and contracts with more efficient firms, 
especially if they export to a developed or more competitive market. Recent 
research by, Blalock and Gertler (2004) for Indonesia; Fernandes and Isgut 
(2005) for Colombia; Van Biesebroek (2006) for Cote d’Ivorie; De Loeker 
(2007) for Slovenia have found evidence that an increase in productivity is 
related to firms’ exposure to exporting.  
  
                                                 
18
 However, this is not always true as Seri and Tomasi (2008) have more recently found 
evidence of learning-by exporting in Italy. Although Italy is a developed country, its productive 
system is less competitive than other European countries which are its trade partners. This 
opens the opportunity for more positive effects resulting from exporting. 
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Table  2.9 Selective Review or Learning-by-Exporting (LBE) studies using 
plant-level data 
Authors Sample Main Results 
Evidence 
LBE 
Clerides, Lach and 
Tybout 
(1998) 
Colombia 
(1981-1991) 
 Labour productivity is higher for 
exporting firms than for non-
exporters 
 Labour productivity is higher for 
export starters than for other groups 
of firms 
 Productivity improves after firms 
start to export 
No 
Some for 
Morocco 
Bernard and Jensen 
(1999) 
United States  
1984-1992 
 More efficient firms become 
exporters 
 Firms that become exporters grow 
faster 
 Exporters are 12%-19% more 
productive 
 Exporters pay higher wages 
 Exporting plants increase their 
probability of survival 
No 
Aw, Chung and 
Roberts 
(2000) 
Taiwan  
(1981, 1986, 1991) 
and  
Korea 
(1983, 1988, 1993) 
 
 Total factor productivity is higher for 
exporters than for non-exporters in 
both countries. 
Some 
(Taiwan) 
Baldwin and Gu  
(2003) 
Canada 
1974-1996 
 Labour productivity is higher for 
exporters than for non-exporters and 
this difference increases over time 
Yes 
Blalock and Gertler 
(2004) 
Indonesia 
(1990-1996) 
 Firms that become exporters 
experience a jump in productivity of 
about 2% to5% 
Yes 
Alvarez and Lopez 
(2004) 
Chile 
(1990-1996) 
 Firm that enter into the export 
markets have higher labour 
productivity and total factor 
productivity than non-exporters.  
No 
Fernandes and Isgut 
(2005) 
Colombia 
(1981-1991) 
 Total factor productivity increases 
4%- 5% for each additional year a 
plant has exported. 
 There is strong evidence of learning 
by exporting, particularly in a) plants 
producing in industries that deliver a 
large percentage of their exports to 
high-income countries and b) in 
plants with larger volume of exports. 
Yes 
Damijan and Kostevc 
(2006) Slovenia 
(1994-2002) 
 Perceived learning effects may only a 
result of increased capacity 
utilization brought by the opening of 
an additional market. 
No 
De Loeker 
(2007) 
Slovenia 
(1994-2000) 
 Export entrants become more 
efficient only after they start 
exporting 
 The productivity is higher for firms 
exporting their products to high 
income regions. 
Yes 
Source: Fernandes and Isgut, 2005; Wagner, 2007; and Martins and Yang, 2009. 
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We are particularly interested in the third hypothesis, as in our sample many 
of the supplier firms involved in outsourcing are exporters. For this reason, we 
suspect that exporting may be another channel for domestic suppliers to gain 
knowledge and technology transfer from the lead firms. For instance, supplier 
firms participating in international markets are exposed to more intense 
competition leading them to improve faster than supplier firms who sell their 
products exclusively in the domestic market.  
 
2.8. Conclusions 
 
The chapter aimed to present relevant theories that help us to construct a 
framework to analyse outsourcing from the perspective of the supplier firm.  
Particularly we wanted to answer these questions: how to measure 
outsourcing?; what are the characteristics  of the supplier firms involved in 
outsourcing?; and which theories help us to understand likely benefits for the 
supplier firms involved in outsourcing?. As opposed to most of the available 
literature on the topic, we tried to address these issues from the perspective 
of the supplier rather than from the lead firm.  
Before reviewing the literature to answer these questions, we presented the 
concepts of outsourcing, off-shoring and subcontracting. Moreover, we 
proposed the concept of outsourcing based on the concepts reviewed and in 
our data available for the empirical analysis. 
Then we presented a theoretical conceptualization of outsourcing from a 
developing country perspective. This conceptualization was proposed by 
(Taimaz and Kiliςaslan 2005), who suggest three theoretical approaches 
(dualistic approach, developmental approach and the networks/clusters 
approach) to understand the main drivers of outsourcing from the perspective 
of the supplier. We then proposed a fourth conceptualization, based on 
Coase’s theory of transaction costs. 
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Regarding our first question on the measurements of outsourcing, we found 
out that outsourcing has been hard to measure. The first attempts to measure 
the phenomenon used macro-data (trade data), but trade data can lead us to 
misleading results because it fails to differentiate between assembled goods 
and components. To overcome this problem, more recent studies use micro 
data at the firm level which seems to give more accurate results. In this thesis, 
therefore firm level data will be used to analyse the Mexican case. 
In the case of our second question, we reviewed papers related to the 
characteristics of both lead firms and supplier firms engaged in outsourcing. 
Evidence in different developed countries suggest that lead firms involved in 
outsourcing are larger, more productive, invest more in research and 
development, are exporters and labour costs are higher. For this reason they 
tend to outsource to reduce production costs. On the suppliers’ side, evidence 
in the Turkish textile industry suggests firms are smaller and subcontracting 
relations entail unequal power relations as suggested by the dualistic 
approach. 
Finally, to analyse the likely benefits of outsourcing to supplier firms, we 
propose that the theories of FDI, GVC and Learning by exporting as the 
frameworks that can provide elements to analyse the channels through which 
suppliers can gain technology transfer, training and organisational techniques. 
In the case of spill-overs of MNC to local firms, the evidence shows mixed 
results suggesting both positive and negative effects. In fact empirical, 
evidence for industrialized economies tends to be   more positive. For 
developing countries, the likelihood of positive effects depends on specific 
elements such as the size of the technological gap between the MNCs and 
local firms, market size, the absorptive capacity of the domestic firms and the 
local content regulations. Moreover, recent changes in the strategies of MNCs 
have also reduced the opportunities for many suppliers, as they face tougher 
competition from follow-source suppliers.  
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In addition, the theory of GVC helps us to understand the upgrading trajectory 
of supplier firms involved in outsourcing and the governance structures that 
are key determinants. One of the concerns is that SMEs can be left outside of 
participating on value chains because they lack skilled labour, infrastructure 
and monetary resources to meet international standards.  
As many of the supplier firms involved in outsourcing in Mexico are exporters, 
we decided to include the learning by exporting theory to see if it can 
contribute to the understandings of the likely benefits of engaging in 
outsourcing. Evidence is clear and suggests that exporters have higher 
productivity, are larger, more capital-intensive, and pay higher salaries than 
non-exporting firms. However, this might reflect the self selection of better 
firms into export markets rather than the effect on productivity.  
To conclude, from the literature reviewed we cannot assume that by engaging 
in outsourcing suppliers in developing countries will automatically upgrade 
their technology and skills.  The spill-overs or upgrading effects depend upon 
the decisions of the lead firms or the governance structure of the value chain.   
So, it will be interesting to see in the case of Mexico what are the 
characteristics of the firms involved in outsourcing, and to analyse whether 
these firms are benefiting in terms of technology and knowledge  transfer. 
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Chapter 3 Off-shoring and Outsourcing 
in the Global Economy 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
 
The globalisation process has encompassed a disintegration of the production 
process across the world. A well known and classical example to illustrate the 
fragmentation of the production process also known as outsourcing is the 
production of the Barbie doll described by Tempest, (1996).  
The Barbie doll is one of the most profitable and global toys in history and 
sells at a rate of two per second and this product alone accounted for $1.4 
billion in sales for Mattel in1995. Its biggest market is in the United States, but 
it can also be found in 140 countries around the world. Paradoxically, this toy 
has never been produced in the United States. The first doll was produced in 
Japan in 1959, when the country was recovering from the Second World War 
and Japanese wages were low. As wages increased in Japan, the production of 
the doll moved to low-wage countries in Asia.  
Barbie is designed in the United States, but the body and wardrobe are 
produced in several countries. The raw materials for the doll (plastic and hair) 
are obtained from Taiwan and Japan. Assembly used to be done in those 
countries, as well as in the Philippines, but due to higher labour costs it has 
now migrated to Indonesia, Malaysia, and China. The moulds for the doll 
come from the United States, as well as the additional paints used in 
decorating. Other than labour, China supplies only the cotton cloth used for 
dresses. Of the $2 export value for the dolls when they leave Hong Kong for 
the United States, about 35 cents covers Chinese labour, 65 cents covers the 
cost of materials, and the remainder covers transportation and overhead, 
including profits earned in Hong Kong. The dolls sell for about $10 in the 
United States, of which Mattel earns at least $1, and the rest covers 
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transportation, marketing, wholesaling and retailing in the U.S. The majority 
of value-added is therefore from U.S. activity.  
Hence, the production of this simple product captures the complexity of the 
world production process. This chapter aims to provide an overview of the 
phenomenon including the origins, driving forces, its significance in the world 
economy. 
  
3.2.  Origins of Off-shoring and Outsourcing 
 
International outsourcing is not a new phenomenon; its origins go back to the 
beginning of the industrial revolution or even before it (Arndt and 
Kierzkowski, 2001). However, during the last decades it has come to the 
attention of policy makers and academics who noticed that a considerable 
part of the production process is occurring internationally.  
In one of its earliest forms, this phenomenon was based on exploiting the 
relatively undifferentiated factor advantages of developing countries such as 
labour and natural resources (Hansen, et al. 2007). In other words, it was 
driven by comparative advantage and involved the production of primary 
commodities in developing countries that were exported for further 
processing to developed economies and finally shipped back (in part) as a 
processed good to the primary-commodity-producing country. For instance, 
iron ore was mined in Mauritania, shipped to Europe for processing into iron 
and steel and then some part of the final processed product was re-exported 
to Mauritania (Yeats, 2001). 
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 In the 1950s and 1960s, a different form of production sharing between 
developing and developed countries emerged. The MNCs started to explore 
different ways of splitting up their processes of production not just in the 
traditional manner of the division of labour on the shop floor, but in a 
geographical sense. Hence, “offshore sourcing” where the materials and 
components of a final product were assembled or processed not in one or 
different plants in the home country, but in several plants in different 
countries began to account for a significant proportion of MNC activity. The 
advantage in relocating production from a developed country to a developing 
country for the MNC was the significant reduction of labour costs, whereas for 
developing countries the advantage relies in the creation of jobs. 
The US MNCs played a key role in an attempt to remain competitive in 
relation to Western Europe and Japan. As an example, some American 
clothing firms started to outsource their production to Colombia, since it 
offered abundant cheap labour with sufficient skills, relative low costs of 
transportation, communications access and location in similar time zones, but 
because of the economic and political instability, American firms decided to 
substitute to sub-suppliers in East Asia (Jones, et al., 2005). At the same time, 
other Caribbean, Central and Latin American countries also started to 
participate into this production sharing scheme including Mexico, Haiti and 
Jamaica.  
A further element facilitating the development of international production 
sharing was the establishment of the US offshore assembly provision19 
(806/807) since September 1962, later renamed the 9802 provision of the 
Harmonized System Code (Jones, et al., 2005). The scheme allowed goods to 
be assembled abroad from U.S. and brought back into the U.S. with duty only 
on the value added, mainly the (cheap) labour and overhead costs (Sklair, 
                                                 
19
 The United States created the Offshore Assembly Programme (OAP) through the provision 
of the Tariff Act of 1930. The original idea of the programme was to make easy the 
manufacturing practices of U.S. steel firms, many of which have plants in Canada and engaged 
in extensive cross-border shipments of intermediate inputs. Over the years, the program has 
expanded to include other industries and other countries (Hanson, 1997). 
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1989; Feenstra, Hanson and Swenson, 2000).  The 806/807 provision has 
played a key role in U.S. multinationals’ offshore sourcing strategy for the 
domestic market. For example, semiconductors, valves, tuners and other 
components started to be assembled for international electronic firms in 
Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. Wearing apparel and leather 
goods were also assembled in the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and the 
Philippines for transnational firms. In addition, many other industries 
transferred the production of parts of the different stages of the production 
to developing countries including television and radio receivers, sewing 
machines, calculators and other office equipment, electrical machinery,  
power tools, machine tools and parts, typewriters, cameras, optical 
equipment 
For instance in 1969, six categories involving assembly work accounted for 
three-quarters of the total volume of US imports falling under 807 and 806.30 
scheme (see Table ‎3.1 ). 
 
Table  3.1 Total Volume of US Imports falling under remission of duty 807 
and 806.30 in 1969 
Category 
Share of the total Volume of 
Imports 
Semi-conductors 26.30% 
Television Sets 19.10% 
Electronic memory 
components 
10.20% 
Textiles 8.60% 
Office Machines 8.30% 
Toys and Dolls 5.90% 
Source: Michalet, 1980. 
The main countries where United States outsourced its production were (in 
order of decreasing importance): Mexico, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
South Korea, Jamaica, the Philippines and Haiti. In fact, Mexico alone supplied 
40% by value of imports covered by the special tariff rate (Michalet, 1980). 
As we can see from previous lines, the United States has exerted a significant 
role by triggering the fragmentation of the production process. However, if 
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we assert that it has been the only aspect, we will underestimate other 
elements that have also contributed to the growth of off-shoring and 
outsourcing. The following section presents the driving forces of off-shoring 
and outsourcing. 
  
3.3.  Driving Forces of Off-shoring and Outsourcing  
 
The increasing trend of outsourcing and off-shoring has been triggered by 
different factors such as more open economic policies including trade 
liberalisation in a large number of countries; technical advances in transport 
and communication and the difference in labour costs between developed 
and developing countries (OECD, 2007a).  
 
3.3.1. Liberalization Policy Reforms 
 
Liberalization policy reforms such as the reduction of barriers to trade and 
investment have been considered significant variables that explain the growth 
of outsourcing (Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001; Yeats, 2001; Ernst and Kim, 
2002; Athukorala, 2003; Yi, 2003). Such policies date back to the early 1970s 
as a response to the breakdown of fixed exchange rates and to cope with 
persistent stagflation. Since then, further measures to liberalize trade and 
investment have been undertaken (see Table  3.2).  
Probably the most significant reductions of trade barriers were implemented 
during the Uruguay Round. For instance, developed countries reduced tariffs 
on a trade-weighted average basis by about 40% on industrial products 
(excluding oil), bringing their average tariff levels down from 6.3% to 3.8%. By 
contrast, developing countries reduced their tariffs by 20% on average. This 
brought average tariffs rates down from 15.3% to 12.3% (Irwin, 2002).  
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Tariffs have reduced for both developed and developing countries. Probably 
the formation of the European Union (EU) and the North American free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) accounted for most of the tariff reductions among 
developed countries (WTO, 2008). 
 
Table  3.2 Evolution of the GATT/WTO international trade framework 
Round No. Countries Major outcomes 
Geneva Round 
(1947-8) 
23 Concessions of 43 tariff lines 
Annecy Round 
(1949) 
29 Modest tariff reductions 
Torquay Round 
(1950-51) 
32 8,700 tariff concessions 
Geneva Round 
(1950-51) 
33 Modest tariff reductions 
Dillon Round 
(1960-1961) 
39 
Tariff reductions following the formation of the 
European Economic Community (EEC).  
4,400 tariff concessions exchanged 
Kennedy Round 
1963-67) 
74 
Average tariff reduction of 35% by developed countries  
Some 30,000 tariff lines bound 
Agreement on antidumping and customs valuation 
Moves to incorporate preferential treatment for 
developing countries 
Tokyo Round 
(1973-79) 
99 
Average tariff reductions to one third by developed 
countries 
Codes of conduct established for interested GATT 
members on specific non-tariff measures 
Uruguay Round 
(1986-94) 
103 (1986) 
117 by end 
1993 
124 by early 
1995 
Average tariff reduction of one-third by developed 
countries 
Agriculture , textiles and clothing brought into GATT 
Creation of the WTO  
Agreements on services (GATS), intellectual property 
(TRIPs), trade related investment (TRIMs) 
Most Tokyo round codes improved 
Doha 
(2001- 
150 countries 
The objective of the round was to make trade fairer for 
developing countries. 
Although technical negotiations have look for specific 
formulas for reducing trade-distorting farm support 
and tariffs, high-level political discussions have yet to 
reached and produce a satisfactory compromise among 
WTO members for future agricultural trade 
liberalization. 
Source: Dicken, 2004 and Hanrahan and Schnepf, 2007 . 
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Table  3.3 reports simple and weighted tariffs on primary and manufacturing 
products, for selected countries during the last years. It illustrates that the 
reduction of tariffs has been more substantial in developing countries than in 
industrialized economies.  For instance, while the United States reduced its 
tariffs on a trade-weighted average basis from 4% in 1989 to 1.9% in 2008; 
China’s weighted average tariffs for manufacturing products decreased from 
35.6% to 5.8%; or India’s weighted average tariffs for manufacturing products 
reduced from 70.8% in 1990 to 5.9 in 2008.  
Table  3.3 Tariffs for selected countries 
 
Year 
Primary Products Manufacturing Products 
 Simple 
Mean Tariff 
Weighted 
Mean Tariff 
Simple 
Mean Tariff 
Weighted 
Mean Tariff 
Developed Countries 
United States 1989 2.5 2 5.5 4 
 2008  2.5 1 3.1 1.9 
Japan 1988 a 8.3 4.4 3.5 2.7 
 2008 4.9 1.2 2.3 1.6 
Canada 1989 a 4.2 2.6 10.5 6.6 
     2008 1.9 0.3 4.1 1.2 
Developing Countries 
Brazil 1989 31.5 18.6 44 37.1 
 2008   7.9 1.1 13.7 9.3 
Bangladesh 1989 79.8 53.6 109 109.9 
 2008 15.1 7.3 14.5 13.1 
China 1992 36.1 14.1 40.6 35.6 
 2008 8.8 2.4 8.7 5.8 
India 1990 69.8 34.1 79.9 70.8 
 2008       19.5 7.3 8.4 5.9 
Korea Rep. 1998 19.3 8.3 18.6 17 
 2008 20.7 11.6 6.6 4.8 
Philippines 1988 29.9 18.5 27.9 23.4 
 2008 6.0 5.2 4.8 2.7 
Thailand 1989 30 24.3 39 35 
 2008 13.5 2.1 10.4 5.8 
a/
 Simple and Weighted tariff rates are most favour nations. 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2005 & 2008. 
 
The reduction of barriers to trade and investment indisputably promote the 
growth of production sharing schemes or outsourcing. For instance, with 
trade liberalization a domestic firm may choose to purchase the intermediate 
good from a more efficient foreign producer rather than obtain it from the 
domestic market. Or it might invest to set up a plant in a developing country 
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either to produce some parts and components needed for the final good or to 
perform the assembly of one of the stages of the production process.  
Although in the theoretical literature economists argue that reductions of 
trade barriers are positively correlated with the growth of outsourcing, there 
is not substantial empirical evidence proving this correlation. Probably the 
lack of studies in the area is related to the fact that the bulk of the empirical 
evidence (Rose, 1991; Baier and Bergstrand, 1999) has been devoted to 
proving the impacts of tariffs on the growth of total trade rather than trade in 
parts and components.   
However, Yi, (2003) develops a non-linear model20 to assess the response of 
vertical specialization or outsourcing to changes in tariffs.  The empirical study 
comprises aggregate US trade for selected years between 1962 and 1997. The 
results show that over 50% of the trade expansion can be explained by 
increased vertical specialization brought about by tariff reductions. In fact, the 
author points out that tariff reductions even of modest magnitudes produce 
large non-linear increases of trade in a model with stages of production.  
In the case of investment, Hoon and Ho (2001) analysed the impact of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) on international fragmentation of production in 
Singapore. The results show that outsourcing is positively correlated to FDI. In 
other words, their results show that a 1% increase in FDI increases 
fragmentation by 0.58%.  
  
                                                 
20
 The non-linearity of the model is based in two facts. Firstly, tariff rates in the early 1960s 
have fallen by only about 11%, while trade growth during this period was larger. Secondly, 
tariff reductions prior to the mid 1980s were larger than after. However, trade growth was 
smaller in the earlier period than in the latest period.  
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3.3.2. Transport costs 
 
The physical dispersion of the different stages involved in the production 
process introduces certain costs, particularly those of communication and 
transportation. For this reason, along with the restrictive trade policies, 
spatial separation of production was traditionally bounded to local or national 
markets (Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001). The rapid developments and 
innovations in communication and transportation have reduced the costs and 
distance that once separated world’s nations, and improved the speed, 
efficiency and economy of coordinating geographically dispersed production 
processes (Athukorala, 2003).  
However, evidence suggests that transportation costs are estimated to be 
higher than tariffs. For instance, Anderson and Wincoop, (2004) suggest that 
in 2004 aggregate expenditure for shipping total imports was three times 
higher than aggregate tariff duties paid.  
Three main types of transportation are identified:  land transport; ocean 
transport; and air transport. Gathering data regarding the evolution of 
transportation costs is complicated due to the lack of data on direct measures 
of transport costs. But available data suggests that land is the cheapest mode 
of transport and most used mean of transport for countries sharing a border. 
For instance, in the European Union, it is estimated that 72 percent of trade 
volume is shipped through the road network (WTR, 2008). Hummels (2007), 
estimates that nearly 90 percent of trade between neighbouring countries 
and the United States occurs via land.  
Trade without a common border takes place mainly via the ocean, particularly 
ocean shipping is the main mode of transportation for bulk commodities like 
oil, petroleum, iron ore, coal and grain. 
Finally, air transport is the third type of transportation mode and the costs are 
measured in terms of revenue per-ton-kilometre. Evidence suggests that the 
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price has fallen by 92 percent between 1995 and 2004 and as a consequence 
the share of trade occurring via air has increased by 11.7 per cent per year 
from 1975 to 2004 (Hummels, 2007). 
Figure ‎3.1 presents figures of freight costs to the United States in 2010. The 
data was gathered from the Word Development Indicators (2010), and freight 
costs are measured using the DHL international U.S inbound worldwide 
priority express rate for 1 kilogram air package presented in the World 
Development Indicators (2010). We can observe that the costs for the main 
trade partners of the States are lower than for other countries. For instance, 
shipping a package of 1 kilogram by air from Mexico to the United States costs 
US 58.8 in 2010. 
Figure  3.1 Freight costs to the United States in 2010 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2010.  
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Trade costs can either reduce or increase trade of goods. The World Trade 
Report (2008) states that transport costs and tariffs penalize goods produced 
in several stages across different countries, because producers need to pay to 
move their goods at each of the stages of the production process. Hence, a 
decline in the transportation costs will be beneficial for producers engaged in 
outsourcing and off-shoring. 
Empirical evidence proving the correlation between outsourcing and costs of 
transportation and communication is reduced and limited to the analysis of 
trade in final goods. For instance, Baier and Bergstrand (2001), assess the 
impact of transport costs reductions on total world trade for a panel of 16 
OECD countries from 1958 to 1960 and from 1986 to 1988. In the model, the 
effect of transportation costs reductions on trade growth is captured by the 
changes in the gross CIF-FOB factors. Their results show an approximately 8-
9% of the growth of trade could be explained by transportation costs 
reductions. 
In addition, a recent study by Jones, Kierzkowski and Lurong (2005), tests the 
hypothesis that reductions of service links21 costs encourage the growth of 
international fragmentation of production (IFP). The data model comprises 
data from 1990 to 2000 and includes all world regions.  Business telephone 
charges are used as a proxy to service links. The results show that service link 
is negatively correlated to IFP. In other words, lower service links prices 
promote trade in general, and benefit particularly trade in parts and 
components. 
  
                                                 
21
 A service link is a combination of activities, such as transportation insurance, 
telecommunications, quality control, and management coordination which guarantee that 
the different stages of production interact properly. 
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3.3.3. Labour Costs 
 
One of the main elements that contributed to the early development of global 
production is labour costs or the significant gap in wage rates among 
developed and developing countries (Yeats, 2001). Wage differentials have 
acted as incentives for firms in developed countries to move unskilled labour 
intensive manufacturing processes to low wage countries.  Comparisons of 
manufacturing labour costs are published on a frequent basis by the U.S. 
Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) covering data of 25 OECD countries and six 
non-OECD economies (Brazil, Hong-Kong, China, Israel, Singapore, Sri Lanka, 
and Chinese Taipei). China and India were not included, but in recent 
publications estimates for both countries were included (BLS, 2010). Table ‎3.4 
illustrates average hourly compensation costs for production workers in the 
manufacturing sector from 1975 to 2008.  
In 1975 wages in Mexico were 77 percent below those in the U.S., whereas 
Hong Kong and Taiwan were 88 percent and 94 percent below respectively. 
By using these foreign labour sources, U.S. corporations not only enhanced 
their own profitability from domestic sales, but also increased their ability to 
compete in third markets due to lower overall production costs. According to 
a study by Mckinsey, (2003) every dollar spent on off-shoring to India leads to 
USD 1.12 – 1.14 in benefits back home in the U.S. The benefits can be in terms 
of lower consumer prices and lower costs for businesses. 
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Table 3.4 Average hourly compensation costs1/ for production workers in manufacturing, by selected regions and countries 
1975-2008, U.S. Dollars 
Region/country 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
Americas 
        
     United States 6.19 9.67 12.76 14.88 17.24 19.73 23.6 26.65 
     Brazil - - - - - 3.5 4.16 6.93 
     Canada 6.4 9.02 11.39 16.62 16.8 16.78 24.29 29.78 
     Mexico 2/ 1.43 2.16 1.55 1.54 1.43 2.16 2.65 3.12 
Europe  
        
     Czech  Republic - - - - 2.54 2.85 6.07 10.35 
     Germany - - - - 26.17 19.62 28.64 36.07 
     Ireland 4.21 7.71 7.43 14.49 16.83 15.35 27.77 35.79 
     Poland - - - - - 2.81 4.49 8.26 
     Portugal 1.7 2.21 1.64 4.01 5.73 4.85 7.76 9.83 
     Spain 2.47 5.75 4.55 11.1 12.47 10.46 17.56 23.67 
     United Kingdom 3.28 7.35 6.08 12.18 13.55 16.68 24.7 27.86 
Asia  
        
     China 3/ - - - - - 0.57 0.73 1.36 
     Hong Kong  4/ 0.75 1.5 1.73 3.22 4.81 5.45 5.65 5.91 
     Japan 2.95 5.43 6.24 12.52 23.34 21.69 21.31 23.15 
     Korea, Republic 
of 
0.33 0.98 1.26 3.8 7.55 8.54 13.2 14.2 
     India 5/ - - - - - 0.81 0.91 - 
     Philippines - - - - 0.89 0.69 0.83 1.31 
     Singapore 0.85 1.56 2.58 3.83 7.74 7.34 7.39 9.83 
     Sri Lanka 0.28 0.22 0.28 0.35 0.48 0.48 0.54 0.68 
     Taiwan 0.39 1.04 1.51 3.91 5.98 6.17 6.43 6.95 
1/ Hourly compensation costs include basic wages, overtime pay for holiday and night work, costs of living adjustments, bonuses,  vacation pay, commuting expenses, cash value of payments, in-kind severance pay, retirement and disability pensions, health insurance, income 
guarantee insurance, sick leave, life and accide nt insurance, occupational injury and illne ss compensation, unemployment insura nce, social insurance and taxes on payrolls or enrolments.  
2/ For Mexico, NAICS 31-33 excludes NAICS 324 Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing   3/ Due to data availability, 2000 data corresponds to 2002.  
4/ Due to data availability, 2000 data corresponds to 2003.        Dash means data not available. 
Source: US Department of Labour, Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2010 
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Table  3.4 and Figure  3.2 show labour costs over in 1975, 1985, 1995 and 2008. 
Labour costs range from USD 0.68 per hour in Sri Lanka, USD 0.91 in India, 
USD 1.36 in China and USD 3.12 in Mexico to over USD 49.54 in Norway. The 
most important OECD countries such as United States, Japan, Canada, France 
and the United Kingdom have hourly costs between USD 20 and USD 30 and 
hour. Switzerland and Germany have the highest level of hourly labour costs 
among major OECD countries in 2008, at over USD 35 an hour. Large wage 
differentials also exist within the OECD regions, for example between central 
and eastern European and Western European countries, and between Mexico 
and the United States.  
In 2008 we can observe that wage gaps of Taiwan and Hong Kong reduced 
with respect to those in the United States. However, in the case of Mexico the 
wage gap increased, and Mexico’s wages are 88 percent below those in the 
United States.  One of the main problems for Mexico over the last years has 
been the tough competition from China. Despite that Mexico’s wages are low 
compared to the Unites States, China’s hourly labour costs are 95 percent 
below those of the U.S.  
These figures should be treated with some caution since they are averages 
across the whole of manufacturing and are therefore affected by the specific 
industry mix. Some industries may have higher wage levels  than others (U.S. 
Department of labour, 2010). In addition, these numbers are averages and 
wages for high-skilled jobs in China for instance might be considerably closer 
in relative terms to those of the OECD countries (OECD, 2007a). 
Production sharing in Europe seems to be driven by similar economic 
incentives (e.g. wage differentials). To remain competitive in international 
markets, producers in high labour cost countries of Europe moved some of 
their more labour intensive production and assembly segments to 
neighbouring countries with cheaper labour costs. Aside from lower labour 
costs, factors such as labour skills, education, technical training, adequate 
transportation and financial infrastructure were also essential in determining 
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the magnitude and direction of outsourcing and off-shoring activities in 
Central Europe. Finally, European firms have also used offshore processing to 
have access to central Europe markets (Yeats, 2001). 
Thus, the first waves of offshore sourcing to developing countries were to a 
big extent focused on low value added activities related to mass production, 
while high value or capital intensive activities such as design, R&D or 
marketing remained in developed countries (Hansen, 2007). 
Recent trends report that firms in India are now also outsourcing higher-value 
added activities such as software development. Thus, not only labour 
intensive segments of the production process are outsourced but also more 
advance functions including business services, IT and even R & D are now 
being sourced (UNCTAD, 2004). 
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Figure  3.2 Geographical variations in hourly compensation costs in 
manufacturing 
 
Source: based of US Department of Labour Statistics 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ichcc.t08.htm 
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3.4. Significance of off-shoring in the global economy 
 
Although outsourcing has increased at a rapid pace and has shown a dynamic 
performance, it has been difficult to draw precise figures of its magnitude. 
One of the drawbacks to capture its significance is that outsourcing decisions 
are normally taken at micro-level of plant or firms, while official data is 
generally collected at the sectoral and national level. 
For instance, in the case of the firm level data most of the times firms are 
reluctant to provide details on their sourcing decisions (OECD, 2007a).  
Sectoral and national trade level data has also different problems since 
current statistical concepts do not allow separating or making a differentiation 
between import statistics and a firm’s decision to substitute a product or 
service produced in house by an imported product or service (WTO, 2005). 
Also, trade data does not differentiate between components and assembled 
products. Identification of trade in parts and components is crucial, since it 
reflects the items that are shipped from one country to another for further 
processing22 (Yeats, 2001; Jones et. al, 2005).   
Despite of the weaknesses of the data many studies have tried to measure the 
magnitude of the phenomenon at the global level using both trade data,   in 
intermediate goods (see Yeats, 2001, Lall et al. 2004, Jones et al. 2005) and  
input-output tables (Hummels, et al, 2001; and OECD 2007a and 2007b). This 
section presents data on the significance and evolution of the phenomenon 
based on previous empirical evidence (see Appendix 1 for a summary of the 
models on measurements of outsourcing). 
 
                                                 
22
 Revisions to the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC Rev. 2 and 3) have 
increased the  numbers of categories containing parts and components within individual 
product groups and now make to somewhat easy to identify trade in parts and components.  
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Figure  3.3 compares the growth of income and trade in parts and components 
from 1990 to 2000. During this period world GDP expanded yearly by 3.7%, 
while world trade increased at a faster rate, averaging 6.5% a year. By 
comparison, trade in parts and components increased 138%, shifting from 
$355 billion to $846 billion which represents an average rate of growth of 
9.1% per year (Jones, Kierzkowski and Lurong, 2005).   
 Figure  3.3 Global Income and Trade 1990-2000 
 
Source: Jones, Kierzkowski and Lurong (2005).                      
Notes:1990 is the base year. 
 
Looking at the regional trends of trade in parts and components Figure  3.4 
illustrates that EU 15 has been the most important actor as compared to East 
Asia and NAFTA. From 1990 to 2000 EU 15 extra-regional trade increased by 
an annual average rate of 8.8%, while intra-regional trade expanded at 5.2%. 
By comparison, East Asia intra-regional trade grew at 13.6% and 9.3% for the 
inter-regional trade. Finally, NAFTA’s intra-regional trade raised 11.5% on 
average per year and inter-regional trade surged 7.6%. These trends suggest 
that although trade in parts and components is greater in the EU 15, East 
Asia’s trade in parts and components has grown at a faster pace. In fact, if this 
trend continues it is more likely that East Asia takes the leading role.  
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Figure  3.4 Trade in parts and components by regions (Millions of US Dollars) 
 
Source: Jones, Kierzkowski and Lurong, 2005.                 
Notes: East Asia includes the following countries: Japan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia. Hong Kong , Indonesia, Lao 
P.D. Rep., Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, Taiwan, China, Thailand and Vietnam. 
 
Trade in parts and components can give us an idea of the extent of the 
phenomenon, but as previously discussed there are problems and limitations. 
A recent study by the OECD (2007b), presents a calculation of indices of 
foreign outsourcing using input-ouput23 tables and trade in parts and 
components.  The index measures the share of intermediate inputs that are 
imported and is constructed as follows: 
      
                                   
                               
 
 
  
  
  
  
Where: 
    are the imports of goods or services j 
    is the domestic demand for goods or services j 
            
          with    is the production of goods or services j 
                      are the exports of goods or services j 
                                                 
23
 Input-output tables offer complementary insights as they provide information on the value 
of intermediate goods and services. 
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The index captures the idea that the more imports of goods or services    are 
purchased by industry   for its production, the more the important is the 
outsourcing practice of industry   . 
Figure  3.5 shows the index of outsourcing abroad for the manufacturing and 
services sector in OECD countries in 2005. The figure indicates that the 
practice of outsourcing abroad is significant. According to the OECD (2010), 
off-shoring or outsourcing abroad has increased in almost all countries over 
2000 to 2005. In countries like Luxemburg, Ireland, Hungary, the Slovak 
Republic and Estonia, the sourcing practices of intermediates abroad has 
increased significantly. In fact, these countries have the highest shares of 
outsourcing abroad (e.g. Luxemburg 59%; Ireland 49%; Hungary, 43%; and 
Denmark, 31%). Countries with a lesser degree of outsourcing are Spain 
(19%), Italy (18%), United Kingdom (18%) and the United States (10%). 
Surprisingly Japan is the country whose manufacturing industry outsources 
the least abroad (11%). This does not mean that firms do not practice 
outsourcing, but it could indicate that outsourcing inside Japan is highly 
developed (OECD 2007b).  
An interesting point to highlight is the relationship between the size of the 
country and the outsourcing pattern, since firms in small countries such as 
Luxemburg, Slovenia, Belgium and the Czech Republic are more likely to rely 
on foreign suppliers than firms in big countries like the United States. 
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Figure  3.5 Index of outsourcing abroad in selected OECD countries, 2005. 
 
Source: OECD, 2010.      
 
Another proxy commonly used by researchers (e.g. Hummels, Ishi and Yi, 
2001) to capture the extent of outsourcing is the import content of exports 24. 
With the growth of global production sharing or GVC, imports and exports are 
increasingly moving together because companies’ production processes are 
characterised by sequential production and movements back and forth. 
Hence, exports are gradually more composed of intermediate inputs imported 
from abroad. For instance, in 2005 the import content of exports also called 
vertical specialisation in trade represented on average 23 percent of total 
trade among OECD countries (OECD, 2010). 
During the same year in countries such as Luxemburg, Hungary, Ireland and 
Estonia, the import content of exports exceeded 50 percent. Conversely, the 
United States, the Russian Federation, Australia, Brazil and India imported 
considerably less through vertical trade than other countries (see Figure  3.6). 
Within the group of emerging economies China and Indonesia show a larger 
dependence on imported intermediates. This trend for China reflects the 
                                                 
24
 See Appendix 3.1 “Methodologies used to measure outsourcing” to have a  more detailed 
description of this measure. 
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increasing international production sharing within the information and 
communication technologies industries, in which the more labour-intensive 
segments are carried out in emerging countries while the more skill -intensive 
activities remain clustered in developed countries (Srholec, 2007). 
Figure  3.6 Import content of exports by country  
 
Source: OECD, 2010 
Figure  3.7 shows the import content of exports by industry in 2005 and we 
can distinguish two different trends. Firstly, the import content or exports is 
particularly high in more basic industries which rely heavily on primary goods 
such as coke, refined petroleum, basic metals, chemicals, and rubber and 
plastics. Secondly, there is a trend showing a rather high import content of 
exports in more technology intensive industries that produce modular 
products. Parts and components are commonly produced in one country and 
then exported to be assembled in a different country. This international 
division of labour is found in electrical machinery, radio/television and 
communication equipment, office and accounting, computing machinery and 
motor vehicles.  
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
1995 2005
84 
 
Figure  3.7 Import content of exports, by industry 
 
Source: OECD, 2010. 
 
Countries tend to source intermediate inputs particularly from neighbouring 
countries. Figure  3.8 shows the import content of exports by partner 
countries. We can observe that the import content of exports of most of the 
European countries rely largely on other European countries. In countries like 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Luxemburg more than three-quarters of the 
intermediate goods embodied in exports are sourced in Europe. This trend is 
different for Ireland, since it sources lot of inputs from the NAFTA region.  This 
is likely to be explained by the significant presence of U.S. multinationals in 
the country. 
Within the NAFTA region, Canada and Mexico are heavily oriented towards 
other NAFTA countries and more than 50 percent of the import content of 
exports comes from the NAFTA partners. Unlike Mexico and Canada, for the 
United States its NAFTA partners have less importance due to the large share 
of East Asian countries (Korea, Japan, China and Chinese Taipei).  
In Japan, China and Korea the majority of intermediates embodied in exports 
come from countries within the region. A triangular trade pattern in this 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
OECD average 1995 OECD average 2005
85 
 
region has emerged in which parts and components are produced by more 
developed countries like Japan, Chinese Taipei and Korea, and then exported 
to emerging countries like China where further assembly takes place (De 
Backer and Yamano, 2007). 
Figure  3.8 Import content of exports with partner countries 
 
Source: OECD, 2010 
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In the case of developing countries there are limited studies of the magnitude 
of sourcing activities both abroad or domestically25. However, we can grasp a 
general idea of the magnitude of the phenomenon by looking at trade 
statistics such as: a) exports from developing countries, b) intra-firm imports 
of parent companies in developed countries and c) import penetration rates.  
According to Yeats (1998), statistics show that over 40% of total 
manufactured exports of Mexico, Jamaica, Haiti, Dominican Republic and El 
Salvador engage assembly operations using components manufactured in a 
foreign country. 
The second approach to have an idea of the magnitude of sourcing in 
developing countries is to look at intra-firm imports, since in theory a 
significant share of the imports attributable to international sourcing involve 
intra-firm imports. Figure  3.9 presents intra-firms imports of American parent 
companies originating from their foreign subsidiaries in selected developing 
countries from 1990 to 2003. The country with the highest share of intra-firm 
imports is Mexico whose imports rose from 9 billion dollars to 40 mbillions. 
This shows that intra-firm imports originating from American subsidiaries in 
Mexico are more substantial that those originating from China and the other 
countries. It also indicates that distance is important, since manufacturing 
activities are relocated more to Mexico than elsewhere (OECD, 2007a). 
  
                                                 
25
  Taymaz and Kiliςaslan (2005), have an empirical study of the textile and engineering 
industries in Turkey from the perspective of both firms receiving and offering outsourcing. 
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Figure  3.9 Imports of goods by U.S. parent companies originating from their 
foreign subsidiaries 
Source: OECD, 2007a.                                                                          
 
 
Figure  3.11 show intra-firm exports of goods from U.S. parent companies 
abroad and intra-firm imports of goods to U.S. parent companies from 
affiliates abroad in 2007. In general terms, the most important intra-firm 
trade of U.S. parent companies was with Canada and Mexico. According to the 
OECD (2007), about 48 percent of US imports from American affiliates in 
Canada and 60 percent from Mexico were from the automobile industry.  
During the same year U.S. imports from affiliates in China reached USD 6 
billion, representing 1.8 percent of total imports from China. Approximately 
59 percent of the imports from U.S. affiliates in China comprised computers 
and electronic products.  In fact, a great part of the U.S. high technology 
imports from China come from Chinese firms or from their own affiliates. 
  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Malaysia
Brazil
Philippines
China
India
Billion  USD
88 
 
Fig. 3.10 Intra-firm exports of goods from US parent companies 
abroad by partner economy, 2007 
 
 
Fig. 3.11 Intra-firm imports of goods to US parent companies from 
affiliates abroad by partner economy, 2007 
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However, there are two problems using intra-firm imports, firstly they capture 
only a part international sourcing activities; secondly they may not reflect the 
nature of the goods imported. For instance the textile imports coming from 
U.S. subsidiaries abroad will not necessarily be made by firms in the same 
group whose activity is textiles, but rather by wholesalers and distributors. 
The third alternative method mentioned above is the import penetration 
rates which are defined as follows: 
                   
                                  
                                 
  
Figure ‎3.12  shows that import penetration rates of the United States with 
developing countries have increased, reflecting the increase of foreign 
dependency of the United States. It might have increased due to sourcing 
activities of US firms into developing countries. However, we can not assert 
import penetration rates capture sourcing activities accurately, actually it only 
help us to see the trends of the phenomenon.   
In the textiles, leather and footwear industry China’s export share to the US 
climbed from 7.11 percent in 1995 to 13.73 percent in 2003. Although 
Mexico’s share rose from 3.64 percent in 1995 to 6.82 percent in 2003, there 
is a drop of 13 percent in the last year26. The other two industries in which 
China has an increasing growth rate are office, accounting and computing 
machinery increasing from 2.70 percent in 1995 to 13.60 percent in 2003; and 
Radio, TV and communication equipments rising from 2.21 percent to 8 
percent during the same period. In these two industries we can also observe 
an upward trend of Mexico from 1995 to 2002 and afterwards a drop. In the 
case of Malaysia in the Radio, TV and communications equipment industries 
there is a downward trend from 1995 to 1999 and then a modest increase in 
the import ratios in the following years. 
                                                 
26
 This slowdown in the industry has opened up concerns in the Mexican government as well 
as in the firms involved in the sector. In July 2008, it was announced by the Ministry of 
Economy that there will  be prepared an analysis  of the situation and threats to the industry as 
well as the measures to overcome the crisis of the industry in recent years. 
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Figure  3.12 Import Penetration Rates in the United States  
Source: OECD, 2007a.                                                                         
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As we can observe in the previous chart international sourcing is present in 
sectors like clothing, automobile and textile and it has gained more 
significance in a number of developing countries like China, India, Malaysia, 
Brazil and Mexico.  
 
3.5. Global Dispersion of industries 
 
The global dispersion of production has been reflected in the changes in the 
share of industrial and developing countries in world manufactures of exports 
(see Figure  3.13). Evidence suggests that between 1955 and 2006, industrial 
countries faced a decline in the share of manufactured exports of clothing, 
textiles and office and telecom equipment (from 1955 onwards); of iron steel 
and chemicals (from 1973), and around 1983 for the automobile industry 
(WTO, 2008). 
Figure  3.13 Share of industrial countries in world manufactures exports by 
product group, 1995-2006. 
 
Source: WTR, 2010, pag.18. 
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In contrast, the decline of the industrial countries has been the mirror image 
of the relative rise of a highly diverse group of developing countries that in 
2008 accounted for more than two-thirds of world clothing exports and more 
than one-half of the world exports textile and office and telecom equipment 
(see Figure  3.14. Moreover, for all manufactured goods, developing countries’ 
share is significantly higher their share than in 1955 (WTO, 2008). 
 
Figure  3.14 Share of developing economies in world manufactures by 
product group, 1983-2006. 
 
Source: WTR, 2010, pag.25. 
 
The phenomenon has open up an opportunity for developing countries to 
capture the production of certain segments of the production process rather 
than supply the whole product (Jones and Kierzkowski, 1990). As a 
consequence, some countries have developed or consolidated competitive 
advantages in specific types of products, categories of technology or 
particular market segments. 
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3.6. Conclusions 
 
In recent times world production processes have become complex 
phenomenon which has given rise to and increasing wave of off-shoring and 
outsourcing. Although off-shoring and outsourcing are not a new entry in 
global economy but during last few decades fragmentation in production 
processing has increased and has opened opportunities for developing 
countries to participate by supplying parts and components. Initially these 
processes were determined by comparative technical advantage of developed 
countries but with the passage of time many other factors like liberalization 
policy reforms, transportation costs, decline of trade costs, the gap in wages 
across different countries and the advances in telecommunications 
technologies became the base of outsourcing between developed and 
developing countries. 
It is difficult to pinpoint the significance of outsourcing in the global economy 
because of unavailable of data. Recent studies using trade data show that the 
practice of outsourcing abroad is significant and has risen in recent years. 
Finally, micro-level data of plant or firms have emerged to provide more 
accurate evidence. However, evidence is limited and is focused in developed 
countries  
  
94 
 
Chapter 4 The Integration of Mexico to 
global production networks and the role 
of Maquiladoras 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The increasing integration of the world market has brought with it the 
disintegration, or so called fragmentation, of the production process 
(Venables, 1999). International fragmentation of production leads to the 
establishment of international production networks, which are linked with an 
increasing importance of world trade in intermediate goods (Hummels et al., 
2001). It is widely recognized (Hanson, 1994; Arndt, 1997; Feenstra, 1998) 
that fragmentation is driven by the persistence of factor price differentials 
across countries which, at the same time, creates incentives for firms in 
developed countries to move unskilled intensive manufacturing to low wage 
countries.  
In the case of Mexico, the growth emergence as a sourcing location was 
triggered by the economic opening and liberalisation of its FDI regimes and its 
proximity to the United States.  This chapter aims to present the evolution of 
the implemented trade liberalisation policies that make Mexico an attractive 
location for foreign firms to source their production. The following section 
introduces the Maquiladoras, which is the main industry involved in 
outsourcing and off-shoring according to Bergin et al., 2009. The final part 
presents the conclusions of this chapter.  
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4.2. Trade Liberalisation in Mexico 
 
During the 1980s, Latin American27 countries introduced trade liberalisation 
strategies as part of their Structural Adjustment Programmes.  The 
implementation of these programmes was accompanied by macroeconomic 
and other structural reforms to tackle problems of both external 
disequilibrium (deficit in the balance of payments) and domestic 
disequilibrium (high inflation and disparities in the distribution of income) 
caused by the Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) (Villarreal, 2006). The 
basis of this policy shift was the assumption that market forces would 
spontaneously lead to an optimal reallocation of resources (Melo, 2001). 
Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI)28 was the trade policy implemented 
in Mexico from the early 1950s to 1985 . This strategy consisted of the 
protection of Mexico’s industrial sector through a set of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers in order to promote the creation of new industries and to encourage 
the development of those already operating.  
However, after the 1982 debt crisis, the collapse of oil prices and the cut-off 
from external financing, the government decided to implement structural 
adjustment reforms.  
The reforms were based on frequent adjustments of the exchange rate, fiscal 
tightening, privatization of state-owned companies, de-regulation of financial 
markets, liberalisation of foreign investment regulations and, after 1985, 
trade liberalisation29.    
                                                 
27
  Chile is the exception, since it implemented a continuous process of trade liberalisation 
since 1973 under a dictatorial regime.  
28
  During ISI the three main forms of trade controls applied were: import tariffs, import 
licensing restrictions and official reference prices. However, import l icensing was the key form 
of trade control and was based mainly in response to the balance of pa yments situation. 
29
  There were also external pressures on the Mexican government from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (organisms on which Mexico relied for financial aid) 
to adopt a more outward-oriented trade policy. 
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By mid-1985 Mexico embarked upon a fast and comprehensive trade 
liberalisation programme, and the first policy reforms were implemented. 
These reforms comprised the removal of quantitative import restrictions on 
intermediate inputs and capital goods, and the replacement of import 
licensing by tariffs. In this first stage, liberalisation fell heavily on intermediate 
and capital goods, because many of these goods were not produced, or not 
produced in sufficient quantities, in Mexico.  
In 1986, Mexico negotiated its membership of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Under this agreement, Mexico promised to continue 
with the replacement of direct trade controls by tariffs, followed by tariff 
reductions and a system to assess anti-dumping and countervailing duties was 
introduced (Ros, 1994).  
However, agriculture and some manufacturing sectors (automobiles, 
pharmaceuticals and electronics) were temporarily excluded from license 
removal because these sectors were under special industrial promotion 
programmes. By 1987, quantitative import restrictions on consumer goods 
were removed and, in the following years, export subsidies were eliminated.  
Table  4.1 shows some indicators of trade liberalisation in Mexico from 1985 to 
1989. It illustrates the drastic changes in the licensing system in that, from 
June 1985 to December 1989, the share of imports covered fell from 92.2% to 
19.8%, whereas the share of the domestic production value covered by official 
reference prices dropped from 18.7% to 0% and the production-weighted 
tariff average decreased from 23.3% to 12.5% in the same period.   
Table  4.1 Mexico’s indicators of Trade Liberalisation 
Indicator 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
June Dec June Dec June Dec Dec Dec 
1.Domestic production 
value covered by 
import licensing (%) 
92.2 47.1 46.9 39.8 35.8 25.4 21.3 19.8 
2.Domestic production 
value covered by 
official reference 
prices (%) 
18.7 25.4 19.6 18.7 13.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 
3.Production-weighted 
tariff averages (%) 
23.5 28.5 24.0 24.5 22.7 11.8 10.2 12.5 
Source: Kate 1992; and Weiss, 1992.  
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Along with the measures undertaken to reduce and eliminate import 
restrictions, a programme to promote manufacturing export industries, 
particularly the Maquiladora 30 industry, was launched (the following section 
will provide a more detailed description of the Maquiladoras and their 
evolution). This programme comprised three facilitation programmes (all 
known by their Spanish acronyms):  
 Programme of Temporal Imports to Manufacture Export Goods 
(PITEX): the programme started in 1985 and gave duty rebates to firms 
with high levels of imported inputs embodied in exports.  
 Highly Exporting Firms Programme (ALTEX): this was created in 1986 
and  enabled firms to make at least 40 percent of their total sales in 
the export markets to benefit from very simplified and fast export and 
import formalities; and, most essentially, to quickly recover the ad 
valorem tax on domestic inputs (Melo, 2001).  
 Finally, the Joint Committee for Export Promotion (COMPEX): 
established in 1989, this was designed to overcome bureaucratic 
barriers for the export producing firms. 
In addition, in 1989 a new bilateral agreement between Mexico and the 
United States was signed to encourage more trade and investment between 
the two countries, and to improve the country’s risk assessment and visibility. 
This agreement can be considered as the predecessor of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  
However, the government started to consider the possibility of negotiating a 
more comprehensive trade agreement between Mexico, the United States  
and Canada.  A considerable part of this new agreement was reintroduced 
from the USA-Canadian trade deal of previous years, but NAFTA consisted of 
                                                 
30
  The term Maquiladora refers to an assembly plant in Mexico, especially one along the 
border between the United States and Mexico, to which foreign materials and parts are 
shipped and from which the finished product is returned to the original market free of 
duty. Duty is paid only on the Mexican value added. 
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features and procedures with more depth and extension than the U.S-Canada 
trade agreement (Ybarra-Yunez, 2003). 
During the 1990s, the following steps towards Mexico’s integration to the 
global markets were based on a foreign economic policy looking for 
liberalisation of trade and investment. In 1992, the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed and came into effect on January 1, 
1994. NAFTA is a complete rules-based agreement between Canada, the US 
and Mexico. The agreement eliminated many tariffs immediately, while other 
tariffs were committed to fall to zero over a five- to fifteen-year period, with 
most tariffs and quantitative restrictions eliminated in 2004.  For example, 
Table  4.2 illustrates the reductions of the import licenses system, from 1990 
to 2002. It shows that by 2002 only 0.58% of the imports required a licence 
whereas, in the same year, the weighted average tariff was 3.1%.  
Table  4.2 Mexico’s indicators of protection 
Year 
Fraction of imports 
subject to licenses 
(%) 
Tariff Averages (%) 
Weighted Tariff 
Averages (%) 
1990 1.7 13.1 10.5 
1991 1.7 13.1 11.2 
1992 1.6 13.1 11.4 
1993 1.6 13 11.6 
1994 1.2 12.4 5.7 
1995 0.55 13.7 3.4 
1996 0.63 13.3 2.9 
1997 0.67 13.3 2.6 
1998 0.64 13.2 2.6 
1999 0.6 16.1 2.9 
2000 0.61 16.2 3 
2001 0.6 16.3 3.2 
2002 0.58 16.4 3.1 
Source: Tornell and Esquivel, 1997; and Mexican Ministry of Economy. 
 
NAFTA represented the beginning of the removal of the remaining barriers to 
trade and investment. The complete elimination of the tariffs was phased in 
four periods over fifteen years and, in 2009, there were no tariffs on traded 
goods (see Figure  4.1). The main assumption was that NAFTA, along with the 
drastic reforms and rapid unilateral trade liberalisation initiated in the second 
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half of the 1980s, would encourage local and foreign investment in the 
production of tradable goods. In turn, this would encourage Mexico as an 
export platform to the United States (Moreno-Brid et al., 2005). 
Figure  4.1 Schedule of Tariff Reduction under NAFTA 
 
Source: Clement et al., 1999, p. 264.  
 
Rules of origin were also designed to keep benefits and preferential treatment 
of the free trade within North America.  These rules applied specifically to 
automobiles and auto parts, computers and textiles (Clement et al., 1999). 
Some of the examples of strategic items are listed in Table  4.3:  
  
Phase 4
By the end of the 15th year of the phase period the three countries have to 
eliminate any tariffs remaining on imports from their partners.
Phase 3
By the end of the 10th year the countries reduced tariff barriers to zero on 38% 
of US and Canadian products, while the US and Canada dropped import tariffs 
on 7% and 12% of Mexican exports respectively.
Phase 2
By the end of the 5th year, Mexico dropped tariffs on an additional 19% of 
Canadian and 18% of US export categories.
Phase 1
Mexico has to eliminate tariffs on 41% of Canadian and 43% of US export 
categories.
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Table  4.3 Rules of origin for selected products 
 In the auto sector, 62.5 percent of automobile parts and components are 
required to be sourced from NAFTA parties. 
 Ninety percent of circuit board assemblies must be packed in NAFTA 
countries. 
 Photocopiers, printers, and fax machines must be sub-assembled in North 
America (this is approximately equivalent to 80 percent domestic content 
requirement). 
 Televisions tubes must be produced within NAFTA to qualify for preferential 
status.  
Source: Gallagher and Zarsky (2007). 
The core of the plan was the manufacturing sector, and the goal was to build 
a strong and internationally competitive manufacturing sector fuelled by FDI. 
In fact, during the 1990s, ten countries captured 80 percent of the FDI flows 
going to developing countries. In order of importance, the most significant 
recipients were China, Brazil and Mexico which together received 58 percent 
of all developing countries’ FDI (UNCTAD, 2002). 
NAFTA has not been the only agreement implemented in Mexico; over the 
last two decades, the country has been very active in signing multiple free 
trade agreements (FTAs) both with developed and less developed countries, 
and has joined several international organizations. Figure  4.2 illustrates 
chronologically the dates and agreements that Mexico has signed.  
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Figure 4.2. Chronology of Mexico’s Free Trade Agreement and Adhesion to International Organisms    
Source: México Negociaciones Comerciales Internacionales, 2004 (Secretaria de Economía) 
* In 1992 Mexico signed an Economic Cooperation Agreement with Chile, but the original agreement was complemented to c onstitu te a Free Trade Agreement in 1999. 
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As a consequence of its liberalisation policies, Mexico has shown a dynamic 
performance in the export markets. For instance, from 1985 to 1994, the 
country ranked fifth among countries with the largest increases in their share 
of world manufacture exports. During 1994 and 2001, it moved to second 
place, just behind China (Moreno-Brid et al., 2005).  
NAFTA influenced the expansion of Mexico’s exports to a great extent; 
however, two related elements also contributed to this export expansion.  
Firstly, the collapse in 1995 of the Mexican domestic market due to the 
Tequila crisis forced domestic firms to seek external markets in order to 
survive. The second factor was the depreciation of the peso with respect to 
the dollar (a drop of 45% in real terms) during the same year, resulting in a 
severe foreign exchange crisis (idem).  
Mexico’s export boom started during the late 1980s, before NAFTA was 
implemented, and it opened an exceptional window for exports to the US (see 
Figure  4.3). In 1994, total exports represented 14.4 percent of Mexico’s real 
GDP and, by the year 2006, this figure had doubled reaching 29.39 percent.  
Between 1983 and 2006, exports rose at an annual average rate of 9.3 
percent. After NAFTA came into effect, there was a significant growth in 
Mexico’s exports, and the Maquiladoras have been a vital force behind this 
export boom. Maquila exports in 1980 represented 1.03 percent of total GDP 
and by 2006 they represented 13.9 percent.  
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Figure  4.3 Mexico’s Foreign Trade (percentage of GDP) 
 
 
Source: Romero, 2009.  
 
The dynamic export performance of Mexico is reflected in the drastic change 
in the composition of exports (see Figure  4.4). For instance, in 1980 oil exports 
accounted for 58 percent of total exports and, by 2005, they have decreased 
until they represent only 15 percent. In contrast, the manufacturing sector 
increased from 31 percent in 1980 to 81 percent in 2006.  
Despite the rapid growth of exports, particularly in the Maquiladora industry, 
the value added of the sector is very small. In 2006, the Maquiladoras 
contributed less than 3 percent to the total value added. This is one major 
problem, which reflects the fact that rather than promoting a greater 
integration with local suppliers of raw materials, Maquiladoras use imported 
raw materials. Therefore, their contribution to the Mexican economy is 
limited. 
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Figure  4.4 Composition of Mexico’s Exports (percentage or total exports). 
 
Source: Romero, 2009.  
In terms of the technological content of the types of goods exported, Figure 
 4.5 shows the evolution of Mexican exports from 1990 to 2006. It is 
interesting to note that, in 1990, primary commodities concentrated 47 
percent of the exports and, by 1995, it decreased to 16 percent. On the other 
hand, medium and high technology manufactures have shown a more 
dynamic performance. In 1990, they represented  32 percent of the total 
exports and, by 2006, they reached 62 percent. Therefore, it can be observed 
that most of the Mexican exports are medium and high technology 
manufactures. 
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Figure  4.5 Mexico’s exports by technological content 
 
Source: CEPAL, División de Comercio Internacional e Integración, sobre la base de cifras 
oficiales obtenidas de UN Comtrade, United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, 
DESA/UNSD.  
 
More disaggregated data is shown in Table  4.4, which includes the twenty 
products that concentrate more than 50 percent of total exports from 1980 to 
2007. It is interesting to note that there has been a change in the share of the 
different products over time. As an oil producing country, crude petroleum 
ranks in the first position in Mexico comprising 13.8 percent of the total, 
although the exports of crude petroleum have reduced drastically over time, 
from 60 percent of the share of total exports in 1980 to 13.8 in 2007. Other 
products have increased their participation, such as television broadcast 
receivers and parts for motor vehicles among the most important. The change 
in the structure of total exports can be an indicator of the activities in which 
supplier firms engaged in outsourcing are concentrated. The table shows that 
most of the categories which have a high share of exports are those related to 
global value chains, for example motor vehicles, televisions and electrical 
equipment. 
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Table  4.4 Mexico: Exports of the 10 Leading products (SITC, REV. 1), 
 by their percentage share each year a/                                  
Code Description 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2007 
33101 Crude petroleum 60.9 57.2 33.9 9.3 8.9 13.8 
7241 
Television broadcast receivers, 
whether or not combined with 
gramophone or radio 
... ... ... 3.7 3.5 8.0 
7321 
Passenger motor cars ( other than 
buses or special vehicles), whether 
or not assembled 
... ... 9.9 9.5 9.9 6.9 
73289 
Other parts for motor vehicles other 
than for motorcycles 
1.3 1.1 1.4 2.8 3.5 4.5 
72491 
Electrical line telephone and 
telegraph equipment 
... ... ... ... ... 4.4 
7323 
Lorries and trucks ( including 
ambulances, etc.), whether or not 
assembled 
... ... ... 2.3 2.9 3.3 
7143 
Statistical machines, e.g., calculating 
from punched cards or tape ... ... 1.3 ... 4.9 3.2 
7231 Insulated wire and cable ... ... ... 4.3 4.0 3.0 
7222 
Electrical apparatus for making and 
breaking or for protecting electrical 
circuits (switchgear, etc.) 
... ... ... 2.6 3.1 2.3 
7221 Electric power machinery ... ... ... 2.2 2.8 1.9 
0011 Bovine cattle (including buffaloes) ... 0.8 1.3 ... ... ... 
0111 
Meat of bovine animals, fresh, 
chilled or frozen ... ... ... ... ... ... 
0313 
Crustacea and molluscs, fresh, 
chilled, salted or dried 2.6 1.6 ... ... ... ... 
0544 Tomatoes, fresh ... 0.8 1.6 ... ... ... 
0545 Other fresh vegetables 1.1 ... 1.7 ... ... ... 
0611 
Raw sugar, beet and cane (not 
including syrups) ... ... ... ... ... ... 
0711 
Coffee, green or roasted, and coffee 
substitutes containing coffee 2.9 2.4 1.4 ... ... ... 
2631 Raw cotton, other than linters 2.0 ... ... ... ... ... 
28311 Ores and concentrates of copper 1.1 ... ... ... ... ... 
3320 Petroleum products 1.6 7.4 2.4 ... ... ... 
3411 Gas, natural 4.0 ... ... ... ... ... 
51252 Polyacids and derivatives ... 0.7 ... ... ... ... 
68111 
Silver, unwrought or partly worked, 
but not rolled 
2.4 1.7 ... ... ... ... 
7115 
Internal combustion engines, other 
than aircraft 
... 7.1 5.3 3.5 ... ... 
72499 
Other telecommunications 
equipment ... ... ... 2.6 4.0 ... 
 
Average share of leading 
products (%) 
79.9 80.8 60.2 42.8 47.5 51.3 
a/
 Starting from 1992, the data include goods processed under Maquila arrangements.                  
Source: ECLAC, División de Comercio Internacional e Integración, Comtrade, United Nations. 
  
107 
 
4.3. FDI liberalisation in Mexico 
 
Mexico’s trade liberalization policies were increased by Mexico’s integration 
into NAFTA which, at the same time, comprised policies and obligations 
pertaining to direct investment in Chapter 11 of the NAFTA agreement. Thus, 
after Mexico joined NAFTA it registered substantial and permanent higher 
inflows of FDI. 
During the 1980s, or the pre-NAFTA period, a great part of this foreign 
investment was received in the stock market31 and from 1994 to 2002, Mexico 
received $12.3 billion of FDI on average each year (Figure  4.6). Twenty-eight 
percent of the FDI was received in the form of mergers and acquisitions, while 
72 percent was Greenfield investment (Gallagher and Zarski, 2003). 
 
Figure  4.6 Mexico’s Foreign Direct Investment Flows 
 
Source: Secretaria de Economía. 
 
                                                 
31
  For example in 1993 Mexico received approximately US$17 billion in foreign investment, of 
which nearly 70% went into the stock market  
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In an empirical work based on an error correction model, Ramirez (2003) tries 
to identify the variables that influenced the surge in the FDI flows after the 
implementation of NAFTA. This author found that the debt conversion 
programme in 1986-1990 and the liberalisation of FDI rules from 1991 to 1994 
were positively correlated with the surge of FDI flows into Mexico. 
Conversely, the economic and political turmoil had a negative relationship. 
Table  4.5 illustrates the sectoral distribution of FDI from 1980 to 2003. The 
data reveals that, in the first period of liberalisation, there was not a 
remarkable increase in the FDI flows. By contrast, in 1994 FDI flows increased 
167% as compared to the previous year. FDI flows have been directed mainly 
towards Greenfield investment in the manufacturing sector, particularly to 
sectors where there is a strong participation of transnational corporations 
(TNC’s) devoted to export-oriented production such as Maquiladora industry.  
By 2001 the figures show an important surge in FDI in the services sector 
which is a result of the US$12,500 million acquisition of the biggest Mexican 
bank, Banamex, by Citygroup. From 1994 to 2002, Maquiladoras received 32 
percent of manufacturing FDI of which 72 percent flowed into the 
automotive, electronics and apparel assembly sectors. 
However, from 2002 onwards there is a drop in the FDI flows into Mexico 
which can be attributed to the recession in the United States market and the 
apparent end of the cycle of privatization. This downturn was strongly felt in 
Mexico whose international competitiveness was also threatened by an  
appreciated currency which led to a loss of over 200,000 jobs in the Maquila 
industry and to the shift of several plants32 from Mexico to Asia. 
 
 
                                                 
32  The production of footwear, apparel, furniture and some electrical and electronic goods 
were some of the activities which moved operations from Mexico to China. 
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Table  4.5 Sectorial distribution of FDI flows into Mexico, 1980-2003  
(Millions of Dollars) 
Year Total Industry Services Commerce Mining Agriculture  
1980 1,622.60 1,286 131 118 87 1 
1985 1,729.00 1,166 435 110 18 0 
1990 3,722.40 1,193 2,203 171 94 61 
1991 3,565.00 964 2,138 388 31 45 
1992 3,599.60 1,101 1,700 751 9 39 
1993 4,900.70 2,321 1,731 760 55 35 
1994 10,630.00 6,195 4,327 1,247 98 10 
1995 8,337.00 4,851 3,398 1,012 79 9 
1996 7,823.00 4,814 2,891 739 84 33 
1997 12,079.00 7,298 4,640 1,868 131 10 
1998 8,325.00 5,003 3,244 1,038 49 29 
1999 13,565.00 9,137 4,207 1,409 138 83 
2000 17,507.00 9,879 7,338 2,432 199 92 
2001 27,059.00 5,492 21,478 2,224 29 61 
2002 18150 7,582 10,234 1,739 242 93 
2003 13773 6,204 7,484 1,394 75 11 
2004 18361 9,290 9,185 1,175 142 15 
2005 13745 7,292 5,955 2,539 -7.7 5.2 
Source: Secretaria de Economía 
 
Opponents of the FDI flows (Cypher and Dietz, 1997) state that FDI flows in 
developing counties constitutes a small portion of capital formation in only a 
few cases. Consequently, rather than contributing to the country’s capital 
formation, they constitute a potential source of drain in the form of 
remittances of profits and dividends to the parent corporations.  
In fact, if profits and dividends are subtracted from FDI flows and the net 
figures are expressed as a proportion of fixed capital formation by 2000 the 
net contribution of FDI to Mexico’s gross fixed capital formation represents 
only 8% (Ramirez, 2003). In this sense, Gallagher and Zarski (2003) found that 
the FDI dependent on export oriented manufacturing is susceptible to 
financial instability and loss of competitiveness in Mexican industry.  
110 
 
Table  4.6 shows that in the manufacturing sector 49 percent of the FDI has 
been concentrated in the Metal products, Machinery and Equipment sectors 
which include autos and electronics.  
Table  4.6 FDI in Mexican Manufacturing by Industry, 1994-2002 
Sector Total % 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 9,999 18 
Metal products, Machinery and Equipment  26,603 49 
Chemicals, Petroleum and coal derivatives, 
rubber and plastic 
7,342 13 
Non-metallic Minerals Products 574 1 
Basic Metal Industries 2,730 5 
Manufacturing Total 54,632 100 
Source: Gallagher, 2004. 
 
4.4. The Role of Maquiladoras in Off-shoring and Outsourcing 
 
Off-shoring and outsourcing has grown over the last fifteen years and has 
become an important part of the trade relationship between the United 
States and Mexico. US firms tend to export parts and components to Mexico 
for further assembly or process into final goods, re-importing the finished 
products. US firms generally specialise in R & D, component production, 
marketing and other headquarters activities, whereas Mexican Maquiladoras 
tend to specialize in assembly. This type of production has become very 
important for both countries and from 2000 to 2003, the United States was 
the source country for 73.4 percent of the inputs imported by Maquiladoras in 
Mexico, and Maquiladoras exports back to the U.S. were equal to 5.3 percent 
of U.S industry shipments (Bergin et al., 2009). 
This production model started in the mid 1960s when Mexico established 
what was called the export processing zone (EPZ). This phenomenon has been 
driven by MNCs and it is not exclusive to Mexico. For instance, Frobel et. al. 
(1981) estimated that in 1975 there were approximately 79 EPZs in 39 
countries, with 750,000 employees.  
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Maquiladoras are in-bond assembly factories offering industrial or service 
processes that involve the transformation, elaboration, or repair of 
merchandise of foreign origin, temporarily or permanently imported for its 
later export. The legal regime of the Maquila in Mexico states that the 
company must register formally in the Ministry of Economy to grant 
temporary import of inputs, machinery, and equipment necessary for 
assembly, transformation provided that the importer posts a bond 
guaranteeing the export of the finished goods and duty is paid only on the 
Mexican value added (De la Garza Toledo, 2007; Gallagher et al., 2007). 
During the last twenty years the Maquiladoras have gained an important role 
in the Mexican economy and contributed enormously to export and 
employment growth. However, over the last decade, Maquiladoras have also 
been facing one of the most serious crises in their history which has negatively 
affected their employment, and the reduction of FDI (Carrillo and Lara, 2005).  
The following section describes the history and evolution of the Maquiladora 
industry. 
 
4.4.1. Evolution of the Maquiladora sector 
 
The development of the Maquiladora can be summed up in three phases: 1) 
the installation, adjustment and recovery from 1965 to 1984; 2) the boom 
period from 1985 to 2000 and; 3) the crisis period from 2000 to date.  
Phase 1: Installation, adjustment and recovery (1965-1984) 
The early stages of the Maquiladora emerged in 1965 as a combination of 
policies of the US and Mexico. In the US, the offshore assembly production 
programme also known as the “806/807” made it possible to export and 
import components duty free, except on imported value added.  
 In Mexico, the Border Industrialisation programme granted assistance to 
investors to establish industrial units on a twenty kilometre strip parallel to 
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the international border line or to the coast line. It granted tax-free 
importations of raw materials, parts, components, machinery tooling 
equipment, and everything else needed for the transformation or processing, 
assembly, finishing of products to be entirely exported (Sklair, 1989). This 
programme allowed foreign firms to enter into the Mexican market with 100 
percent of their own capital, whereas only 49 percent of foreign capital was 
allowed in the manufacturing industry.  The Maquiladora programme was 
introduced to tackle the unemployment problems in Mexico’s northern 
border produced by the cancellation of the “Bracero Programme”33 in 1964.  
The Maquiladora programme had three main objectives: a) to create jobs on 
the northern border of Mexico; b) to reduce migration to the United States; 
and c) to promote manufacturing export industries.  
Until 1967, the majority of the Maquiladoras were small enterprises, 
subsidiaries of small and medium corporations, and their operations consisted 
of simple assembly of parts and components supplied by the lead firm.  
Table  4.7 shows that during the 1st phase of the Maquiladoras, the number of 
plants increased from 72 establishments in 1967 to 672 in 1984, whereas the 
number of employed rose from 4,000 employees to 199,684 during the same 
period. 
  
                                                 
33
 The Bracero Programme was originally a temporary contract labour programme in itiated in 
1942, designed to supply the shortage of labour in the US, providing work au thorizat ion for 
Mexican farmers. 
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Table  4.7 Maquila Industry Plants, employees, labour costs, and value 
added, 1967-1988. 
Year 
No. 
Establishments 
No. Employees Labour costs Value added 
1967 72 4,000 n.a 925 
1968 112 10,927 n.a 975 
1969 149 15,900 n.a 973 
1970 160 20,327 n.a 1035 
1971 205 28,483 16,460 1,227 
1972 339 48,060 17,388 1,820 
1973 400 64,330 17,808 2,415 
1974 455 75,977 32,082 2,610 
1975 454 67,214 36,153 4,015 
1976 448 74,496 44,579 5,424 
1977 443 78,433 57,731 7,118 
1978 457 90,704 66,006 10,000 
1979 540 114,365 76,030 14,543 
1980 620 119,546 87,816 17,729 
1981 605 130,973 111,809 23,957 
1982 585 127,048 192,998 46,588 
1983 600 150,867 311,055 99,521 
1984 672 199,684 504,418 194,756 
Source: Sklair, 1989.  
 
Phase 2: The Boom (1985-2000) 
 
During this period the Maquiladora industry became the most successful case 
of Mexico’s export-led industrialisation model that faced a boom period when 
Mexico joined NAFTA in 1994. Most of the exports are channelled to the 
United States, thus Maquiladora plants tend to locate along Mexico’s 
northern border to take advantage of the cheap labour and transportation 
costs and proximity to the US market. Table  4.8 shows that, from 1990 to 
200634, more than 70 percent of the Maquiladora establishments were 
located in the northern states, specifically in Chihuahua, Baja California, 
Tamaulipas, Coahuila and Sonora. 
  
                                                 
34
 Although this second phase finished in 2000, data until 2006 is  included. 
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Table  4.8 Total number of Maquiladora establishments and share of 
Maquiladoras in northern border and other states. 
Year 
Total 
Establishments 
Northern 
Border states 1/ 
1990 1,703 85.8 
1991 1,914 84.3 
1992 2,075 84.1 
1993 2,114 83.4 
1994 2,085 82.4 
1995 2,130 79.4 
1996 2,411 77.8 
1997 2,717 77.1 
1998 2,983 75.4 
1999 3,297 73.4 
2000 3,590 72.5 
2001 3,630 72.3 
2002 3,003 72.0 
2003 2,860 72.4 
2004 2,810 73.2 
2005 2,816 73.6 
2006 2,810 74.1 
Notes:  
1/
 Northern Border States include Baja California, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Sonora and 
Tamaulipas 
 
While the Maquiladora programme is one of the instruments designed by the 
government to promote exports, it accounted on average for more than 50 
percent of Mexico’s manufacturing exports from 1990 to 2007 (see Table  4.9).  
However, one of the problems is the low value added, which hardly reached 3 
percent during the same period. This reflects the fact that, far from promoting 
integration of assembly plant with local suppliers, the Maquiladora 
programme has relied solely on imported raw materials.  
Paus and Gallagher (2008) argue that the potential for spill-overs in Mexico 
has been constrained because MNCs strategically decided to import their 
inputs, rather than source them locally, and because Mexican firms lacked 
much of the absorptive capacity necessary to capture spill-overs that were 
available. 
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Table  4.9 Participation of Maquiladora exports in total exports and value 
added as percentage of GDP. 
Year 
Participation of Maquiladora exports 
in total Manufacturing exports 
Value added of 
Maquiladoras as 
percentage of GDP 
1990 49.9 1.4 
1991 50.1 1.3 
1992 52.7 1.3 
1993 53.2 1.3 
1994 52.7 1.4 
1995 47.3 1.7 
1996 46.4 1.9 
1997 48 2.2 
1998 50.3 2.5 
1999 52.5 2.8 
2000 54.9 3.1 
2001 54.6 3.1 
2002 55.1 2.9 
2003 55.1 2.9 
2004 55.1 2.8 
2005 55.6 2.8 
2006 55.2 2.9 
2007 55.7 2.8 
Source: INEGI, Encuesta de la Industria Maquiladora de Exportacion (various issues). 
 
Phase 3: The Crisis (2002-    )    
The last phase of the Maquiladora evolution corresponds to the crisis period. 
The crisis was not only a result of the economic recession in the U.S. nor of 
the competition from China, but it also resulted from structural limitations in 
the sector’s main production models. For instance, from 2001 to 2007 the 
number of Maquiladora establishments dropped from 3,630 to 2,819 (see 
Figure  4.7). De la Garza (2007) and Carrillo (2007) raised concerns about the 
Maquiladora crisis, questioning whether this model is an acceptable route for 
growth of the economy and dignified jobs, and if it has reached its limits. 
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Figure  4.7 Number of Maquiladora establishments 
 
Source: INEGI. 
De la Garza (2007) states that this crisis was generated because of the 
economic crisis of the US, the competition from other countries with lower 
wages than Mexico, such as China and the Caribbean countries; and finally by 
the growth of Maquila wages in recent years. 
The problem is that Maquiladora production has relied largely on cheap 
wages and has not generated the channels to promote linkages between local 
suppliers.  The lack of linkages with local suppliers is due to the legal rules 
established by the government for Maquiladoras that bound them to 
importing raw materials.  
However, more positive points of view exist, advocating that Maquiladoras 
were not only limited to assembly but also incorporated more sophisticated 
processes based on automated technology, new forms of organisation, better 
qualified workers and an increase in the share of technicians (Carrillo and 
Hualde, 1998; Carrillo and Lara, 2005; Carrillo and Zarate, 2009). These 
authors assert that there are other advantages apart from low wages such as 
the proximity to the United States, infrastructure in Mexico, energy costs, 
educated workforce, abundance of labour and social peace. 
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For instance, Carrillo and Lara (2005) and Carrillo and Hualde (1998) propose a 
thesis of three generations of the Maquila, based on the firms’ trajectories, 
summarised in Table ‎4.10 In principle, the authors suggest that the first 
generation of Maquiladoras are based on intensive manual work; during the 
second generation, it is based on rationalization of work and is characterised 
by the implementation of the Japanese system of production known as ‘lean 
production35’. The third generation is based on intensive use of knowledge 
and, more recently, they have proposed a fourth generation where firms have 
to develop non-material activities for the coordination of a huge range of 
activities, agents and units of production interconnected in the value chain.  
The above-mentioned authors also point out that, although there is a 
distinction between the different types of plants, different generations or 
companies co-exist in the same period. In other words, this concept is not 
static or stagnates in the same period of study: on the contrary, the 
generations co-exist and mix, but with the prevalence of one generation.  
  
                                                 
35
 Lean production is an assembly-line methodology developed by Toyota and the 
manufacturing of automobiles. It is also known as the Toyota producti on system or just-in-
time. It is characterised because components are delivered in small, very frequent batches, 
minimal stocks are held, quality control is ‘built in’ at all  stages, minimal warehousing space 
and staff is required, it uses a minimal number of suppliers within a tiered supply chain, and it 
encourages suppliers to locate close to customers (Dicken, 2007). 
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Table ‎4.10 Typology of Maquiladoras based on generations of companies 
a. First Generation Maquiladoras (“Assembly in Mexico”) 
The source of competitiveness relies on the relatively low salaries and the 
intensification of labour. The reference period in which they emerge and develop: 
1965–1981, from the beginning of the Border Industrialisation Program to one year 
before the economic crisis (1981). Foreign traditional assembly plants, unrelated, 
from the point of view of production, from national industry; with scarce technology, 
high dependence on the decisions of the corporate and main customers, and 
essentially based on intensive manual labour performed by young women with rigid 
job positions and activities that are repetitive and monotonous (Carrillo and Hualde, 
1998). 
b. Second Generation Maquiladoras (“Made in Mexico”) 
Period: 1982–1994 with the start of the quest for quality up to the signing of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Plants with capital originating from 
a greater range of sources aimed at manufacturing, with incipient development of 
local suppliers of components and direct and indirect services; with a higher level of 
technology and automation; with a gradual, albeit timid, process of autonomy in 
corporate decisions and, centrally, with a large trend towards the streamlining of 
production and work (Carrillo and Hualde, 1998). 
More men are incorporated, including qualified workers, technicians and engineers. 
Work is performed in teams under the functional flexibility scheme (greater 
responsibility, commitment and involvement). The new activities of engineers make 
it possible to acquire knowledge and local and regional professional degree courses 
are consolidated. The main concern is to improve quality standards and cut delivery 
times and rework sources, delays, dead time and inventory. Competitiveness 
comprises of a combination of quality, delivery time, unit costs and labour flexibility. 
Companies capable of giving a rapid response to the increasing fluctuation in demand 
(Carrillo and Hualde, 1998). The management bodies are run increasingly by 
Mexicans (Contreras, 2000). 
c. Third Generation Companies (“Created in Mexico”) 
Plants with a greater presence of TNCs focusing on design, research and 
development. (Carrillo and Hualde, 1998) Vertical integration, both intra-company or 
kereitzu and inter-company (ties with domestic suppliers and trade between 
maquiladoras), emerges (Koido, 2003; Lara 1998). Clusters are formed around 
technical centres, assembly plants, suppliers of components, indirect suppliers such 
as machining or plastic injection workshops, and suppliers of services (Carrillo and 
Hualde, 2002; Lara, 2002). A greater level of technology and prototype development. 
There is a substantial increase in autonomy in decision-taking. Highly skilled work, 
with high levels of responsibility and discretion that privileges knowledge and 
creativity in both design and manufacture. In other words, engineering and 
technological capabilities, the relative salaries of skilled staff, along with 
communications and the proximity of assembly and manufacturing plants (Carrillo 
and Hualde, 1998; Lara and Carrillo, 2003). Top level management becomes 
increasingly Mexicanized, although there is still a mixture of foreigners and nationals 
(Contreras, 2000; Dutrenit and Vera-Cruz, 2002).  
d. Fourth Generation (coordination from Mexico) 
The coordination of manufacturing, research, purchasing and services becomes the 
central axis of this generation of Maquiladoras. An example of this type of firm is 
Delphi technical centre located in Juarez that coordinates approximately 57 plants 
and almost 75,000 employees in Mexico. 
Source: Carrillo and Lara, 2005, p. 260. 
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4.5. Conclusions 
 
Over the last two decades Mexico has implemented a comprehensive number 
of reforms to liberalise trade and investment with the hope of achieving 
economic growth. These reforms facilitated the emergence of Mexico as an 
attractive sourcing location for the United States, and the Maquiladoras 
played an important role in this. 
As a result of these liberalisation reforms, Mexico’s trade flows and FDI have 
expanded. Particularly, much of the growth in exports can be attributed to the 
Maquiladoras that represent nearly 50 percent on average of the total 
manufacturing exports from 1990 to 2007.  
Despite the good performance of the Maquiladoras as one of the main drivers  
of exports, the value added of the Maquiladora firms accounts for a small 
portion of the total value added, and this may reflect the lack of integration 
between the Maquiladoras and local firms. Some authors have an optimistic 
point of view of the development of the Maquiladoras, while others are more 
sceptical arguing that the Maquiladoras’ advantage is merely based on low 
wages. 
For this reason, this thesis aims to fill the gap in the literature by testing the 
characteristics that are associated to supplier firms engaged in outsourcing, 
and this is presented in the next chapter. The intention is also to test whether 
suppliers engaged in outsourcing benefit from this type of production in terms 
of more in-plant training and higher investment in R & D or improvements in 
organizational techniques. 
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Chapter 5 Research   Methodology and 
Data   Description 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the methodology used and data 
employed in this research. The first two sections present the research 
questions, research process and choice of methods available. It also explains 
data management techniques used for this research along with illustration of 
data used. 
 
5.2. Research Questions 
 
International sourcing has been analysed from the point of view of lead firms 
in developed countries, but much less is known about its significance and 
implications for supplier firms in developing countries.  Hence this thesis 
wants to contribute to the understanding of the phenomenon from the 
perspective of the supplier.  
In Chapter 2 of the Literature Review, we formulated research questions to be 
answered in the process of this research. The three questions were:  
1. How significant is outsourcing in the Mexican Manufacturing Industry?  
2. What are the characteristics of the supplier firms involved in 
outsourcing in the Mexican Manufacturing Industry? 
3. Does the engagement in outsourcing increases R & D, training and 
improves the organizational techniques of the supplier firms involved 
in outsourcing? 
A series of propositions can be derived from question 3. The research 
questions are as follows and are analysed in Chapter 7: 
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d. Does outsourcing foster R & D activities of supplier firms  involved 
in outsourcing? 
e. Does outsourcing encourage in-firm training of supplier firms 
involved in outsourcing? 
f. Does outsourcing promote better organizational techniques of 
supplier firms involved in outsourcing? 
This chapter answers questions 1, 2 and 3 using descriptive data. Econometric 
techniques are carried out to answer questions 3 and 4 and the detailed 
methodology for each question is presented in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
5.3. Research Process and choice of methods 
 
The classic research process model usually starts with choosing theory, 
generating hypothesis, testing the hypothesis and interpreting the results (see 
Figure  5.1). This process is a cyclical, where the results of one study feedback 
into the system and inform future research (VanderStoep and Johnson, 2008).  
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Figure  5.1 Classic Research Process  
 
Source: VanderStoep and Johnson, 2008. 
Once we understand the basic research model, the debate arises of whether 
to choose qualitative or quantitative research approaches to test the 
hypothesis. Quantitative methodology uses a deductive form of logic where 
theories and hypothesis are tested in a cause-and-effect order.  Concepts, 
variables and hypothesis are chosen before the study begins and remain fixed 
throughout the study. Conversely, in a qualitative methodology inductive logic 
dominates. Categories and concepts emerge from informants, rather than 
being identified a priori by the researcher (Creswell, 1994:7). 
The advantage of quantitative research is that the findings from the sample 
under analysis reflect more accurately the overall population from which the 
sample was drawn. However, one of the disadvantages is that it can give a 
superficial understanding of participants’ thoughts and feelings or firm’s 
behaviour in our case. 
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Qualitative research is preferred if the researcher desires a more narrative 
understanding. The main advantage is that it provides richer and more in-
depth understanding of the population under study. However, the main 
disadvantage of qualitative research is that sample sizes are usually small and 
non-random. Therefore, the findings can not be generalized to the entire 
population from which the sample was drawn. 
From the previous arguments it is evident that each approach has its own 
advantages and disadvantages. Ideally, quantitative and qualitative research 
methods can be employed, but practically speaking, limitations of time and 
resources constrain such an exhaustive research. In our case, at first we aimed 
to use a mixture of these two methods, but because of time and resources 
limitations we decided not to use mixed approaches.   
According to Giroud (2003), the criteria to take into account when choosing 
research methods is that the research questions must drive the methodology. 
In this thesis, the research questions involve casual relationship concepts like 
“measure”; “characteristics”, and “increase”. Since our concepts are 
measurable or at least we can draw measurable indicators, we consider that 
quantitative research is more appropriate to answer our research questions. 
In addition VanderStoep and Johnson, ( 2008) state that if a large, accurate 
sample that will generalize to the larger population is available, quantitative 
research would be preferred. 
When we started this project and raised the research questions, the following 
step was to figure out how to measure outsourcing, and how this abstract 
concept can be translated in something measurable. By reviewing different 
theoretical models and empirical papers summarized in Chapter 2, we 
identified a set of variables that helped us to identify and construct variables 
that moved our research from an abstract concept into one that can be 
measured. 
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The next challenge faced, was to identify possible secondary data sources 
containing not only detailed information of the different firm characteristics, 
but also and most importantly an indicator of outsourcing practices. Mexico’s 
statistical office provides detailed records of these indicators in different 
surveys which are described in the following section. Table  5.1 summarises 
the questions to research, the approach, methods, variables and type and 
source of the data. 
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Table  5.1 Summary of Research Methodology 
Research Question Approach Methods Variables 
Type and 
source of 
the data 
Chapter 5. 
1. How significant is 
outsourcing in the 
Mexican 
Manufacturing 
Industry? 
Country-case 
Includes all industries in 
the manufacturing 
sector 
Quantitative 
(Descriptive) 
Outsourcing ratio 
Secondary 
Data 
(EIA and 
System) and 
(ENESTYC 
Chapter 5. 
2. What are the 
characteristics of the 
supplier firms 
involved in 
outsourcing? 
Country-case 
Includes all industries in 
the manufacturing 
sector 
Quantitative 
(Descriptive) 
Independent Variables: 
Ownership, Export 
propensity, Size of the 
firm, Subsidiary status, 
Share of imported raw 
materials, skills and 
Industry dummy 
Secondary 
Data 
(ENESTYC) 
Chapter 6. 
 
3. What are the 
characteristics of the 
supplier firms 
involved in 
outsourcing in the 
Mexican 
Manufacturing 
Industry? 
 
Country-case 
Includes all industries in 
the manufacturing 
sector 
Quantitative  
(Probit & Tobit 
Models) 
Dependent: 
Probability of outsourcing 
Independent: 
Size of the firm 
Export propensity 
Ownership status 
Age of the firm 
Productivity 
Wages 
Share of imported raw 
materials 
Dummy for investment in 
R & D 
Skills of the workers 
Dummy for unionization 
Subsidiary status 
Industry dummy 
Secondary 
Data 
(ENESTYC) 
Chapter 7. 
 
4.Does outsourcing 
foster R & D activities 
of supplier firms 
involved in 
outsourcing? 
Country-case 
Includes all industries in 
the manufacturing 
sector 
Quantitative 
(Probit Model) 
Dependent: 
Probability that a firm 
invest in R & D 
Independent: 
Outsourcing ratio 
Ownership of the firm 
Export propensity 
Size of the firm 
Industry dummy 
Secondary 
Data 
(ENESTYC) 
Chapter 7. 
 
5.Does outsourcing 
encourage in-firm 
training of supplier 
firms involved in 
outsourcing? 
 
Country-case 
Includes all industries in 
the manufacturing 
sector 
Quantitative 
(Probit Model) 
Dependent: 
Probability that a firm 
performs in-plant training 
Independent: 
Outsourcing ratio 
Ownership of the firm 
Export propensity 
Size of the firm 
Industry dummy 
Secondary 
Data 
(ENESTYC) 
Chapter 7. 
 
6.Does outsourcing 
promote better 
organizational 
techniques of 
supplier firms 
involved in 
outsourcing? 
Country-case 
Includes all industries in 
the manufacturing 
sector 
Quantitative 
(OLS) 
Dependent: 
Number of organizational 
techniques implemented 
by the firm 
Independent: 
Outsourcing ratio 
Ownership of the firm 
Export propensity 
Size of the firm 
Secondary 
Data 
(ENESTYC) 
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The contribution of this thesis is twofold. Firstly, to find out for the first time 
in the Mexican context the characteristics of supplier firms engaged in 
outsourcing relationships. Secondly, to test if supplier firms involved in 
outsourcing are more likely to invest in R & D, perform more in-plant training 
and implement better organizational techniques.  The importance of these 
questions for policy is clear, if outsourcing is a source of upgrading and 
technology transfer in developing countries, then policy makers should 
promote it. Likewise, if it is not having these positive effects, policies should 
be designed to create the conditions under which upgrading and technology 
transfer are possible for suppliers in developing countries.  
Although our results cannot be generalized in the context of developing 
countries, they take a significant and manageable slice of the phenomenon in 
the world economy. 
 
5.4. Data collection and description 
 
During the last decade there have been an increasing number of studies using 
micro-level data (e.g. Clerides, et. al, 1998; Baldwin and Gu, 2003; Alvarez and 
Lopez, 2005; Haskel, et. al., 2007; Crespi et. al., 2008; etc). Micro-level data 
analysis has been possible due to the efforts of statistics offices in different 
countries to collect firm and household level data.  
 In the case of Mexico the National Institute of Statistics, Geography and 
Informatics, (INEGI by its Spanish acronym) has a long experience of collecting 
firm level data.  For this thesis, data from different sources is used to analyse 
outsourcing in Mexico: the Annual Industrial Survey (EIA); the National 
Accounts System for the Export Maquiladora establishments and the National 
Survey of Employment, Wages, Technology and Training (ENESTYC).  
This thesis shows a general outsourcing ratio using aggregate data to have a 
general overview of annual trends of outsourcing in the Mexican Economy 
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from 1994 to 2006. For this purpose we use data from the Annual Industrial 
Survey (EIA) and the National Accounts System for the Export Maquiladora  
establishments (SCNM). These data are easy to access through the INEGI’s 
website.  The EIA and SCNM are used since the data is collected on a yearly 
basis and the same firms are followed over time. Hence, we can have yearly 
estimations of outsourcing ratios rather than calculations for the different 
waves of the ENESTYC which is the main survey that we are using for our firm-
level analysis in Chapters 6 and 7.  The EIA contains economic information 
such as production, wages, use of intermediate inputs, outsourcing practices 
(in and out), exports, imports, wages, among other variables. The SCNM show 
detailed information of the total gross production and its components for the 
Maquiladora establishments. One of the limitations of both surveys is that 
they do not offer detailed data regarding training practices, technology used, 
and unionization. 
 In this sense, the ENESTYC which is a special supplementary survey of the EIA, 
includes detailed quantitative and qualitative questions regarding training and 
technology used and outsourcing practices among other variables. As it was 
mentioned before, the econometric regressions in the empirical chapters 
primarily rely on data from the ENESTYC.   
Because of the confidentiality of the data, INEGI granted me access to the 
database provided all the analysis was performed at their offices. Therefore, I 
spent several months at INEGI, in Aguascalientes working with the data with 
the support of several INEGI analysts. The close interaction with INEGI’s 
analysts was an enriching experience because it helped me to understand the 
information and limitations of the data. 
 For the Annual Industrial Survey and the National Accounts System for the 
Maquiladora establishments a brief explanation is provided as the data is only 
used to calculate the outsourcing ratios in this Chapter. For the ENESTYC more 
attention is devoted and we present its content, sampling methodology, the 
procedures used for data cleaning and deflating procedure of the data.  
128 
 
5.4.1. Annual Industrial Survey (EIA) 
 
The Annual Industrial Survey (EIA) is carried out yearly, and the data refers to 
the previous calendar year. It is the main and oldest survey covering the 
Mexican manufacturing sector36. The first wave of the EIA dates back to 1963, 
and included 622 plants spread over 29 classes of activity. Then the number of 
firms and manufacturing activities were expanded (Table  5.2).The 
diversification and growth of the Mexican economy has led to a diversification 
of the manufacturing activities in Mexico and an increase of the number of 
firms. As a result, in 1993 the EIA faced a further expansion covering 205 
classes of activity and 6,867 firms which were subsequently followed over 
time. Specific analysts in the INEGI offices in Aguascalientes, Mexico, follow 
up the plants over time, and double-check inconsistencies or sudden changes 
in the plant, in many cases by calling the establishment on the phone. Thus, 
the quality of the data in the EIA is better than in surveys with less regular 
contact between the INEGI analysts and the survey respondents (Verhoogen, 
2008). 
Table  5.2  Historical evolution of the EIA 
Year 
No. 
manufacturing 
activities covered 
No. of firms covered 
1962 29 622 
1976 57 1,338 
1987 129 3,218 
1994 205 6,867 
Source: INEGI, 2005 
The unit of observation is the plant described as “the manufacturing 
establishment where the production takes place” and each plant is classified 
in its respective class of activity based on its principal product (at 6 digit level 
                                                 
36
 The EIA excludes Maquiladora firms but their information is collected in a separate survey 
(Encuesta de la Industria Maquiladora e Exportacion). 
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based on the CMAP 9437 (Mexican Classification of Activities and Products). 
The CMAP is organized in 6-digit industries called “clases”, 4 digit industries 
called “ramas”.  
The sampling method is deterministic and aims to capture the most 
representative classes of activities and the larger establishments. The most 
important activities which jointly represent 85 percent of the total 
manufacturing output are included. All plants with more than 100 employees 
are included automatically, despite the 85 percent threshold has already been 
reached.  
For the highly disaggregated classes (for instance activities with small size 
plants and a high number of manufacturing establishments), whenever the 
normal sampling procedure specify that more than 120 plants have to be 
surveyed to reach the 85 percent threshold, the number of firms is kept to a 
maximum of 120. In fact, in these highly disaggregated sectors the actual 
coverage is approximately 60 percent of the total manufacturing output of the 
respective class. Similarly, for highly concentrated classes (activities with a 
reduced number of large plants where industrial concentration is very high), 
when the 85 percent threshold is reached by including less than 15 plants, all 
the plants are included (Iacovone, 2008).  
As we can observe from the sampling method, the EIA is skewed towards 
large firms. For instance, while in 1993 the Industrial Census covered 106,748 
plants, the EIA only covered 6.5 percent of the plants sampled in the Census, 
but it represented 85 percent of the total manufacturing output. 
The EIA contains information on employment, total hours worked, wages, 
total production value, revenues from domestic maquila services, domestic 
and export sales, costs of intermediate goods and materials (both national 
                                                 
37
 The CMAP 94 comprises 9 sub-sectors, 50 “ramas” or branches and 309 6-digits classes.  
The EIA covers all  the subsectors and ramas but only 205 classes. 
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and imported), costs of packing, expenditure for technology transfers, R & D 
expenditure, other revenue, inventories, and capital assets and investment.  
The survey identifies plants producing under subcontract (domestic 
outsourcing). Participants in the Maquiladora program are not included in the 
EIA. Hence, to gather data for the Maquiladora firms INEGI implemented a 
survey called Survey of the Export Maquiladora Industry (Encuesta de la 
Industria Maquiladora de Exporetacion, EIME). But the aggregate data on 
total gross production is calculated and published in the National Accounts 
System of Mexico: production, wages, employment and productivity of the 
export Maquiladora industry are described in the following section. 
5.4.2. National Accounts Systems of Mexico (NASM): Production, 
Wages, Employment and Productivity of the Export Maquiladora 
Industry 
 
To calculate the outsourcing ratios at the national level, we need aggregate 
data of the gross total production not only from all the manufacturing 
activities but also for the firms involved in outsourcing. As we are considering 
Maquiladora production as a proxy for outsourcing, the data to calculate the 
outsourcing ratios is obtained from the National Accounts Systems of Mexico: 
Production, Wages, Employment and Productivity of the Export Maquiladora 
Industry (NASM) published by INEGI. For the elaboration of the NASM INEGI 
gathers the information of nearly 3,000 establishments from The Export 
Maquiladora Survey (Encuesta de la Industria Maquiladora de Exportacion, 
EIME) and calculates production, wages, and employment and productivity 
indicators of the Export Maquiladora Industry. The data is classified according 
to Mexico’s National Accounts System codes to make it compatible with the 
information of the other manufacturing industries. The data for the 
Manufacturing and Maquiladora activities are reported separately.  
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The NASM contains the following information:  
 Total gross production at current and constant prices 
 Employment  
 Annual average wages by type of worker 
 Productivity rates 
 Intermediate consumption (national and imported)  
 Gross value added at current and constant process  
 Balance of trade 
The data are presented disaggregated by industrial activity, by branch of 
economic activity “rama” at the national level, and disaggregated by state. 
 
5.4.3. ENESTYC (National Survey of Employment, Wages, Technology 
and Training) 
 
The ENESTYC is a firm level survey is based on a representative sample of 
manufacturing establishments in 5438 manufacturing activities and has five 
waves with many of the questions referring to the previous calendar year. The 
survey was conducted in 1992, 1995, 1999, 2001 and 2004 with many of the 
questions referring to the previous calendar year. The survey included 5,071 
establishments in 1992, 5,242 in 1994; 6,840 in 1999; 8,181 in 20 01 and 9,920 
in 2004.  
The survey is designed to cover firms of all sizes at four-digit of the 
manufacturing using the CMAP (Mexican Classification of Activities and 
Products) classification in the first four waves and is derived from the EIA 
(Annual Industrial Survey). The last survey changed the classification from 
CMAP to NAICS (North American Industrial Classification). This change makes 
                                                 
38
 Although the ENESTYC includes 54 industries, for this analysis we exclude two sectors 3511 
Basic Petrochemicals; and 3550 Oil Refining since outsourcing practices are null. 
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it difficult to compare the data with previous surveys, but INEGI has a table of 
concordance. 
It is implemented through the joint efforts of INEGI (National Institute of 
Statistics, Geography and Informatics) and the Ministry of Labour, STPS 
(Secretaria del Trabajo y Prevision Social). Unlike the EIA the ENESTYC includes 
maquiladora establishments. In fact, from 1999, due to the fast growth of 
export Maquila activities in Mexico, INEGI decided to include a separate 
section of the ENESTYC devoted exclusively to Maquiladora establishments. In 
the 1999 wave a total of 589 Maquiladora establishments were surveyed and 
in 2001, the sample included 675 establishments.  
The present study includes data from the 1992, 1999 and 2001 ENESTYC 
surveys. We do not include in our analysis data from the 1995 and 2004 waves 
of the ENESTYC. In 1994 the Survey was an annex questionnaire of the 
Industrial Annual Survey (EIA) and the data does not include export 
Maquiladora establishments.  
Finally, the last wave of ENESTYC was not included either, since at the time 
that I conducted the fieldwork the results were not released.   
 
5.4.3.1 Coverage and sampling structure 
 
The sampling frame in each year was stratified by total employment, with 
plants with 100 or more employees sampled with certainty, and a sample of 
plants with less than 100 employees chosen randomly. In 1995 two samples 
were drawn, the first was probabilistic comparable to the samples in 1992, 
1999 and 2001, but Maquiladora plants were excluded. The second sample 
was a follow-up sample for the 1992, and all respondents to the 1992 survey 
that could be traced were included. Only a few Maquiladoras were included 
through this follow-up sample (Verhoogen, 2008). 
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The Survey was designed as separate cross-sections, not as a panel, but since 
large establishments have been sampled with certainty, it is possible to trace 
them and construct a panel with around 906 firms. We did not use the panel 
for our empirical analysis because Maquiladora establishments were not 
included. Since Maquiladora is one of our proxy variables of outsourcing,  
Finally, many questions changed in the questionnaires between waves, but 
several key variables are comparable across years.  
 
5.4.3.2 Content 
 
The ENESTYC contains quantitative and qualitative variables and covers the 
following topics:   
 Characteristics of the establishment: includes information such as the main 
product produced, years of operation, ownership of the firm (domestic or 
foreign), and subsidiary status. 
 Production and organization: contains information on the implementation 
of new methods of organization (e.g. Just in Time, Total Quality Control, 
etc.) and their impact on productive aspects and employment structure; 
value of production and fixed assets; share of installed capacity, costs for 
materials and supplies; expenses in subcontracting and Maquila services 
requested to other establishments; and expenses on waste and/or rework.  
 Market: this section of the survey collects information of the main effects 
of NAFTA on the competitive level of the products produced in the 
establishment in comparison with domestic and imported products; 
production revenues and income from subcontracting services; forms of 
organization with other companies for the purchase of materials, 
machinery and equipment, for training or research activities; destination of 
products (domestic or foreign market); and origin market of the raw 
materials (percentage). 
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 Quality control technology: in this section of the ENESTYC establishments 
are asked if they have implemented any quality control method (e.g. ISO 
9000); quality assurance procedures; if they have acquired new machinery 
and equipment; conditions of the machinery and equipment acquired (new 
or used); and the effects of the acquisition of machinery and equipment on 
the production and employment structure. Finally firms have to answer if 
they have carried out any research and technological development 
activities. 
 Employment: this section gathers data on the number of workers in 
different occupational levels by gender, level of education and age of the 
workers; unionisation; type of contract; hours worked; existence of 
vacancies and job profile required to cover the vacancy; terms covered by 
the collective contract and by the law, as well as the characteristics of the 
staff recruitment. 
 Wages: salary categories and the variation between the highest and lowest 
category; benefits and payments for the different occupational levels; and 
overtime worked by occupational level and gender. 
 Training: the existence of the Joint Committee of Training, number of 
workers trained and the duration of the courses; type of agents who 
provided the training; firms are also asked if they have knowledge of the 
training programs offered by the government.  
As we can note, the ENESTYC contains very detailed information of the 
establishments. However, one of its drawbacks is that sometimes it is difficult 
to validate and homogenise the answers of the respondents since it comprises 
both qualitative and quantitative data. For example, the survey has two 
related questions regarding R & D practices adopted by firms. In one of them, 
firms have to answer whether or not they invest in R & D. In the second 
question, firms have to specify the amount of money invested in R & D. The 
problem arises because many of the firms answering that they have invested 
in R & D, did not answer the amounts invested in R & D. Hence, it is hard to 
validate the data or to make inferences if they are really investing in R & D.  
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Despite these inconsistencies the information included in the survey is very 
rich and comprehensive and at least we can have a glance of firms’ behaviours 
and practices. 
The reason why we selected the ENESTYC as the main source of data for our 
empirical analysis is because it elicited information regarding outsourcing 
practices, both contracting out and being subcontracted by a third firm. 
Hence, we can take this second variable as s proxy for outsourcing and relate 
it with other firm specific characteristics to understand more about the nature 
of the phenomenon and the likely benefits for supplier firms involved. We are 
particularly interested in the analysing the phenomenon from the perspective 
of the supplier firms, since as far as the author knows, there is limited 
research on this area. 
 
5.5. Data Management 
 
Each plant surveyed by the ENESTYC was assigned an identifier composed of 
its 4-digit class of activity and additional 6-digit code “folio”. Jointly these two 
codes allow us to identify each plant and merge the data from the 
Manufacturing and Maquiladora surveys of the ENESTYC. The following 
sections describe the process of data merging, deflating of variables, cleaning 
of data. 
5.5.1. Merging the Maquiladora and Manufacturing surveys 
 
For each of the waves of the ENESTYC consists of three different files for the 
Manufacturing and three for the Maquiladora Surveys. Since questions of the 
Maquiladora and Manufacturing survey are compatible, the two databases 
were merged. Table  5.3 shows the total sample size after merging the 
databases in 1999 and 2001.  
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Table  5.3 Number of firms after merging the files 
 
Year Manufacturing Maquila Total 
1999 6,840 589 7,429 
2001 8,181 675 8,856 
Source: Author’s calculations with data from ENESTYC 1999 and 2001.  
 
5.5.2. Deflating variables 
 
All the variables reported in the ENESTYC are in current nominal values, so it 
was necessary to transform them into constant 1994 pesos. In order to do this 
transformation we basically used two different deflators: producer prices 
index and consumer prices index. The deflators were obtained from the 
Mexican Central Bank (BANXICO).  
The total revenues were deflated using the producer prices expressed in 1994 
Mexican pesos. Similarly Maquila Income and Outsourcing income series are 
deflated using the same producer-price index.  
Labour costs: the wage bill of the three different categories was deflated to 
1994 pesos by the main consumer price index published by the Mexican 
Central Bank. 
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5.5.3. Data Cleaning 
 
The following establishments were removed:  
 Establishments that report zero or missing values for total revenue, 
average employment and average weekly hours worked.  
 When we calculated productivity there were establishment with 
exaggerated figures either too high or too low productivity levels due 
to inconsistencies in the data (e.g. the value added was too high and 
the firm had only one or two employees) were removed. To remove 
these observations first we plotted a scatter diagram to identify 
potential outlier points, and then we checked these cases to remove 
them from the data. 
After the data cleaning procedure we finish with the following number of 
firms for the econometric analysis (see Table  5.4) 
Table  5.4 Total number of firms after cleaning procedure 
Year Number of firms 
1992 4,882 
1999 6,096 
2001 6,888 
Source: Author’s calculations with data from ENESTYC 1992, 1999 and 2001 
 
5.5.4. Definition of Variables 
 
To start building up the variables used for our empirical analysis we used the 
following variables from the ENESTYC: 
 Total revenues: Total sum of annual sales’ income, fixing and 
maintenance’s income, concession of patents and trademarks’ income, 
income received for Maquila and outsourcing services and other 
income. We are using total revenue, because we do not have 
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disaggregated information on production. The survey only includes 
total output, and to measure the ratio of outsourcing we need 
disaggregated information on maquila. Thus, using revenues is more 
convenient because the information is disaggregated and we can 
identify and weight outsourcing on total revenues.  As for the Maquila 
Survey, revenues are more disaggregated and we can identify the part 
of the sales channelled to the domestic market as well as to the 
foreign market. 
 Maquila Income: Monetary amount received by the firms for the 
production, assembly or any other transformation done to raw 
materials of a third party. Firms reporting this type of income are 
registered in the Maquiladora programme.  
 Subcontracting Income: Total amount of money obtained by the firm 
for its specialized services offered in the production of the one or any 
of the different stages of the production process which are part of its 
core activities. It is based on the firm’s competitive advantage as 
compared to other firms, which allow it to increase its technical 
experience and productive efficiency 
 Foreign ownership status: The survey distinguishes three types of 
ownership: private, foreign and public. However, most of the firms in 
the survey are private and foreign. We created a dummy variable 
which takes the value of 1 if plant has 10 percent or more foreign 
ownership, 0 otherwise. 
 Exports: is the ratio of total exports to output.  
 Size of the firm: The survey classifies firms into four categories 
according to the number of employees, micro (from 1 to 15 workers), 
small (16-100), medium (101 to 250) and large (more than 250 
workers). 
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 Wages and employment The survey distinguishes four categories of 
wages and employment39:  
 General production workers 
 Specialized production workers  
 Administrative, technical and clerks and  
 Managers  
However, Verhoogen (2008), points that these categories are not very 
accurate and can led to a significant amount of noise in the data, particularly 
in the distinction between general and specialized production workers. The 
problem is that some plants report all their general production workers under 
the specialized production workers category and the latest under the general 
production workers. For this reason, the author suggests that it is better to 
aggregate specialized and general production workers into one category (blue 
collar). Therefore we aggregated wages and employment into three 
categories in the present analysis:  
 Managers 
 White collar: which comprises the administrative, 
technical and clerks and  
 Blue collar: includes general production workers 
(unskilled blue collar) and specialized production 
workers (skilled blue collar). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39
 Data are expressed in average yearly employment.  
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5.6. Significance of Outsourcing in the Mexican Manufacturing Industry 
 
Previous chapters show trends in the significance of outsourcing at the global 
level using trade statistics, but the question of how significant outsourcing is 
in Mexico, has not been addressed yet. This section presents trends of 
outsourcing intensity in the Mexican manufacturing Industry and summary 
statistics at the firm level showing the number of supplier firms participating 
in outsourcing and some of the main characteristics of firms engaged in 
outsourcing. We present trends at the national level using data from the EIA 
and National Accounts System, and at the firm level using the ENESTYC.  
The EIA and National Accounts System of Mexico for Maquiladora firms are 
used to paint a broad picture of trends of outsourcing intensity from 1994 to 
2004. Figure  5.2 shows Mexico’s total gross value of production (GVP) 
compared with domestic and foreign outsourcing GVP. We can observe that 
after Mexico joined to NAFTA in 1994 there is a slow but steady growth of the 
GVP until 2000. From 2000 to 2001 the entire industrial activity in Mexico 
including the Maquiladora entered into a crisis. In the case of the 
Maquiladoras, from 2000 to 2003 personnel occupied dropped 17.7 percent 
and the number of Maquiladora establishments decreased 20.5 percent. 
However, from 2004 we can observe a recovery.  According to Toledo (2007), 
the causes of the crises can be explained by three primary factors:  
1. Decrease of the demand for Maquila products due to the economic 
recession in the United States  
2. Competition from other low wage countries such as China and 
Central American countries that have provoked the closure of 
plants in Mexico and their relocation to other countries. 
3. The growth of Maquila wages in Mexico over the last years has 
reduced the sector’s profit margin. 
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Figure  5.2 Mexico’s Gross Value of Total Production vs. Outsourcing GVP 
 
Source: Author’s calculations with data from ENESTYC 1992, 1999 and 2001  
 
The author argues that with exception of the first argument, all of these 
causes suggest that Maquiladoras competitive advantage is based on low 
wages, and when this advantage is reduced or eliminated, foreign 
Maquiladoras are more likely to leave the country or close the plants to 
relocate their production into a cheaper location.  
To measure the magnitude of the outsourcing production and answer our first 
question we take as a proxy of outsourcing the variable Maquiladora gross 
value of production (GVP), and the ratio is calculated as follows: 
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Figure  5.3 shows outsourcing ratios intensities from 1994 to 2004 in the 
Mexican Manufacturing sector. During this period outsourcing ratios show an 
upward trend especially in the production devoted to foreign markets. In 
1994, 18.4 percent of total production in the Mexican manufacturing sector 
was produced by local suppliers involved in outsourcing. By 2004, we can 
observe that nearly one third of the total production was subcontracted. It is 
interesting to note that suppliers involved in outsourcing are more exposed to 
the export markets. This is because United States firms have used Mexico as 
one of their most important off-shoring destination to carry out particular 
stages of their production (Bergin, et. al. 2009).  
We can also distinguish in Figure  5.3, two different periods of the outsourcing 
model in Mexico. During the first period, that we can call the “boom period”, 
spanning from 1994 to 2000 the average annual growth rate of outsourcing 
was 10 percent, whereas in the second stage called the “crisis period”, the 
average annual growth rate was minus 2 percent.  
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Figure  5.3 Outsourcing Intensity Ratios 
 
Source: Author’d calculations from Industrial Annual Survey (EIA) and National Accounts 
Systems of Mexico data. 
In 2006 we can observe that the outsourcing intensity is starting to improve, 
but there is still no certainty that this type of production model will be able to 
recover the role held in the 1990s (De la Garza, 2007).  
Bergin, et. al. (2009), suggest that this type of production entails excessive 
volatility and to some extent is driven by the business cycles of the US 
economy. For instance, Dickerson (2005), published in the business section of 
Los Angeles Times that the Mexican car industry is highly susceptible to 
fluctuations in demand of American Brand Automobiles. In this sense, the Big 
Three’s (General Motors, Ford and Daimler Chrysler) shrinking U.S. market 
jeopardized one of Mexico’s main industries, and drove to a decline in the 
production volume, exports and employment from 2001.  
The present thesis unfortunately does not explore this crisis period because of 
data availability, instead we offer an analysis of the period when outsourcing 
through the Maquiladora scheme became a central part of the economic 
export model in Mexico. 
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To have a closer picture of this type of production model, the following part of 
the thesis presents statistics from the ENESTYC. As was previously mentioned, 
this survey offers more detailed description of firms and most importantly it 
identifies outsourcing and off-shoring practices under subcontracting and 
Maquiladora income.  
In order to measure outsourcing using the ENESTYC data, we take as proxy 
variable the share of total revenue received by firms for performing other 
firm’s production, assembly, or any transformation at any of the different 
stages of the production process to total revenue. This revenue is reported in 
the survey as Maquiladora and subcontracting income. Although there may be 
limitations of this empirical measure; with the available data this is the best 
approximation to capture the extent of outsourcing and off-shoring in the 
Mexican manufacturing industry.  
Once we calculated the outsourcing ratios we create a dummy variable to 
identify non-outsourcing suppliers from the outsourcing ones. The non-
outsourcing firms are those whose outsourcing ratios range from 0 to 59 
percent, whereas outsourcing firms are those whose ratios are greater than 
60 percent. This percentage has been selected since the number of supplier 
firms engaged in outsourcing gradually increase from this point. In addition, 
when we scatter the ratio of outsourcing with other independent variables 
such as foreign ownership and exports we can observe an upward trend from 
this cut-off point. A detailed discussion of this cut-off point is provided in 
Chapter 6. 
Taking this measure for outsourcing, we calculated the total number of firms 
participating in outsourcing as suppliers in 1992, 1999 and 2001 (see Figure 
 5.4). In 1992 we can observe that only 638 of the firms surveyed were 
engaged as suppliers in outsourcing, in 1999 the number of firms increased to 
1,017 and by 2001 the number reached a total of 1,182 firms. It is important 
to highlight that Maquiladora firms play a key role in as supplier firms involved 
in outsourcing and off-shoring. In 1999 nearly 50 percent out of the 1,017 
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firms involved in outsourcing correspond to Maquiladoras and by 2001, 
Maquiladoras represent 66 percent of the total number of supplier involved in 
outsourcing. In 1992 we cannot distinguish how many firms were involved in 
outsourcing, because the data of the survey does not allow identifying the 
number of firms registered  as Maquiladoras. 
Figure  5.4 Number of Supplier Firms Engaged in Outsourcing 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC 1992, 1999 and 2001 . 
 
If we cross the information from Figure  5.3 we can conclude that in 2000 31.3 
percent of Mexico’s GVP was produced under outsourcing agreements by 13 
percent of Mexican supplier firms. Although, these figures provide a general 
overview of the significance of outsourcing in Mexico, we aim to go further, 
and explore the characteristics of supplier firms engaged in outsourcing. For 
this reason, we propose a simple typology of firms, based in some firm-
specific characteristics that have been found to be relevant in the literature 
review Chapter 2. 
For this classification, we distinguish whether the firm is involved in 
outsourcing or not, whether is a national or foreign firm and finally whether is 
an exporter or not. 
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Figure  5.5 shows a diagram with the proposed typology of non-outsourcing 
and outsourcing firms. To illustrate the distribution of firms we added the 
numbers to each of the categories using data from the 2001 ENESTYC survey. 
One interesting thing to note is the concentration pattern of the supplier firms 
involved in outsourcing. We can distinguish that supplier firms are 
concentrated into two main groups. Firstly, we have a significant number of 
firms that are national and non-exporters. Secondly, there are a large number 
of firms that are foreign and exporters. Hence, most of national suppliers 
involved in outsourcing do not export their products, whereas the foreign 
firms are the ones exposed to the foreign markets.   
Probably one of the obstacles for national firms to become exporters is the 
large entry sunk costs. Research on exporting plants in other countries has 
found that the sunk costs of becoming an exporter are quite high. For 
instance, Das et. al (2007),found in Colombia that among small producers, 
average entry costs range from $430,000 U.S dollars for leather producers to 
$412,000 U.S. dollars for knitting mills. For large producers, the average cost 
of entering into a foreign market is lower, ranging from an average of 
$344,000 U.S. dollars for basic chemical producers to $402,000 U.S. dollars for 
knitting mills. The authors also argue that the lower costs for large firms may 
reflect differences in the types of goods they are exporting and/or the market 
they serve. Size advantages may also result from existing contracts and 
distribution channels among large plants or from larger office operations. 
Our data on the outsourcing plants do not allow us to calculate the sunk costs, 
besides this is not an issue that we are interested in addressing in this thesis. 
We are interested in analysing the characteristics of the firms involved in 
outsourcing and to identify the different groups in which these firms are 
concentrated in order to draw inferences for the econometric analysis of the 
following chapters.  
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Figure  5.5 Typology of firms in the recipient country, 2001. 
Source: Author’s creation with data from ENESTYC, 2001. 
The typology proposed in Figure  5.5 is simplified to the extent that not all the 
characteristics of the supplier firms concerned in outsourcing and the 
contractual agreements entailed in the relationship are taken into account. In 
reality the typology can be more complex, however because of limitations of 
data, we are not able to distinguish some relationships that can not be 
considered as outsourcing. Some these examples are listed below: 
 Suppose that a MNC in the U.S. relocates the production of some its 
parts and components to its Mexican subsidiary which is registered as 
a Maquiladora. In this case both firms are vertically integrated and the 
exports of the parts and components from the Maquiladora to its 
parent company in the U.S correspond to intra-firm trade rather than 
outsourcing.  
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 Suppose that Wall Mart in the U.S. buys power replacement cables for 
computers from a Mexican Maquiladora firm. Although the firm in 
Mexico is registered as a Maquiladora, by no means the contractual 
relationship corresponds to outsourcing.  
Despite all these drawbacks, this thesis provides a broad picture of the 
phenomenon in the Mexican Manufacturing industry.   
The following section presents descriptive statistics of variables that can be 
related to the characteristics of the supplier firms involved in outsourcing.  
These descriptive data help us to identify the likely characteristics of the 
suppliers firms involved in outsourcing that will be considered in our next 
empirical chapters. 
 
5.7. Characteristics of the supplier firms involved in outsourcing 
 
In Chapter 2 we reviewed empirical studies of the characteristics of the firms 
involved in outsourcing from the perspective of both the lead and supplier 
firms. A different set of variables were found to be positive and significant. 
For instance, from the perspective of the lead firm labour costs, labour 
productivity, size of the firm, market changes, skill requirement, product 
innovation, R & D, industry size, export propensity, age, market competition, 
foreign ownership and agglomeration were found to be significant and 
positively correlated to the firm’s decision to outsource. Conversely, from the 
supplier’s perspective, the number of hours worked, the number of firms 
operating in the same sector, advertisement expenses, the number of female 
workers, and the share of expenditures on communication services to total 
sales revenue were found to be positive and significant. 
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Taking into account previous studies, with the data available in the ENESTYC, 
we selected the following set of variables to explain the possible 
characteristics of the firms involved in outsourcing: foreign ownership, export 
propensity, size, subsidiary status, labour skills, and dummies for each of the 
industries to explore different pattern of concentration of the suppliers 
involved in outsourcing. Hence, this section aims to answer the following 
questions:  
1. Are foreign or national firms more likely to engage in outsourcing 
as suppliers? 
2. Do exporting supplier firms more easily engage in outsourcing? 
3. Do subsidiary firms tend to be more involved in outsourcing? 
4. What is the size of the supplier firms involved in outsourcing? 
5. Are supplier firms involved in more labour or capital intensive 
activities?  
6. What kinds of industries concentrate a larger number of supplier 
firms engaged in outsourcing? 
Hence the aim of this section is to explore potential variables that can explain 
different characteristics of firms involved in outsourcing. This is a merely 
exploratory analysis, which will help us to draw some helpful inferences for 
the econometric analysis of the next chapter.  
 
5.7.1. Ownership status 
 
Ownership status is among one of the main characteristics that we are 
considering in our analysis. According to the developmental approach 
explained in Chapter 2, outsourcing opens up channels to suppliers in 
developing countries to integrate into global production networks. Hence, if 
the developmental approach holds, we would expect a significant number of 
more domestic firms rather than foreign firms engaged in outsourcing.  
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However, Sturgeon and Lester (2003), identify a new global supply-base 
model started to develop, where lead firms are increasingly relying on large 
suppliers and contract manufacturer in their country of origin to support their 
global operations. For instance, in the case of the automobile industry during 
the 1990s there was a wave of new assembly and supplier plant construction 
in emerging markets such as China, India, Thailand, Vietnam, Brazil, Mexico 
and East Europe. As the number of production locations increased, 
automakers looked to streamline operations on a global scale, particularly in 
vehicle design and component sourcing. The globalisation of the motor 
vehicle industry changed the relationship between automakers and their 
largest suppliers. In this relationship first tier-suppliers are in charge of the 
module design; second tier component sourcing, and provision of local 
content in emerging markets. In order to supply automakers with modules on 
a worldwide basis first-tier suppliers started to expand geographically. 
Companies like Bosch, Johnson Controls, Lear, Magna, Siemens Automotive, 
TRV, Yazaki, and others are an example of this wave of geographic expansion. 
(Sturgeon and Lester, 2003). Thus, considering this example we can also 
expect that firms engaged in outsourcing as suppliers might be foreign owned.  
Empirical evidence is limited, and it has focused on developed countries. In 
Japan Kimura (2002), finds that foreign-owned share is positive related to the 
probability of using subcontractors and negative to the probability of working 
as subcontractor (Kimura, 2002). So, the question of whether foreign firms 
might have greater presence than domestic firms as suppliers in the context 
of developing countries is still open.  
Table  5.5  shows the total number of outsourcing and non-outsourcing firms 
by ownership status in the Mexican Manufacturing Industry. We can observe 
nearly 43 percent of suppliers engaged in outsourcing are foreign in 1992; 49 
percent in 1999; and 47 percent in 2001. Hence, the proportion of domestic 
firms involved in outsourcing is greater than the proportion of national firms 
for the three years of the analysis.   
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Table  5.5 Outsourcing and Ownership status 
Ownership 
Status 
1992 1999 2001 
Non-out Out Non-out Out Non-out Out 
National 3,703 363 5,690 518 6,863 632 
Foreign 730 275 722 499 811 550 
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001. 
 
5.7.2. Export propensity 
 
There are several reasons to expect suppliers involved in outsourcing to be 
more likely to export their output. Firstly, the GVC approach emphasizes that 
value chains promote inter-firm networks, by which developing-country 
producers through foreign buyers are able to access foreign markets (Bair 
Dussel-Petters, 2006). 
Secondly, the development of the production-sharing scheme “806/807” 
(discussed in Chapter 3), where U.S. firms were able to export parts and 
components to lower-wage locations such as Mexico and other countries in 
the Caribbean basin for assembly and re-import on a duty free basis opened 
opportunities to developing country suppliers to export their products. For 
Mexico, the implementation of NAFTA in 1994 reinforced and promoted a 
higher degree integration and trade between Mexican, U.S and to lesser 
extent Canadian firms.  
For these reasons, we expect that supplier firms involved in outsourcing are 
more likely to export their production. Table  5.6 reports export propensity 
ratios for non-outsourcing and outsourcing firms. We consider a firm as an 
exporter if at least 50 percent or more of its total production is exported.  
Results suggest that with exception of 1992, firms involved in outsourcing as 
suppliers tend to export more than non-outsourcing firms.  In 1999 and 2001; 
approximately 60 percent of the firms involved in outsourcing exported more 
than 50 percent of their production. During 1992 we can not observe a 
significant number of supplier firms engaged in outsourcing exporting their 
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production, for two reasons. Maquiladora firms are not included in the survey 
and also because Mexico’s export boom took place after joining to NAFTA (see 
Table  5.6).  
Table  5.6 Outsourcing and export propensity 
Export Status 
1992 1999 2001 
Non-out Out Non-out Out Non-out Out 
Non-exporter 4,169 613 5,877 410 7,091 474 
Exporter 264 25 535 607 583 708 
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001.  
 
5.7.3. Size 
 
Size of the firm is another important variable exerting some influence over 
owners/managers of the firms to disintegrate their production and contract 
out some segments, or to suppliers willing to receive other firms’ production. 
The dualistic approach expresses that lead firms in developed countries 
outsource to reduce production costs and to smooth production cycles at the 
expense of small suppliers. In this sense, the dualistic approach suggests that 
primarily small firms assume the role of suppliers in the outsourcing 
relationship. Empirical results by Taimaz and Kiliςaslan (2005), support this 
argument finding in the Turkish textile industry that large high wage firms 
tend to subcontract a large part of production and small firms receive the 
contracts.  
In the case of the Mexican Manufacturing industry, this argument does not 
hold and results suggest that more than 70 percent of the suppliers involved 
in outsourcing are large and medium firms for the three waves of the survey  
(see Table  5.7). 
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Table  5.7 Size of non-outsourcing and outsourcing firms 
Firm size  
1992 1999 2001 
Non-out Out Non-out Out Non-out Out 
Large 1,491 273 1,732 588 1,729 721 
Medium 1,426 197 1,768 219 1,904 213 
Small 908 99 1,119 92 1,659 105 
Micro 608 69 1,793 118 2,382 143 
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001. 
 
 
The limited participation of small and micro firms in outsourcing might 
suggest that these types of firms are not able to engage in outsourcing due to 
high sunk costs that they have to face to start supplying lead firms; or they 
may not be able to fulfil the quantity and quality standards set by the lead 
firms. Another explanation can be that lead firms bring their own suppliers 
from their home countries which may be large firms. 
 
5.7.4. Subsidiary status 
 
Multinational firms most of the time develop large networks among their 
affiliates that source factories all over the world (Gereffi, 1999). According to 
Cusmano et. al. (2010), being part of a group is important for international 
outsourcing because firms are integrated in a larger network of providers and 
potential clients.  The authors find strong evidence that groups subsidiaries 
rather than headquarters are driving international outsourcing activities. Also, 
after interacting subsidiary status and foreign ownership, it is found that 
foreign owned subsidiaries affect positively the probability of international 
outsourcing. Hence, we would expect a positive relationship between the 
subsidiary status and the probability of engaging in outsourcing as supplier.  
Descriptive data for the Mexican Manufacturing Industry confirms Cusmano 
et. al, research findings. Figure  5.6 shows that in 1992; 41.38 percent of the 
total number of supplier firms involved in outsourcing were subsidiaries and 
in 1999 and 2001, approximately 61 percent of the total number supplier 
firms involved in outsourcing were subsidiaries.  
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Figure  5.6  Percentage of Subsidiary Firms 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001. 
 
Table  5.8 shows more disaggregated figures of subsidiary firms by ownership 
and exporting status. Data shows that during 1992 and 2001 more than 40 
percent of the supplier firms engaged in outsourcing are foreign subsidiaries 
and between 39.73 and 42.97 are foreign subsidiaries producing for the 
export markets.  
Unfortunately, one of the limitations of the data is that it is impossible to 
distinguish whether these subsidiaries are operating under vertical integrated 
or arm’s length market transactions. If their production corresponds to 
vertical integration and trade happens through intra-firm transactions. This 
type of production can not be considered as outsourcing, and we might be 
over estimating the magnitude of the phenomenon. But as it was mentioned 
in previous lines, we can not distinguish in detail the type of transaction that 
firms are engaged in. This is one of the shortcomings of this analysis . 
 
 
1992
1999
2001
20.35%
32.24%
29.11%
41.38%
61.26%
61.25%
Percentage of Subsidiary firms
Non-out Out
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Table  5.8  Subsidiary status 
Year 
Non-outsourcing Outsourcing 
National Foreign National Foreign 
Non-exp. Exp. Non-exp. Exp. Non-exp. Exp. Non-exp. Exp. 
1992 12.34 0.38 5.64 1.99 10.50 0.00 29.15 1.72 
1999 21.62 1.82 6.60 2.20 11.01 6.29 0.98 42.97 
2001 19.53 1.58 5.89 2.11 11.34 8.04 2.12 39.76 
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001.  
 
5.7.5. Share of imported raw materials 
 
We also include the variable share of imported raw materials because the 
legal regime of the Maquiladora firms provides tax exemption for the raw 
materials imported. Since our main proxy for outsourcing transactions is 
Maquiladora’s production we propose that the share of imported raw 
materials is an important characteristic of the supplier firms involved in 
outsourcing.  
Figure  5.7 scatters the relationship between these two variables and shows a 
positive relationship between the ratio of imported raw materials and 
outsourcing. We can also appreciate that firms with higher outsourcing ratios 
are more likely to have higher shares of imported raw materials used in their 
production. 
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Figure  5.7 Relationship between the ratio of outsourcing and the share of 
imported raw materials used by supplier firms involved in outsourcing 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001. 
 
Table  5.9 shows that over the three waves of the survey, more than the 48 
percent of the supplier firms engaged in outsourcing imported more than 50 
percent of their raw materials. 
 
Table  5.9 Percentage of firms importing more than 50 percent of their raw 
materials 
Year Non-outsourcing Outsourcing 
1992 16.2 49.7 
1999 11.9 48.0 
2001 11.5 51.4 
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC , 1992, 1999 and 2001. 
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5.7.6. Skills  
 
Human capital seems to be a good and highly significant predictor of 
outsourcing behaviour in developed countries (Tomiura 2005; Cusmano, 
2010) and in developing countries (Taimaz and Kiliςaslan, 2005).  
In developing countries Taimaz and Kiliςaslan, (2005), find in the Turkish 
textile industry that firms employing less skilled labour are more likely to 
engage in outsourcing as subcontractors.  
Taking into account these arguments, we selected the variable years of 
schooling to describe the skills of the labour employed by the non-outsourcing 
and outsourcing firms. 
To test the statistical differences of the means of the skill intensity of labour 
use in outsourcing and non outsourcing firms the t-test is conducted at the 1 
per cent. Difference in skill intensity of labour use in outsourcing suppliers 
compared with non-outsourcing firms is always statistically significant40. 
In addition, Table  5.10 shows during 1992 and 1999 58.2 percent and 49.2 
percent of the employees of suppliers firms involved in outsourcing were 
unskilled having less than 6 years of schooling. By 2001, we can observe a 
significant increase in the years of schooling of the employees working with 
outsourcing firms as 52 percent of them had from 7 to 12 years of schooling. 
However, compared to non-outsourcing firms, it seems that suppliers 
engaged in outsourcing contract labour with lower years of education. 
Probably because the activities in which they concentrate are low-value 
added activities which require minimal skills.  
 
                                                 
40
 Independent t-tests were conducted and significant differences in years of schooling are 
found between non-outsourcing and outsourcing firms. In 1992, t(5055)=9.32, p=0.00 (two-
tailed); 1999, t(7393)=9.33, p=0.00 (two-tailed); and in 2001, t(8522)=7.98, p=0.00 (two-
tailed). 
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Table  5.10  Percentual distribution of employees by schooling category 
Years of 
schooling 
1992 1999 2001 
Non-out Out Non-out Out Non-out Out 
0-6 years 43.2 58.2 26.3 49.2 31.5 40.5 
7-12 years 46.0 34.5 61.7 45.1 58.0 52.9 
more than 12 10.8 7.0 12.0 5.7 10.6 6.6 
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001 . 
 
5.7.7. Concentration of outsourcing activities by industry 
 
Concentration ratios of outsourcing are calculated at the industry level to 
observe from a sectoral perspective a pattern of specialization of and also 
identify inter-industry variations in outsourcing intensity. The outsourcing 
ratio in industry   is calculated as follows: 
              j
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j
j
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j
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     
where   corresponds to the industry; and   denotes the firm. 
The logic behind outsourcing is that firms in developed countries tend to 
source abroad to cut costs by contracting out activities to firms that operate 
with lower costs or labour abundant countries where market wages are lower 
(Girma and Görg, 2004). Results confirm that labour intensive industries are 
the ones with higher outsourcing ratios (see Table  5.11).  
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In particular, with outsourcing ratios higher than 40 percent in at least two 
waves of the survey are: Textile, Fabric Finishing and Fabric Coating Mills 
(3213); Wearing and Apparel manufacturing (3220); Machinery and 
equipment and electric accessories (3831); Electronic equipment (ratio, T.V 
and communication) (3832); Transport equipment and part/except autos and 
trucks (3842); and Instruments and precision equipment manufacturing 
(includes surgical equipment) (3850). 
Industries with low outsourcing intensity ratios are more concentrated on the 
Food (31), Paper (34); Chemicals (35); Clay, Glass and Cement (36) and Basic 
Metals (37). 
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Table  5.11 Outsourcing ratios by industries 
Industry 1992 1999 2001 
3111 Meat Products 2.53 5.52 7.59 
3112 Dairy Products 0.51 0.50 0.45 
3113 Processing and preserving of foods/ exclude meat and milk 1.39 5.25 7.19 
3114 Grain Mill  products , s tarch products and cereals 0.17 6.16 1.76 
3115 Bread 2.14 2.01 1.05 
3116 Tortillas and Nixtamal Milling 2.52 1.47 0.51 
3117 Edible oils and fats 1.25 3.80 0.73 
3118 Sugar 0.44 0.16 0.11 
3119 Cocoa, chocolate and confectionary 1.86 2.98 2.74 
3121 Other human feed products 1.56 0.22 0.17 
3122 Prepared animal feeds 0.47 0.24 0.34 
3130 Beverages 1.11 1.45 0.68 
3140 Tobacco Products 0.49 1.88 0.62 
3211 Fibre, Yarn and Thread Mills 0.73 0.08 15.99 
3212 Fabric Mills 11.34 5.75 13.36 
3213 Textile, Fabric Finishing and Fabric Coating Mills 8.28 58.77 66.87 
3214 Textile Furnishing Mills 8.31 16.36 19.57 
3220 Wearing Apparel Manufacturing 29.83 48.30 42.34 
3230 Leather and fur products/except footwear 8.36 28.56 21.56 
3240 Footwear/excludes plastic and rubber products 3.23 6.21 7.92 
3311 Products  of Wood and Carpentry/except furni ture 2.94 5.48 19.50 
3312 
Wooden Containers and other wood products  and cork/except 
furni ture 
3.83 19.23 17.96 
3320 Furniture mostly of wood/includes  mattresses 3.39 20.78 16.45 
3410 Pulp, paper and paper products 0.79 9.24 0.99 
3420 Publishing and printing and related industries 9.03 2.24 4.37 
3512 Basic chemicals , excludes basic petro chemicals 1.02 1.94 1.18 
3513 Synthetic or arti ficial fibres 5.50 0.46 0.62 
3521 Pharmaceuticals 1.73 2.20 3.01 
3522 Chemical Products 1.90 0.57 4.22 
3540 Coke, includes  other coal and oil  derivatives 0.07 0.22 0.77 
3550 Rubber Industry 2.97 7.25 21.01 
3560 Plastic Products 7.72 15.80 25.72 
3611 Ceramics and Pottery 0.57 22.31 43.13 
3812 Metallic frames , tanks  and industrial boilers 78.77 3.75 0.90 
3813 Metallic furniture 5.14 4.71 20.96 
3814 Other metallic products/except machinery and equipment 3.38 16.23 16.81 
3821 Machinery and Equipment for specific purposes 4.68 12.92 3.04 
3822 Machinery and equipment for generic purposes 4.66 8.03 27.39 
3823 Machinery and equipment for offices  and informatics 7.79 14.14 19.53 
3831 Machinery and equipment and electric accessories 16.09 56.51 64.02 
3832 Electronic equipment (radio, tv and communication) 14.61 75.40 86.16 
3833 Devices and accessories for domestic use/except electronics 3.90 30.56 36.20 
3841 Automotive industry 0.58 6.06 6.97 
3842 Transport equipment and parts/except autos and trucks 11.83 8.60 52.03 
3850 
Instruments  and precision equipment manufacturing (includes 
surgical equipment, excludes electronics 
16.21 37.97 60.39 
3900 Other manufacturing industries 6.81 31.38 57.82 
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC , 1992, 1999 and 2001 . 
  
161 
 
5.8. Conclusions 
 
This chapter presented the methodology used in this research, and argued 
that a quantitative research approach appears to be more suitable to answer 
the research questions. The ENESTYC survey is used since it is an extremely 
rich database that provides a large sample of detailed firm-level data that 
allow the development of econometric models as methods of analysis. 
Despite the limitations of the data highlighted in the chapter, inferences of 
the significance of outsourcing and characteristics of the supplier firms in 
Mexico can be drawn. Our main findings are listed as follows: 
Ownership status: the results suggest that the proportion of domestic firms 
involved in outsourcing is greater than the proportion of national firms for the 
three years of the analysis. 
Export propensity: the results show that with exception of 1992; firms 
involved in outsourcing as suppliers tend to export more than non-
outsourcing firms. 
Size: the results suggest that more than 70 percent of the suppliers involved in 
outsourcing are large and medium firms for the three waves of the survey. 
Subsidiary status: our results show that in 1992; 41.38 percent of the 
suppliers involved in outsourcing were subsidiaries and in 1999 and 2001, the 
number increased to approximately 61 percent of the total number supplier 
firms were subsidiaries 
Share of imported raw materials: results show that firms with higher 
outsourcing ratios are more likely to have higher shares of imported raw 
materials used in their production. Over the three waves of the survey, more 
than the 48 percent of the supplier firms engaged in outsourcing imported 
more than 50 percent of their raw materials 
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Labour skills: results suggest that suppliers engaged in outsourcing contract 
labour with lower years of education. Probably because the activities in which 
they concentrate are low-value added activities which require minimal skills . 
Industry dummy variables: results show that supplier firms involved in 
outsourcing tend to concentrate in labour intensive industries such as textile 
and wearing apparel manufacturing, plastic products and basic metals . 
However, a more comprehensive analysis is conducted in the Chapters 6, in 
order to test the joint predictive power of the selected variables. 
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Chapter 6 Characteristics of Outsourcing 
from the supplier’s perspective: Evidence 
from the Mexican Manufacturing 
Industry 
 
6.1.  Introduction 
 
Outsourcing has been undertaken by an increasing number of firms over the 
last two decades. However, empirical investigations analysing the firm’s 
decision to outsource has focused on the buyer’s position on developed 
countries (e.g. Antras and Helpman (2004); Tomiura (2005); Girma and Görg 
(2004); Görg, Hanley and Strobl (2004); Diaz-Mora (2006 and 2008) and Holl 
(2008). From the empirical and theoretical evidence available to date, we can 
understand only one aspect of outsourcing. The present study provides 
further new empirical evidence focuses on the characteristics of outsourcing 
from the perspective of the supplier. This analysis concentrates on the 
Mexican manufacturing sector using firm level data for 1992, 1999 and 2001. 
One of the limitations to analyze the characteristics of outsourcing from the 
supplier’s perspective is the lack of theoretical and empirical evidence related 
to the topic. To identify the characteristics of outsourcing in less developed 
countries (LDC), Chapter 2 presented an extensive review of variables that 
were included in previous empirical work and that may help us to identify 
possible variables related also to the characteristics of suppliers in developing 
countries and Chapter 5 presented a descriptive analysis of these variables to 
explore their relation with outsourcing. Hence, this chapter aims test the 
explanatory power of these variables by using a probit model. The first part of 
this chapter presents the exploratory analysis followed by the correlation 
analysis. Then it presents the results of the probit model for the three waves 
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of the survey. Finally it presents the main conclusions and findings derived 
from the results. 
6.2. Exploratory Analysis 
 
Table  6.1 reports the means of the explanatory variables for low outsourcing 
and high outsourcing supplier firms with outsourcing ratios lower and greater 
than 60 percent in 1992, 1999 and 2001. Significant differences between the 
two types of firms can be observed over the three waves of the survey.  
Firstly, more than 40 percent of the supplier firms engaged in outsourcing in 
the three waves of the survey are foreign.  This might be explained by the fact 
that MNCs in developed countries tend to relocate activities to countries 
where production costs are considerably lower, such as Mexico. 
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Table  6.1 Summary statistics 
 1992 1999 2001 
Variables 
Low 
Out. 
High 
Out. 
Low 
Out. 
High 
Out. 
Low 
Out. 
High 
Out. 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Ratio Outsourcing (%) 1.63 97.19 1.05 97.76 0.81 98.55 
Foreign (%) 12.53 41.37 9.27 47.87 8.16 45.45 
Exports (%) 8.13 3.80 11.59 60.88 10.18 60.79 
Labour Productivity 41.61 14.15 30.90 12.77 27.55 8.80 
Per-capita annual wages directors1/  155.09 121.77 159.12 152.28 136.16 135.77 
Per-capita annual wages white 
collar1/ 
33.90 31.65 35.79 39.12 31.10 33.58 
Per-capita annual wages blue collar1/ 15.38 13.50 16.27 16.89 14.71 14.39 
Size  (number of employees) 305.92 378.31 258.69 818.85 222.69 861.33 
Age 23.25 13.82 20.56 8.7 21.47 15.80 
Subsidiary (%) 20.35 41.38 32.24 61.26 29.11 61.25 
Quality control (%) n/a n/a 22.26 40.02 25.74 47.63 
Imported raw materials (%) 19.67 49.28 14.46 47.78 13.58 50.66 
Union (%) n/a n/a 59.86 54.67 55.26 53.98 
Investment in R & D (%) 48 39 33.05 29.79 28.81 31.90 
Low skilled labour  
(% of total labour) 
43.20 58.20 26.30 49.23 31.45 40.53 
Medium skilled labour  
(% of total labour) 
46.02 34.77 61.66 45.09 57.97 52.88 
High skilled labour  
(% of total labour) 
10.78 7.03 12.04 5.67 10.57 6.59 
Foreign subsidiary (%) 7.62 30.88 8.80 43.95 8.00 41.88 
Manual equipment (%) 20.21 21.19 31.54 31.48 33.58 29.98 
Machines and tools (%) 38.95 44.57 32.03 35.59 30.61 32.77 
utomatic equipment (%) 20.86 15.59 25.12 23.24 25.90 25.87 
Numerical control (%) 6.09 4.55 2.71 2.87 2.74 2.93 
Computerized numerical control (%) 4.20 3.64 5.23 4.75 5.39 6.64 
Robots (%) 0.68 0.51 0.42 0.69 0.46 1.05 
Total number of firms 4,433 638 6,412 1,017 7,674 1,182 
1/ Thousand of pesos 1994=100 
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001.  
 
Secondly, firms involved in outsourcing tend to be larger in terms of number 
of workers. Probably because the activities in which these firms concentrate 
are more labour intensive, such as 3220, 3831, 3832 and 3212 (see Table 
‎6.1,Table ‎6.2, Table ‎6.3) Moreover, these industries also register the larger 
number of high outsourcing firms. For instance in 1992, 46 percent of the 
total numbers of high outsourcing firms are concentrated on these four 
industries and by 1999 and 2001 more than 50 percent. We can also observe 
that there is a twofold increase of number of firms in 3220, 3831 and 3832.  
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Regarding the age of the firms, suppliers engaged in outsourcing tend to be 
younger that non-outsourcing firms. This might indicate that due to the 
policies offered by the government to attract FDI many new firms in Mexico 
have started operations over the last two decades, especially under the 
Maquiladora scheme.  
 
Table  6.2 Industries concentrating the largest number of high outsourcing 
firms 
Industry 1992 1999 2001 
3220 Manufacture of wearing apparel except footwear 119 240 280 
3831 Manufacture of electrical industrial machinery and apparatus 81 118 162 
3832 
Manufacture of radio television and communication equipment 
and apparatus 47 99 109 
3212 Manufacture of made-up textile goods except wearing apparel 47 51 60 
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001.  
 
Note also in Table  6.1 that nearly 50 percent of raw materials used by the 
suppliers involved in outsourcing are imported. This is expected as a great 
part of supplier‘s subcontracted are Maquiladora firms and they rely on 
imported raw materials. 
Labour productivity tends to be considerably lower for the suppliers engaged 
in outsourcing than for the manufacturing firms with lower outsourcing ratios. 
This result is surprising, as we were expecting that supplier firms contracted 
by other firms were more productive than non-outsourcing firms. This might 
indicate that productive firms are not interested in engaging in outsourcing or 
that probably the segments in which the subcontracted activities are 
concentrated are more labour intensive activities.  For instance, a significant 
number of high outsourcing suppliers are concentrated on the manufacture of 
“wearing and apparel”. Due to data aggregation, we can not distinguish the 
specific activities in which these firms specialize or the exact nature of work 
for example if they are sewing clothes or cutting the fabric. Further 
disaggregation of data might be of help to explain the differences in 
productivity, as a sewing firm is more labour intensive than a cutting firm.  
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We also observe that suppliers who outsource are more likely to use labour 
with lower skill and pay lower salaries than non-outsourcing suppliers. This is 
consistent with the labour cost saving motivation of outsourcing from the 
perspective of the lead firm. It is also supported by the fact that wages are 
lower for blue-collar workers as compared to wages of blue-collar workers of 
non-outsourcing firms.  
These preliminary findings on productivity and wages are similar to those of 
Puyana and Romero (2005), shown in.Table  6.3  Selected variables of the 
performance of the non-Maquiladora and Maquiladora in Mexico. Although, 
the authors distinguish between Maquiladora and Non-maquiladora activities; 
we can compare our results on the basis that most of the supplier firms 
involved in outsourcing are Maquiladora firms. 
Table  6.3 shows selected variables of the performance of non-Maquiladora 
and Maquiladora industry in Mexico. Overall, we note that employment, value 
added, average wages and productivity have increased in both Maquila and 
Non-Maquila industries from 1988 to 2001. However, value added, average 
wages and productivity is lower for Maquiladora firms, particularly in the 
“wearing an apparel” industry.  
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Table  6.3  Selected variables of the performance of the non-Maquiladora 
and Maquiladora in Mexico. 
Year 
Employment 1/ Wages 2/ Value Added 2/ Average wages3/ Productivity 3/ 
Non-
Maquila 
Maquila Non-Maquila Maquila Non-Maquila Maquila 
Non-
Maquila 
Maquila 
Non-
Maquila 
Maquila 
Automotive Industry 
1988 0.27 0.07 7,032 1,360 16,416 1,746 26.26 18.5 61.31 23.75 
1993 0.35 0.1 9,828 2,059 25,417 2,686 28.24 19.93 73.03 26.01 
1995 0.32 0.12 7,983 2,390 23,000 3,199 24.73 19.79 71.25 26.49 
1999 0.46 0.19 11,207 3,936 40,408 5,005 24.27 20.27 87.52 25.77 
2000 0.5 0.22 13,114 4,688 47,401 5,469 26.18 26.18 94.62 25.33 
Electric and Electronic Industry 
1988 0.25 0.13 4,999 2,291 8,763 2,843 19.72 18.1 34.56 22.46 
1993 0.29 0.16 6,478 3,015 11,372 3,670 22.16 19.32 38.9 23.51 
1995 0.31 0.19 6,443 3,569 12,401 4,574 22.11 18.83 40.63 24.13 
1999 0.49 0.33 10,180 6,633 23,550 7,787 20.66 19.97 47.79 23.44 
2000 0.57 0.39 12,434 8,366 27,737 9,297 22 21.57 49.08 23.97 
Wearing and Apparel 
1988 0.22 0.03 2,393 296 6,091 387 10.98 9.58 27.94 12.51 
1993 0.23 0.05 2,902 538 7,393 698 12.59 10.6 32.06 13.75 
1995 0.23 0.08 2,450 812 7,103 1,156 10.52 10.07 30.49 14.33 
1999 0.39 0.22 3,928 2,243 9,912 2,961 9.96 10.09 25.14 13.33 
2000 0.42 0.25 4,638 2,728 10,395 3,386 10.96 10.94 24.57 13.58 
Total 
1988 3.03 0.37 61,675 6,072 178,416 7,562 20.29 16.43 58.79 20.47 
1993 3.31 0.53 79,694 9,324 219,934 11,529 24.08 17.72 66.45 21.9 
1995 3.07 0.62 66,625 10,781 217,582 14,174 21.73 17.33 70.95 22.79 
1999 3.91 1.14 80,482 19,736 296,631 24,243 20.58 17.26 75.85 21.2 
2000 4.1 1.29 83,853 24,021 317,092 27,481 21.9 18.69 77.3 21.39 
Source: Puyana and Romero (2005). 
1/ Millions of workers 
2/ Million of pesos 1993=100 
3/ Thousand of per-capita pesos 1993=100 
 
 
6.3. Correlation Analysis 
 
The correlation matrixes for the three waves of the survey are included in 
Appendix 2 tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. This preliminary analysis is conducted to 
explore the different characteristics of the supplier firms that determine their 
engagement in outsourcing activities. The sign out the front indicates whether 
there is a positive or a negative correlation and the value of the coefficient 
can range from -1.00 to 1.00. To interpret the values of the coefficients, 
Cohen (1999, pp. 79-81) suggests the following guidelines:  
r=0.10 to 0.29  low correlation 
r=0.30 to 0.49  medium correlation 
r=0.50 to 1.0  high correlation  
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Since correlations between the independent variables are small (except 
between outsourcing ratio and export intensity), we interpret that there are 
no multicollinearity problems in the regressions. 
The 1992 results suggest that the degree of outsourcing for high outsourcing 
supplier firms has a positive correlation with the variables foreign ownership, 
imported raw materials and foreign subsidiary with the variables that we have 
focused on (Appendix 1 table 2.1).  
In 1999 we have more interesting results suggesting that there is a large and 
positive correlation between exports and the degree of outsourcing and 
positive correlation between the ratio of outsourcing and foreign ownership, 
subsidiary, and imported raw materials (see Appendix 2, table 2.2).  
Finally, in 2001 the degree of outsourcing is positively correlated to foreign 
ownership, export intensity, productivity, per-capita wages of blue collar 
workers, imported raw materials and foreign subsidiary firms (see Appendix 2, 
table 2.3). 
Over the three waves of the analysis, our preliminary results suggest that the 
main variables explaining the characteristics of outsourcing are: foreign 
ownership; imported raw materials; subsidiary status; and exports. 
 Though the positive sign is as expected in these variables, we must wait for 
the regressions simultaneously controlling for many factors.  
 
6.4. Econometric Model 
 
In this section, we describe the econometric methods used to examine the 
characteristics of outsourcing from the perspective of the supplier.  
The econometric analysis consists of two different parts. In the first analysis, 
we estimate a Probit model to determine the firm-specific characteristics that 
are important for supplier firms to engage in outsourcing.  In the second 
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analysis, we use a Tobit model to identify the differences within the firms who 
engage in outsourcing as suppliers and the ones who do not.  
Tobit model is used, as a proportion of observations on the dependent 
variable are zero if a firm is not engaged in any outsourcing and positive if it 
does (see Figure  6.1). Tobit allows simultaneous examination of both the 
probability of outsourcing and the extent of outsourcing. This technique 
makes use of all the observations, both at the limit and those above it 
(Macdonald and Moffit, 1980).  
 
Figure  6.1 Histograms of Outsourcing ratios 
  
   (a)      (b) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001.  
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6.4.1. Probit Estimation 
 
In the first part of the analysis we model outsourcing decisions as a function 
of a number of variables, which capture suppliers-specific characteristics.  
itii xout  10)1Pr(   
 
Where it denotes the firm-specific unobservable effect and we assume that 
it ~ ),0(
2N . Where i denotes firm and x are the firm’s specific characteristics.  
The dependent variable is the probability that a firm involves in outsourcing 
which is equal 1 if the outsourcing ratio is greater than 60 percent; 0 
otherwise.  
The cut-off point of 60 percent has been chosen to identify the main 
characteristics of the suppliers with high outsourcing ratios versus the ones 
with low outsourcing ratios. This percentage has been selected since the 
number of supplier firms engaged in outsourcing gradually increases from this 
cut-off point (see Figure  6.1, charts a,b and c). In addition, when we compare 
the behaviour of the ratio of outsourcing versus the independent variable 
propensity to export (see Figure  6.2 charts a, b and c) we can observe that 
after the 60 percent threshold, the level of exports in 1999 (chart b) and 2001 
(chart c) surges, whereas in 1992 it drops down. Therefore, this cut-off point is 
useful to capture some differences in the behaviour of low and high 
outsourcing suppliers. 
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Figure  6.2 Outsourcing Ratios vs. Exports 
    
       (a)                            (b)  
 
 
(c) 
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001.  
 
6.4.2. Tobit Estimation  
 
The problem with probit is that if we collapse all positive observations on itout  
and treat them as binomial probit we would discard the information on the 
different outsourcing intensity ratios (Baum, 2006).  The use of tobit 
estimation allows for the account of limited dependent variables and is 
designed to deal with estimation bias associated with censoring. The model 
combines aspects of binomial probit for the distinction of 0itout  versus
0itout . 
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Therefore, the second part of the analysis  uses a tobit model that not only 
measures the probability that a supplier firm gets involve into outsourcing, 
but also it measures the intensity of outsourcing.  
The model can be expressed as follows: 
itit xY  '
*   
*
0
i
YY
Y
i
i


if
if
60
60
*
*
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
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The tobit model captures the firms with outsourcing ratios higher than sixty 
percent (see Figure  6.3).  
Figure  6.3 Outsourcing Ratios  
 
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001. 
 
6.4.3. Probit model and description of variables  
 
We model outsourcing decisions as a function of a number of variables, which 
capture suppliers-specific characteristics. We propose six different probit 
specifications to test the explanatory power of a number of the variables. The 
equations can be written as: 
Equation 1: 
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Where i denotes firm and t is the year. The dependent variable is the 
probability that the supplier will engage in outsourcing. 
The first equation includes four explanatory variables. The first explanatory 
variable is a dummy for foreign ownership of the firm. The variable takes the 
value of 1 if the firm has 10 percent or more foreign ownership, 0 otherwise.  
Foreign is included  as over the last decades the increase of outsourcing to 
developing countries can be partly explained as a movement or shift of firms’ 
value chain functions from developed countries (Hansen, 2008). Therefore, 
we can expect a positive relation of outsourcing and foreign ownership if the 
relocation of these activities is through foreign direct investment.  
Exports represents the export intensity and is measured by the ratio of 
)/( SalesExports .This variable tries to identify the outward orientation of the 
firm. We can expect a positive relationship between outsourcing and exports 
for two reasons. Firstly, if developed countries use subcontracting as a means 
of cost reduction in labour intensive segments, we might expect that the 
outsourced production in Mexico will be exported to a foreign country. 
Secondly, by engaging in outsourcing collaboration with MNCs, domestic 
suppliers in developing countries have the opportunity to gain access to 
foreign markets.  
Productivity is measured by the log of the ratio of annual output to total men-
hour  itit LQ . The variable test the hypothesis that firms subcontracted to 
performs other’s production works might have higher productivity than firms 
which are not involved in any subcontracting at all.  
The variable size is given by the log of the number of employees per firm; the 
variable tries to capture many size-related characteristics not captured by 
other variables. For instance probably larger firms are more likely to be 
subcontracted because they have better reputation or they have the capacity 
to produce or assemble large quantities as compared to small firms.  
Conversely, probably a lot of subcontracting tasks are given to small firms, 
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because large firms are not able to produce everything or maybe they just 
want to focus on their core activities.  
Equation 2  
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The second equation includes three wage variables includes the annual per-
capita wage for directors, white collar, and blue collar workers: 
bcwcdir LwagesLwagesLwages ,, . These variables test the hypothesis that wages 
are a determinant that explains outsourcing, for instance if lead firms are 
subcontracting to other firms as a cost cutting strategy we would expect the 
salaries of the supplier firm to be lower than firm not engaged in outsourcing.  
Equation 3  
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The third equation includes more control variables such like the age of the 
firm, a dummy for subsidiary, quality control, imported raw materials , a 
dummy to identify if the firm has a union and a dummy for investment in 
research and development. 
Outsourcing can either attract supplier firms from abroad or it can open up 
opportunities for domestic firms to become suppliers of specific segments of 
the production chain. Empirical evidence 41 suggests that firms in many 
countries are subcontracting abroad a wide number of activities ranging from 
product design, production of intermediate inputs, assembly, marketing, and 
after sales service, etc.  
Grossman and Helpman (2003), emphasize that it is clear that the production 
of inputs is an important activity of foreign subsidiaries, and this activity has 
                                                 
41
 see Campa and Goldberg (1997), Feenstra (1998), Hummels et al. (20 01), Yeats (2001). 
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been increasing at a fast pace. Thus, we also include a dummy variable for 
foreign subsidiary to distinguish between foreign and domestic subsidiaries 
(see Equation 4). 
However, one limitation of our data it that we can not distinguish whether the 
subsidiary firm involved in outsourcing is vertically integrated or it is working 
under an arm’s lengths contract.  
Antràs (2003) provides evidence in the US using intra-firm US imports and 
finds that capital-intensive intermediate goods, such as chemical products, 
tend to be imported to the US within the boundaries of the multinational 
firms, while labour intensive goods, such as textiles, are imported from non-
affiliated firms.  The author also shows that the share of intra-firm imports by 
multinationals as a share of total U.S. imports is higher, the higher the capital -
labour ratio in the exporting country. For instance, U.S. imports from capital -
abundant countries, such as Switzerland, tend to involve multinationals, while 
import from labour abundant countries, such as Egypt are likely to be arm’s 
length contracts. 
Taking Antràs arguments as given, we will assume that subcontracted 
production exported by Mexican suppliers in labour abundant industries is 
inter-firm rather than intra-firm trade. 
The variable age is included, as many of the supplier firms engaged in 
outsourcing might have established over the last two or three decades due to 
the advantages offered by the free trade agreements and the Maquiladora 
Programme. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between age and 
outsourcing. 
Imported raw materials “irm” is included to control the origin of the raw 
materials used for the production process. For instance, Maquiladoras import 
materials and equipment on a duty and tariff free basis for assembly or 
manufacturing and then re-exports the assembled product usually to the 
country of origin. Since a large proportion of suppliers engaged in outsourcing 
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are Maquiladora firms, we expect a positive relation on imported raw 
materials and outsourcing.  
We also include a dummy variable for union, which captures the degree of 
unionization of the supplier firm. Unionized firms may act to increase labour 
costs as they force firms to abide by the union work rules. Therefore, if lead 
firms are using outsourcing as a cost-saving strategy, they might contract 
firms with no unions or unions with low bargaining power. Thus, we expect a 
negative relationship between outsourcing and unions. 
 
Equation 4  
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One of the questions that we are interested in exploring is related to the 
functions in which suppliers are involved or specialized in. We want to explore 
if these functions are more intensive in labour or capital. To control for skills 
intensity of the suppliers, we include the variables 
l
it
m
it
h
it SkillsSkillsSkills ,,  
corresponding to three different levels of education: highly educated, medium 
educated, and low educated (see  
Equation 5). 
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The previous equation controlled for skills, but in order to have a deeper 
understanding of the kind of activities that are produced by suppliers, we 
include a dummy variable to control for the technology used by the firms. The 
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survey distinguished five different types of machines and equipment  
cnc
it
nc
it
ae
it
tm
it
me
it TechTechTechTechTech ,,,,
&  (see Equation 6). 
Equation 6  
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Although we have included different firm-specific characteristics in our 
specifications, it does not take into account a potential unobserved 
heterogeneity across industries. This is likely to occur, due to the 
concentration of suppliers in different sectors. For instance, Hansen et al. 
(2008), state that outsourcing in developing countries is extensively 
concentrated in low value-added activities related to standardized products 
and services. 
In order to deal with such heterogeneity and identify the industries in which 
Mexican suppliers are concentrated, we estimate a model including a dummy 
variable for the 54 manufacturing industries.  
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Table  6.4 Variable Description 
Variable Description of the variables 
Outsourcing ratio Ratio of income received of subcontracting per unit of total output 
Export propensity Ratio of total exports to output 
Foreign Ownership = 1 if the firm has 10 percent or more foreign ownership, 0 otherwise. 
Labour Productivity Value added per unit of hourly labour 
Wages 
Log of annual per-capita wages (directors, white collar, blue collar 
workers) deflated to 1994 pesos by the main price producer index (INPP). 
Size of the firm Log total number of employees in the firm 
Age Log age of the firm 
Foreign Subsidiary = 1 if plant is a subsidiary of a foreign firm, 0 otherwise. 
Quality control  = 1 if a firm has a quality certification, 0 otherwise. 
Imported raw materials (%) Percentage of imported raw materials 
Union 
Dummy variable =1 if the majority of the workers are covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement, =0 otherwise. 
Investment in R & D  Dummy investment in Research & Development=1 ; 0 otherwise 
Skills 
Level of education (percentage of low, medium and high skilled labour). 
Low skilled-labour: elementary school (0 to 6 years of education) 
Medium skilled: secondary school and high-school (more than 6 years 
less than 12 years) 
High skilled: bachelor degree and postgraduate studies (more than 12 
years of education). 
Type of technology used (%) 
- Manual equipment 
- Machines and tools 
- Automatic equipment 
- Numerical control 
- Computerized numerical control 
- Robots 
Industry 
Dummy variable =1 if the establishment is in the four-digit CMAP 
classification (Mexican Classification of Activities and Products), 0 
otherwise. 
 
6.5. Econometric results  
 
This section reports the regression results from our firm-level data in 1992, 
1999 and 2001. The main question we aim to answer are: 
1. What are the firm-specific characteristics determining a firm’s 
involvement in outsourcing as a supplier?  
By answering this question, we will be able to understand the characteristics 
of outsourcing in the Mexican Manufacturing industry. In addition, we will 
contribute to present empirical evidence of outsourcing from the perspective 
of the supplier firms in a developing country.  
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The first part of the analysis shows the results of the different probit 
specifications mentioned above, and the marginal effects. Since the 
outsourcing ratio varies between 0 and 100; the second part of the analysis 
employs a tobit model which allows for left and right censoring of data.  
 
6.5.1. Probit Results 
 
Table ‎6.5 to Table  6.10 present results of probit estimates for the 1992, 1999 
and 2001 ENESTYC Surveys respectively. All the models use robust standard 
errors to get rid of possible heterosckedasticity problems. 
Starting with the firm-specific characteristics in 1992, coefficients in the cross -
section estimates of columns 1 to 6 in Table ‎6.5and Table ‎6.6 show high level 
of significance levels in key variables like export propensity, foreign 
ownership, imported raw materials, etc., and are generally in line with the 
results we were expecting to obtain.  
Supplier firms who are foreign, exporters, subsidiaries, import their raw 
materials and who are larger are more likely to engage in outsourcing.  
In the case of the variable exports, we can see that overall is statistically 
significant but has a negative relationship with the probability to outsource. 
This relationship is completely different to the results we were expecting. By 
exploring the data, we can find that out of 638 firms with outsourcing ratios 
greater than 60 percent, only 35 firms export their production. Thus, the small 
sample of exporting firms does not give us robust results to explore the 
relationship between outsourcing and exports. To get consistent assertions of 
this relationship we will wait to see the results of the regressions for the 
following waves of the survey.  
We can also observe a negative relationship between productivity and the 
probability to engage in outsourcing. As mentioned in the descriptive analysis, 
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this result is surprising as we were expecting a positive relationship between 
outsourcing and productivity.  
There are many reasons to suspect that firms engaged in outsourcing have 
low productivity. Firstly, activities in which outsourcing firms are involved are 
more labour intensive such as apparel and electronics industries where more 
labour is needed to assemble electronic items or stitch clothes. Secondly, the 
problem with Maquiladoras is that a great part of the value added is made up 
of wages. For instance, in 1993 approximately 74 percent of the value added 
in the Maquiladora was made up of wages and in 2000 it reached 
approximately the 80 percent (Puyana and Romero, 2005). Therefore, 
productivity of suppliers relies on wages and since suppliers’ main 
comparative advantage is given by low wages, productivity will remain low 
unless outsourcing suppliers start moving up to more capital intensive 
activities. 
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Table ‎6.5 Characteristics of Outsourcing: Probit Estimation and Marginal 
Effects 1992 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Independent Variables  Coefficients Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficients Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficients Marginal 
Effects 
Constant -0.673***  1.381  1.680*  
 (0.092)  (0.820)  (0.852)  
Foreign 1.275*** 0.189 1.293*** 0.165 0.632*** 0.074 
 (0.065) 0.010 (0.075) 0.010 (0.081) 0.010 
Exports  -1.417*** -0.210 -1.439*** -0.183 -1.771*** -0.208 
 (0.187) 0.026 (0.214) 0.025 (0.224) 0.024 
Log Productivity -0.487*** -0.072 -0.506*** -0.064 -0.456*** -0.054 
 (0.028) 0.004 (0.037) 0.005 (0.037) 0.004 
Log Size 0.131*** 0.019 0.120*** 0.015 0.148*** 0.017 
 (0.022) 0.003 (0.029) 0.004 (0.031) 0.004 
Log per-ca pita    -0.186*** -0.024 -0.163** -0.019 
Wages directors    (0.056) 0.007 (0.060) 0.007 
Log per-ca pita    0.153 0.020 0.079 0.009 
Wages white collar   (0.086) 0.011 (0.089) 0.010 
Log per-ca pita    -0.151 -0.019 -0.077 -0.009 
Wages blue collar   (0.085) 0.011 (0.087) 0.010 
Log Age     -0.321*** -0.038 
     (0.038) 0.005 
Dummy Subsidiary      0.269*** 0.035 
     (0.074) 0.011 
Share of Imported      1.029*** 0.121 
raw materials      (0.098) 0.011 
Investment in      -0.217*** -0.026 
R & D     (0.065) 0.008 
Log likelihood -1.4e+03  -1.0e+03  -941.614  
Prob. chi-squared 586.512  459.653  581.565  
Pseudo r-squared 0.237  0.259  0.331  
N 4,882  4,027  3,995  
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table ‎6.6 shows three additional specifications controlling for skills, type of 
technology used in the production process and industry heterogeneity. We 
can observe that the different types of technology used do not appear to be a 
good predictor for the general strategy of outsourcing. However, firms with 
low skill and medium skill labour are highly significant characteristics of 
outsourcing. 
In the last column, we also include 54 industry dummy variables  to control for 
industry specific effects. After removing not significant industries, we can find 
that firms in industries 3212, 3213, 3220, 3720, 3831 and 3832 have greater 
probability of engaging in outsourcing as suppliers. 
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Table ‎6.6 Characteristics of Outsourcing: Probit Estimation and Marginal 
Effects 1992 
Independent Variables 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Coefficients 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficients Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficients 
Marginal 
Effects 
Constant -2.267   -2.151   -2.062***   
 (1.219)  (1.222)  (0.586)  
Foreign 0.717*** 0.079 0.723*** 0.0788 0.887*** 0.096 
 (0.119) 0.013 (0.118) 0.0130 (0.090) 0.010 
Exports -1.810***  -0.200  -1.825***  -0.1987  -1.921***  -0.207  
 (0.231) 0.024 (0.230) 0.0238 (0.205) 0.022 
Log Productivity -0.403***  -0.045  -0.406***  -0.0442  -0.417***  -0.045  
 (0.041) 0.005 (0.040) 0.0048 (0.036) 0.004 
Log Size 0.046 0.005 0.061 0.0067 0.368*** 0.046 
 (0.037) 0.004 (0.038) 0.0041 (0.077) 0.011 
Log per-capita -0.158*  -0.017  -0.151*  -0.0165  1.043*** 0.112 
Wages directors (0.066) 0.007 (0.066) 0.0071 (0.107) 0.012 
Log per-capita 0.137 0.015 0.149 0.0162 -0.336***  -0.036  
Wages white collar (0.103) 0.011 (0.104) 0.0112 (0.041) 0.005 
Log per-capita -0.014  -0.001  -0.026  -0.0029  0.027*** 0.003 
Wages blue collar (0.100) 0.011 (0.100) 0.0109 (0.006) 0.001 
Log Age -0.317***  -0.035  -0.324***  -0.0353  0.021** 0.002 
 (0.042) 0.005 (0.042) 0.0049 (0.006) 0.001 
Dummy Subsidiary 0.246* 0.030 0.245* 0.0295 0.897*** 0.173 
 (0.113) 0.015 (0.114) 0.0149 (0.129) 0.036 
Share of Imported 1.052*** 0.117 1.073*** 0.1169 0.335 0.047 
raw materials (0.106) 0.013 (0.106) 0.0125 (0.284) 0.049 
Investment in -0.182*  -0.020  -0.170*  -0.0186  1.334*** 0.318 
R & D (0.072) 0.008 (0.072) 0.0079 (0.122) 0.044 
Dummy Foreign 0.114 0.014 0.124 0.0146 0.174 0.021 
Subsidiary (0.155) 0.020 (0.156) 0.0198 (0.165) 0.023 
Low skilled labour 0.035*** 0.004 0.033*** 0.0036 0.791** 0.150 
 (0.007) 0.001 (0.007) 0.0007 (0.277) 0.077 
Medium Skilled 0.030*** 0.003 0.029*** 0.0032 0.295 0.039 
Labour  (0.007) 0.001 (0.007) 0.0008 (0.166) 0.027 
Manual equipment   -0.001  -0.0001  0.320** 0.043 
   (0.002) 0.0002 (0.106) 0.017 
Machines and tools   -0.000  0.0000 0.780*** 0.145 
   (0.002) 0.0002 (0.179) 0.049 
Automated   -0.003  -0.0003  0.262 0.034 
equipment    (0.002) 0.0002 (0.165) 0.025 
Numerical control    -0.003  -0.0003  0.335 0.047 
   (0.003) 0.0003 (0.287) 0.050 
Computerized    -0.008*  -0.0008  0.262 0.035 
numerical control    (0.003) 0.0004 (0.283) 0.045 
Robots    -0.008  -0.0009  0.887*** 0.096 
   (0.005) 0.0005 (0.090) 0.010 
3212. Fabric Mills     -1.921***  -0.207  
     (0.205) 0.022 
3213. Textile, Fabric Finishing     -0.417***  -0.045  
and Fabric Coating Mills     (0.036) 0.004 
3220. Manufacture of wearing     0.368*** 0.046 
apparel except footwear     (0.077) 0.011 
3560. Plastic Products     1.043*** 0.112 
     (0.107) 0.012 
3720. Basic Metals/except iron and steel     -0.336***  -0.036  
and include nuclear material     (0.041) 0.005 
3814. Other metallic products/except      0.027*** 0.003 
machinery and equipment      (0.006) 0.001 
3831. Machinery and equipment and     0.021** 0.002 
electric accessories     (0.006) 0.001 
3832. Electronic equipment      0.897*** 0.173 
(radio, TV and communication)      (0.129) 0.036 
3841. Automotive industry     0.335 0.047 
     (0.284) 0.049 
3842. Transport equipment and     1.334*** 0.318 
parts/except autos and trucks     (0.122) 0.044 
3850. Instruments and precision 
equipment manufacturing (includes  
    
0.174 0.021 
surgical equipment, excludes electronics      (0.165) 0.023 
Log likelihood -791.147   -785.468   -832.360   
Prob. chi-squared 560.578  576.218  729.370  
Pseudo r-squared 0.362  0.367  0.436  
N 3,472  3,472  3,847  
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table ‎6.7 and Table ‎6.8, show similar results to Table ‎6.5 and Table ‎6.6 with 
respect to the characteristics of outsourcing. 
However, in the case of exports we can observe that the coefficient is positive 
and significant indicating that higher levels of export propensity ratios are 
related to a higher probability of engaging in outsourcing as supplier. Hence, 
firms orientated to international markets would have more probabilities to 
engage in outsourcing. In 1992 export does not seem to be significant because 
Maquiladoras are not included in the survey.  
We can also observe a negative relationship between outsourcing and blue-
collar wages. This is consistent with the theory which points that costs do 
influence the level of outsourcing activity (Gorg, 2000; and Egger and Egger, 
2005; Swenson, 2006). 
Table  6.7 Characteristics of Outsourcing: Probit Estimation and Marginal Effects 1999  
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coefficients Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficients Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficients Marginal 
Effects 
Constant -3.906***  -3.762***  -2.931***  
 (0.250)  (0.423)  (0.383)  
Foreign  0.988*** 0.007 0.932*** 0.014 0.554*** 0.007 
 (0.087) 0.003 (0.094) 0.005 (0.122) 0.003 
Exports 2.971*** 0.022 3.076*** 0.045 2.272*** 0.028 
 (0.175) 0.008 (0.196) 0.014 (0.171) 0.008 
Log Productivity  -0.463*** -0.003 -0.458*** -0.007 -0.402*** -0.005 
 (0.041) 0.001 (0.047) 0.002 (0.046) 0.002 
Log Size 0.318*** 0.002 0.319*** 0.005 0.348*** 0.004 
   (0.042) 0.002 (0.045) 0.001 
Log per-capita   -0.078 -0.001 -0.046 -0.001 
Wages directors   (0.061) 0.001 (0.065) 0.001 
Log per-capita   -0.131 -0.002 -0.115 -0.001 
Wages white collar    (0.084) 0.001 (0.094) 0.001 
Log per-capita   0.242** 0.004 0.258** 0.003 
Wages blue collar    (0.092) 0.002 (0.095) 0.001 
Log Age     -0.301*** -0.004 
     (0.049) 0.001 
Dummy subsidiary      0.201 0.003 
     (0.125) 0.002 
Dummy Qu ality      -0.086 -0.001 
     (0.110) 0.001 
Imported raw     0.591*** 0.007 
materials     (0.139) 0.003 
Dummy Union      -0.480*** -0.009 
     (0.103) 0.004 
Investment in      -0.249** -0.003 
R & D     (0.095) 0.002 
Log likelihood -528.619  -487.795  -398.662  
Prob. chi-squared  449.582  392.927  460.081  
Pseudo r-squared  0.718  0.714  0.710  
Obs 6,096  4,680  4,531  
Robust standard errors in the parenthesis           
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Over the last decades an important element of firms’ modernization in Mexico 
has been the adoption of flexible methods of organizing work in the 
production lines to reduce costs. The flexible methods of organizing 
production refer to labour relations, job descriptions, length of the workday, 
worker mobility between tasks, and forms of hiring and firing. As a result, the 
changes had important effect on internal labour relations and have modified 
the structure of worker’s qualifications, training and collective bargaining. In 
this context, unions have been slowly losing control over working conditions 
such as hiring, legal protection, etc. (Pozas, 2004). Hence, we included in the 
model the dummy variable “unions” and it seems  to be a negative and 
significant characteristic of engaging in outsourcing before controlling for 
industry specific effects (see Table  6.8). This result may suggest that we have 
low unionised industries rather than low unionised firms.  
Finally, the last column shows that again firms in labour intensive industries 
are more prone to be involved in outsourcing.  
  
186 
 
Table  6.8 Characteristics of Outsourcing: Probit Estimation and Marginal Effects 1999  
Independent Variables 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Coefficients Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficients Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficients Marginal 
Effects 
Constant -4.344***  -4.567***  -4.496***  
 (0.760)  (0.858)  (0.374)  
Foreign  0.766*** 0.013 0.777*** 0.0120 0.834*** 0.0019 
 (0.211) 0.005 (0.218) 0.0048 (0.132) 0.0008 
Exports 2.049*** 0.034 2.080*** 0.0322 2.075*** 0.0020 
 (0.178) 0.009 (0.179) 0.0086 (0.181) 0.0009 
Log Productivity  -0.375*** -0.006 -0.383*** -0.0059 -0.420*** -0.0015 
 (0.049) 0.002 (0.049) 0.0017 (0.048) 0.0006 
Log Size 0.289*** 0.005 0.301*** 0.0047 0.302*** 0.0006 
 (0.051) 0.002 (0.053) 0.0015 (0.044) 0.0008 
Log per-capita -0.039 -0.001 -0.043 -0.0007 0.312*** 0.0043 
Wages directors (0.072) 0.001 (0.074) 0.0012 (0.086) 0.0019 
Log per-capita -0.105 -0.002 -0.124 -0.0019 -0.247*** -0.0043 
Wages white collar  (0.103) 0.002 (0.105) 0.0017 (0.051) 0.0021 
Log per-capita 0.351*** 0.006 0.374*** 0.0058 0.094 0.0000 
Wages blue collar  (0.099) 0.002 (0.100) 0.0022 (0.130) 0.0000 
Log Age -0.278*** -0.005 -0.274*** -0.0042 0.691*** 0.0000 
 (0.053) 0.001 (0.054) 0.0014 (0.147) 0.0000 
Dummy subsidiary  0.210 0.004 0.213 0.0034 -0.482*** 0.0133 
 (0.162) 0.003 (0.162) 0.0028 (0.114) 0.0109 
Dummy Qu ality  0.035 0.001 0.037 0.0006 0.007*** 0.0142 
 (0.118) 0.002 (0.121) 0.0020 (0.002) 0.0139 
Imported raw 0.744*** 0.012 0.793*** 0.0123 0.003* 0.0317 
materials (0.149) 0.005 (0.149) 0.0045 (0.001) 0.0123 
Dummy Union  -0.503*** -0.012 -0.479*** -0.0108 0.745* 0.0252 
 (0.108) 0.005 (0.109) 0.0045 (0.299) 0.0249 
Investment in  -0.279** -0.004 -0.267* -0.0040 0.752* 0.0307 
R & D (0.105) 0.002 (0.106) 0.0020 (0.351) 0.0303 
Dummy Foreign -0.167 -0.002 -0.162 -0.0022 1.099*** 0.0188 
Subsidiary  (0.244) 0.003 (0.250) 0.0030 (0.167) 0.0197 
Low skilled labour  0.018* 0.0003 0.018* 0.0003 0.988* 0.0071 
 (0.007) 0.0001 (0.007) 0.0001 (0.412) 0.0056 
Medium Skilled  0.013 0.0002 0.013 0.0002 1.070* 0.0221 
Labour (0.007) 0.0001 (0.008) 0.0001 (0.434) 0.0133 
Manual equipment  0.766*** 0.013 -0.001 0.0000 0.861* 0.0053 
 (0.211) 0.005 (0.004) 0.0001 (0.397) 0.0032 
Machines and tools    0.004 0.0001 0.527* 0.0132 
   (0.004) 0.0001 (0.245) 0.0094 
Automated    0.001 0.0000 0.938*** 0.0052 
equipment    (0.004) 0.0001 (0.251) 0.0051 
Computeriz ed    -0.002 0.0000 0.449** 0.0123 
numeric al control    (0.005) 0.0001 (0.149) 0.0085 
Robots   -0.009 -0.0001 0.728** 0.0019 
   (0.006) 0.0001 (0.222) 0.0008 
3212 Fabric Mills     0.447 0.0020 
     (0.252) 0.0009 
3214 Textile Furnishing      0.702** -0.0015 
Mills     (0.246) 0.0006 
3220 Manufacture of wearing      0.834*** 0.0019 
apparel except footwear      (0.132) 0.0008 
3410 Manufacture of pulp     2.075*** 0.0020 
paper and pap erboard      (0.181) 0.0009 
3420 Publishing and printing      -0.420*** -0.0015 
and related industries      (0.048) 0.0006 
3512 Basic chemicals, excludes      0.302*** 0.0006 
basic petro ch emic als      (0.044) 0.0008 
3812 Metallic frames, tanks      0.312*** 0.0043 
and industrial boilers      (0.086) 0.0019 
3814 Other metallic p roducts/exc ept      -0.247*** -0.0043 
machinery and equipment      (0.051) 0.0021 
3831Machinery and equipment      0.094 0.0000 
and electric accessories     (0.130) 0.0000 
3832 Electronic equip ment       0.691*** 0.0000 
(radio, tv and communication)      (0.147) 0.0000 
3841 Automotive industry      -0.482*** 0.0133 
     (0.114) 0.0109 
3900 Other manufactu ring industries     0.007*** 0.0142 
     (0.002) 0.0139 
Log likelihood -335.697  -331.073  -344.647  
Prob. chi-squared  487.019  507.631  553.421  
Pseudo r-squared  0.722  0.726  0.741  
Obs 3706  3706  4849  
Robust standard errors in the parenthesis           
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table ‎6.9 presents outcomes for 2001, which are similar to the results of previous 
years. Foreign ownership, export propensity, productivity, size, wages of blue collar 
workers, imported raw materials and unions are among the main characteristics of 
outsourcing in the Mexican manufacturing industry. 
 
Table  6.9 Characteristics of Outsourcing: Probit Estimation and Marginal Effects 2001 
Independent Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coefficients Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficients Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficients Marginal 
Effects 
Constant -4.198***  -4.872***  -3.772***  
 (0.374)  (0.864)  (0.860)  
Foreign  0.857*** 0.0004 0.846*** 0.0002 0.466*** 0.0001 
 (0.105) 0.0003 (0.120) 0.0003 (0.138) 0.0001 
Exports 3.255*** 0.0014 3.897*** 0.0009 3.484*** 0.0007 
 (0.263) 0.0012 (0.415) 0.0011 (0.405) 0.0008 
Log Productivity  -0.876*** -0.0004 -0.943*** -0.0002 -0.955*** -0.0002 
 (0.058) 0.0003 (0.086) 0.0003 (0.091) 0.0002 
Log Size 0.468*** 0.0002 0.586*** 0.0001 0.543*** 0.0001 
 (0.052) 0.0002 (0.061) 0.0002 (0.064) 0.0001 
Log per-capita   -0.238* -0.0001 -0.140 0.0000 
Wages directors   (0.101) 0.0001 (0.105) 0.0001 
Log per-capita   -0.293* -0.0001 -0.452** -0.0001 
Wages white collar    (0.143) 0.0001 (0.152) 0.0001 
Log per-capita   0.665*** 0.0002 0.655*** 0.0001 
Wages blue collar    (0.168) 0.0002 (0.172) 0.0002 
Log Age     -0.224** 0.0000 
     (0.084) 0.0001 
Dummy subsidiary      0.198 0.0000 
     (0.159) 0.0001 
Dummy Qu ality      -0.046 0.0000 
     (0.139) 0.0000 
Imported raw     1.069*** 0.0002 
materials     (0.163) 0.0003 
Dummy Union      -0.441** -0.0002 
     (0.141) 0.0002 
Investment in      0.041 0.0000 
R & D     (0.115) 0.0000 
Log likelihood -384.527  -302.573  -269.518  
Prob. chi-squared  341.043  311.462  348.769  
Pseudo r-squared  0.784  0.811  0.832  
Obs 6,888  4,988  4,988  
Robust standard errors in the parenthesis           
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
In this wave of the survey technology such as machine tools and automated 
equipment have a positive and significant effect on outsourcing. However, the 
type of technology used by outsourcing suppliers seem not to be very high-
tech. 
The last regression of our model again shows that the activities in which 
subcontractors are involved are again labour intensive activities like 3212, 
3213, 3220, 3410 (see Table  6.10).  
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Table  6.10 Characteristics of Outsourcing: Probit Estimation and Marginal Effects 2001  
Independent Variables  
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Coefficients Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficients Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficients Marginal 
Effects 
Constant -6.342***  -7.804***  -7.850***  
 (1.215)  (1.664)  (1.042)  
Foreign 0.017 0.0000 0.387* 0.0000 0.853*** 0.0001 
 (0.249) 0.0001 (0.154) 0.0001 (0.146)    0.0001 
Exports 3.724*** 0.0001 3.710*** 0.0004 3.532*** 0.0004 
 (0.532) 0.0001 (0.549) 0.0006 (0.360)    0.0005 
Log Productivity -0.966*** 0.0000 -0.966*** -0.0001 -0.912***  -0.0001  
 (0.109) 0.0000 (0.116) 0.0002 (0.083)    0.0001 
Log Size 0.584*** 0.0000 0.596*** 0.0001 0.379*** 0.0000 
 (0.069) 0.0000 (0.069) 0.0001 (0.062)    0.0001 
Log per-capita -0.073 0.0000 -0.073 0.0000 0.369*   0.0000 
Wages directors (0.102) 0.0000 (0.101) 0.0000 (0.161)    0.0001 
Log per-capita -0.316* 0.0001 -0.313* 0.0000 0.286    0.0000 
Wages white collar (0.157) 0.0002 (0.156) 0.0001 (0.158)    0.0001 
Log per-capita 0.560** -0.0001 0.600** 0.0001 -0.443**  -0.0001  
Wages blue collar (0.200) 0.0001 (0.199) 0.0001 (0.138)    0.0001 
Log Age -0.226* 0.0000 -0.209* 0.0000 0.027**  0.0000 
 (0.099) 0.0000 (0.097) 0.0000 (0.008)    0.0000 
Dummy subsidiary -0.010 0.0001 0.165 0.0000 0.025**  0.0000 
 (0.220) 0.0002 (0.180) 0.0000 (0.009)    0.0000 
Dummy Quality 0.031 0.0000 0.062 0.0000 0.548    0.0002 
 (0.153) 0.0000 (0.155) 0.0000 (0.321)    0.0003 
Imported raw 1.149*** 0.0000 1.129*** 0.0001 1.491*** 0.0054 
materials (0.182) 0.0000 (0.182) 0.0002 (0.411)    0.0071 
Dummy Union  -0.335* 0.0000 -0.347* -0.0001 1.543*** 0.0054 
 (0.148) 0.0001 (0.149) 0.0001 (0.217)    0.0050 
Investment in  0.105 0.0001 0.129 0.0000 0.694*   0.0004 
R & D (0.129) 0.0001 (0.128) 0.0000 (0.294)    0.0005 
Dummy Foreign 0.525 0.0000 0.016 0.0000 3.335*** 0.2312 
Subsidiary (0.293) 0.0000 (0.009) 0.0000 (0.634)    0.1584 
Low skilled labour 0.017 0.0000 0.014 0.0000 0.841**  0.0006 
 (0.009) 0.0000 (0.010) 0.0000 (0.312)    0.0008 
Medium Skilled 0.015 0.0000 0.015 0.0000 1.780*** 0.0121 
Labour  (0.010) 0.0000 (0.011) 0.0000 (0.370)    0.0106 
Manual equipment   0.012 0.0000 0.793**  0.0005 
   (0.011) 0.0000 (0.247)    0.0006 
Machines and tools   0.015 0.0000 0.927*** 0.0009 
   (0.011) 0.0000 (0.175)    0.0009 
Automated    0.007 0.0000 0.981*** 0.0011 
equipment    (0.012) 0.0000 (0.243)    0.0014 
Numerical control    0.015 0.0000 0.621**  0.0003 
   (0.012) 0.0000 (0.224)    0.0003 
Computerized numerical control   0.387* 0.0000 0.311    0.0001 
   (0.154) 0.0001 (0.441)    0.0002 
3212. Fabric Mills     0.813**  0.0006 
     (0.290)    0.0009 
3213. Textile, Fabric Finishing and      0.853*** 0.0001 
Fabric Coating Mills     (0.146)    0.0001 
3220. Manufacture of wearing      3.532*** 0.0004 
apparel except footwear     (0.360)    0.0005 
3410. Manufacture of pulp paper      -0.912***  -0.0001  
and paperboard     (0.083)    0.0001 
3521. Pharmaceuticals      0.379*** 0.0000 
     (0.062)    0.0001 
3560. Plastic Products     0.369*   0.0000 
     (0.161)    0.0001 
3720. Basic Metals/except iron and      0.286    0.0000 
steel and include nuclear material     (0.158)    0.0001 
3814. Other metallic products/     -0.443**  -0.0001  
except machinery and equipme nt     (0.138)    0.0001 
3831.  Machinery and equipment and      0.027**  0.0000 
electric accessories     (0.008)    0.0000 
3832. Electronic equipment (radio,      0.025**  0.0000 
TV and communication)      (0.009)    0.0000 
3841. Automotive industry     0.548    0.0002 
     (0.321)    0.0003 
3842. Transport equipment and      1.491*** 0.0054 
parts/except autos and trucks     (0.411)    0.0071 
3850. Instruments and precision 
equipment manufacturing 
    1.543*** 
0.0054 
(includes surgical equipme nt, excludes 
electronics 
    (0.217)    
0.0050 
Log likelihood -212.007   -211.437   -217.531   
Prob. chi-squared 307.909  325.472  374.207  
Pseudo r-squared 0.845  0.845  0.849  
Obs  3975  3975  4661  
Robust standard errors in the parenthesis           
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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The results show an interesting insight into the characteristics  of being an 
outsourcing supplier versus the probability of not being an outsourcing 
supplier in the Mexican manufacturing industry. Overall, results are consistent 
for the three years analysed and show that the firms are more likely to involve 
in outsourcing if they are foreign owned, exporters, if they use more low 
skilled labour, if they import their raw materials, if they are subsidiaries and 
pay lower wages.  
As we can observe from our results, Mexico is specializing in labour intensive 
activities, which are concentrated by Maquiladoras.  
We can also observe that wages are an important characteristic. This is 
consistent with Puyana et. Al (2005) findings who assert that wages are 
among the main incentives to attract foreign firms to subcontract activities in 
Mexico. The authors also point that the Maquila activities did not have the 
expected impact on industrialization. In this case, this argument is also 
consistent with present findings. In the case of Mexico evidence suggest that 
productivity levels, employment, and wages have not increased. Besides, due 
to the regulations of the Maquiladoras it has not created linkages with non-
maquiladora firms. Maquiladoras were supposed to import all the raw 
materials to get advantage of the duty free and until 2001 they were forced to 
export all their production. Therefore, this has not opened incentives or 
promoted opportunities for domestic linkages through subcontracting.  
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6.5.2. Tobit results 
 
This chapter is not only interested in the characteristics  determining whether 
a supplier firm gets involves in outsourcing or not, but also in the 
determinants of the outsourcing ratio, i.e. how much a firm outsources. Figure 
 6.1 previously shown that outsourcing ratios vary between 0 and 100. 
Therefore OLS estimation is not appropriate, instead we employ a tobit model 
which allows for left and right censoring of data. To estimate the tobit model, 
we stick to the definition of outsourcing used in the probit analysis and we 
look at the firms with outsourcing ratios higher than 60 percent42.  
As in the probit estimations, results show that foreign firms and exporters 
tend to outsource more. For example in 2001, the tobit results suggest that an 
increase in the export propensity ratio by one percentage point, leads to and 
increase in the firm’s outsourcing ratio by 0.257 while holding the other 
variables in the model constant (see Table  6.11).  
Other variables like wages of blue collar workers and the share of imported 
raw materials are significant at the 1 and 5 percent respectively. However, 
results are positive and significant only in one wave of the survey. Therefore 
we cannot draw strong conclusions from these two variables. 
Finally, when we control for industry specific effects we do not find strong and 
significant results suggesting that outsourcing is more practiced in one 
industry. 
  
                                                 
42
 To estimate the tobit model firms with less than 60 percent of outsourcing ratio or without 
outsourcing have outsourcing ratios of zero. For the firms with ratios greater than 60 percent, 
we transformed the ratio by subtracting 60 to the outsourcing ratio. Thus the new ratios 
range from 1 to 40 percent.  
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Table  6.11 Tobit Results  
 
Independent Variables  1992 1999 2001 
Constant        76.674*** 16.633*** 9.694*** 
 
(15.97) (2.425) (2.449) 
Foreign         0.096*** 
 
0.027*** 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.007) 
Exports         -0.279*** 0.265*** 0.257*** 
 
(0.034) (0.018) (0.019) 
Log Productivity -1.826* 0.461 -1.196* 
 
(0.787) (0.464) (0.537) 
Log per-capita wages -3.124 -0.601 2.901*** 
blue collar workers (1.715) (0.79) (0.853) 
Imported raw materials 
 
0.032** 
 
  
(0.01) 
 3111 Meat Products 
  
-12.057* 
   
(6.014) 
3114 Grain Mill products, starch products and cereals 
  
18.389** 
   
(6.14) 
3212 Fabric Mills 3.192 
  
 
(2.689) 
  3213 Textile, Fabric Finishing and Fabric Coating Mills 22.962* 
  
 
(10.449) 
  3214 Textile Furnishing Mills 7.388 
  
 
(3.947) 
  3220 Wearing Apparel Manufacturing 3.924* -3.134** 
 
 
(1.997) (0.969) 
 3230 Leather and fur products/except footwear 
 
-8.655*** 
 
  
(2.602) 
 3311 Products of Wood and Carpentry/except furniture 
 
25.848*** 
 
  
(7.782) 
 3420 Publishing and printing and related industries 
 
-9.663** 
 
  
(3.473) 
 3522 Chemical Products -13.275 
  
 
(7.233) 
  3691 Cement, lime and plaster/ includes other products  
 
-8.653* 
 based and non metallic products 
 
(4.304) 
 3811 Metallic pieces melting and moulding 
  
-7.663 
   
(4.355) 
3821 Machinery and Equipment for specific purposes 
 
-8.908* 
 
  
(3.87) 
 3841 Automotive industry -6.955 
  
 
(3.946) 
  Standard error of estimate 13.827*** 7.376*** 5.781*** 
 
(0.763) (0.373) (0.307) 
Log likelihood -977.524 -898.912 -775.214 
Prob. Chi-squared 118.150 279.838 217.289 
Pseudo r-squared 0.057 0.135 0.123 
Obs. 609 561 495 
 
 
Standard errors in the parenthesis 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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6.6. Conclusions 
 
Results show an interesting insight into the characteristics related to the 
suppliers involved in outsourcing. Overall, results are consistent for the three 
years analysed and show that the firm specific characteristics that increase 
the suppliers’ probability to involve in outsourcing are, the share of foreign 
ownership, the propensity to export, wages of blue collar labour, low skilled 
labour, the share of raw materials that are imported, and if a firm is a 
subsidiary. In the case of the dummy variable unions, results suggest that we 
have low unionised industries rather than low unionised firms.  
We can also observe that Mexico is specializing in labour intensive activities , 
where lot of Maquiladora firms are concentrated Maquiladoras.  
Results also show that wages are one of the main characteristics the main 
drivers of being subcontracted.  
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Chapter 7 Spill-overs and Upgrading 
effects of Outsourcing on suppliers in the 
Mexican Manufacturing Industry 
 
7.1. Introduction 
  
Over the years developing country firms have relied on imported technology, 
licensed know-how and FDI for firm technological upgrading and spill-overs. 
However, with the integration of international production systems into global 
networks, access to advanced technology for developing country firms (DCF) 
depends on their ability to integrate and move up global value chains. Entry 
into global production chains offers firms in developing countries not only 
upgrading capabilities from “learning” through technology transfer but also 
exposure to international practice systems of corporate governance (Palit, 
2006).    
Mexico is an interesting case study, as the country embraced trade and 
financial liberalization reforms from the mid 1980s. Reforms in rules and 
regulations on foreign investment opened the door to an increase of capital 
flows and trade in goods and services. It also offered the opportunity to the 
country to participate in global production networks. Since then, the country 
has been used as a production base for supplying the North American market.  
The liberalization strategy aimed to attract global firms, which in turn will 
generate spill-overs to local firms through backward supply linkages. Spill-
overs from MNC’s were supposed to flow through different channels. For 
instance, increased demand may help local suppliers to achieve economies of 
scale; consequently the increased efficiency or revenue could be used to 
invest in new technology.   
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Similarly, spill-overs can also flow to local contractors and suppliers as MNCs 
encourage them to upgrade technology and to adopt higher and more 
consistent quality standards. Also MNCs can provide training to local supplier 
firms involved in outsourcing. (Gallaguer and Zarsky, 2007).  
The growth rate of exports since the early 1980s has been very fast (around 8 
percent per year) and has risen at a faster pace since NAFTA took effect, 
increasing from a rate of 5.8 per annum from 1982 - 1993 to 11.1 percent in 
1993-2006 (Table  7.1). Although exports have increased fast, real per-capita 
income has not increased since 1982.  
Table  7.1 Export Growth for Mexico and selected developing countries 
(average annual rate in percent) 
 
1982-1993 1993-2006 
China 6.9 18.7 
South Korea 10.9 14.2 
Turkey 7* 11.5 
Mexico 5.8 11.1 
Malaysia 12.3 8.9 
Argentina 3.7 8.3 
Thailand 14.5 7.8 
Chile 8.4 7.5 
Brazil 8 7.1 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 
*1987-1993 
 
Mexico’s paradox of successful export growth with poor economic 
performance needs to be analyzed. Some authors argue that the lacklustre 
economic performance may be attributed to the lack of linkages between 
foreign firms and the domestic economy, low levels of technological capacity 
building; low value added exports of the Maquiladora sector; and 
overdependence of the US (Puyana and Romero; 2005;  De la Garza Toledo, 
2007; Gallagher and Shafaeddin, 2010).  
Therefore, taking the GVC and FDI approach, the present chapter aims to 
analyse how subcontracting linkages have or have not been responsible for 
the upgrading of supplier firms involved in outsourcing in the Mexican 
manufacturing industry using firm level data. Particularly, this chapter aims to 
answer the following research questions: 
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 Does outsourcing linkages encourage research and development of the 
supplier firms? 
 Does outsourcing increase human capital training? 
 Does outsourcing improve organizational techniques of supplier firms? 
The existing empirical evidence generally tends to be dominated by case 
studies of manufacturing companies or, they study few selected industries 
within the manufacturing sector (e.g. Gereffi, 1999; and Gallagher and Zarzky, 
2007). 
The present study contributes to the literature as it presents empirical 
evidence of the spill-overs and upgrading effects of outsourcing on the 
supplier firms involved in outsourcing in all manufacturing industries in 
Mexico.  
To answer the research questions, we use the concepts of upgrading and spill-
overs embedded in the theoretical approaches of the global value chains GVC 
and FDI previously discussed in Chapter 2.  For the empirical analysis we use 
econometric techniques based on micro-level data to test the validity of our 
hypothesis. 
This chapter consist of three hypotheses, for each of these the data and 
econometric model is presented followed by a discussion of the estimated 
results. The chapter concludes by drawing together the analysis of the three 
hypotheses. 
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7.2. Hypothesis 1.  Outsourcing fosters R & D activities of supplier firms 
involved in outsourcing 
 
MNCs are widely recognised as crucial actors in the technology transfer of 
local firms in developing countries. Moreover, relationships with lead firms 
can be key channel of technology transfer and R & D activities to supplier 
firms. However, it is up to MNCs to make strategic decisions regarding 
whether to develop an R & D capacity with the supplier firms or not.  
Although R & D is regarded as being one of the least internationalised 
segments, a survey conducted to the largest R & D investors by UNCTAD from 
November 2004 to March 2005, suggests that the internationalisation of R & 
D may be accelerating with a clear trend towards increasing relocation to 
developing economies.  In fact, expenditures on R & D by affiliates of United 
States TNCs in developing countries are concentrated in five countries: China, 
Singapore, Brazil, Mexico and Republic of Korea. The survey also finds that the 
chemical and pharmaceutical industries were the most internationalized in 
terms of R & D (UNCTAD, 2005).  
Secondly, as economies become more open, lead firms look for suppliers who 
can be more competitive in terms of price or quality. In this sense, supplier 
firms have to innovate their products or processes opening up a possibility to 
invest more in R & D.  
MNCs can also undertake R & D in host countries to adapt products to local 
and regional needs (product upgrading), they very rarely transfer advanced 
engineering and innovation capabilities (Kim, 2003). 
Conversely, there are cases where the relationships between lead-firm and 
suppliers involved in outsourcing might not generate spill-overs.  
Negative spill-overs can occur through backward linkages, if the entry of 
foreign firms decreases the efficiency or competitiveness of domestic supplier 
firms or drives them out of the business.  Likewise, if a MNC has a strong bias 
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toward global suppliers it is not possible to generate spill-overs through 
backward linkages with domestic suppliers (Gallagher and Zarsky, 2007). 
Negative spill-overs also occur if the outsourcing relationship is based merely 
on cheap labour. For instance, if MNCs outsource their simplest and least skill-
intensive technology activities within the value chain.  
To explore this hypothesis, the survey includes two questions regarding R & D. 
In one of the questions, firms have to answer whether or not they invest in R 
& D. In the other question, firms have to specify the amount invested in R & D 
over the last two years. Since many of the Maquiladora firms did not answer 
the amount invested in R & D, we rather use the first question regarding R & D 
practices.  
For instance in 2001, 377 suppliers involved in outsourcing invested in R & D 
and only 69 reported the amount invested in R & D. 
 
7.2.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
R & D is a key factor that enables developing countries to achieve economic 
development and growth. Unfortunately Mexico’s R & D intensity is one of the 
lowest of the OECD countries.  
According to the OECD (2008b), in 2008 Mexico’s gross domestic expenditure 
in R & D was 0.5 percent of total GDP. This figure has not increased 
significantly over time, as in 1993 it accounted for just 0.3 percent of total 
GDP (OECD, 2006 and 2008b).  
Even though Mexico has very low levels of investment among the OECD 
countries, we want to explore whether outsourcing agreements have been a 
factor that increased the probability that suppliers involved in outsourcing will 
invest in R & D.  
198 
 
This section presents descriptive statistics of R & D and some variables that 
can drive its growth in Mexico. We use data from the ENESTYC in 1992, 1999 
and 2001.   
Figure  7.1 shows that the proportion of firms investing in R & D after 1992 
decreased drastically. In 1992, 48 percent of the non-outsourcing firms and 39 
percent of suppliers engaged in outsourcing invested in R & D. By 2001 only 
29 percent of the non-outsourcing firms and 32 percent of the suppliers 
involved invested in R & D. The figure also shows that after NAFTA the 
investment in R & D decreased, probably because of the lack of policies from 
the government to promote R & D; the lack of access to credit for firms to 
finance R & D activities; or because the subcontracted activities involved do 
not need to invest in R & D. 
 
Figure  7.1 Percentage of firms investing in R & D 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001.  
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During 1999 and 2001 large outsourcing supplier firms are more likely to 
invest in research and development than large non-outsourcing firms43. A 
reason for this is that R & D activities are related to high costs, which small 
firms may not be able to afford and thereby excluding them from innovation 
activities. Or more likely, small firms perform basic activities that do not 
require R & D. We can also observe that, medium non-outsourcing firms 
invest more in R & D than suppliers engaged in outsourcing by examining the 
three waves of the survey (see Table  7.2) 
Table  7.2 Percentage of firm investing in R & D by size  
Size of the  1992 1999 2001 
Firm  Non-Out Out. Non-Out Out. Non-Out Out. 
Large  20.32 20.38 13.88 22.91 11.21 25.38 
Medium  16.47 11.60 11.98 5.11 9.20 4.40 
Small  8.75 5.96 5.04 1.67 6.23 1.86 
Micro  2.21 1.41 2.15 0.10 2.18 0.25 
                   Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001.  
 
Evidence suggests that foreign firms invest more in R & D than national firms. 
However, our data shows that this pattern does not completely hold. We find 
that foreign supplier firms involved in outsourcing and national and non-
outsourcing are more likely to invest in R & D44 (see Table  7.3).   
 
Table  7.3 Percentage of firms investing in R & D by ownership 
Ownership 
 1992 1999 2001 
 Non-Out Out. Non-Out Out. Non-Out Out. 
National  37.94 17.87 27.34 9.64 23.66 13.62 
Foreign  9.81 21.47 5.71 20.16 5.15 18.27 
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001.  
 
                                                 
43
 The one-tailed t-tests for the three years show statistically significantly differences in 
investment in R & D between large, medium, small and micro firms. This may suggest that 
larger firms have higher investment in R & D than the other firms. For example in 1992, 
t(4968)=-8.98, p<0.00; 1999, t(6880)=-10.94, p<0.00; and 2001, t(7816)=-12.41, p<0.00. 
44
  The t-test results show that there are statistically significantly differences in the investment 
in R & D between domestic and foreign firms. In 1992, t(5069)=-5.84, p=0.00 (two-tailed); 
1999, t(7427)=-7.83, p<0.00 (two-tailed); and in 2001, t(8554)=-13.27, p<0.00 (two-tailed). 
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In the case of exports, a similar pattern is found. We find again two different 
groups of firms investing in R & D45. Table  7.4 shows that firms who are more 
likely to invest in R & D are non-outsourcing and non-exporting firms and 
suppliers who are involved in outsourcing are exporters.  
Table  7.4 Percentage of exporting and non-exporting firms investing in R & D 
 1992 1999 2001 
 Non-Out Out. Non-Out Out. Non-Out Out. 
Exporter  3.32 2.51 3.68 23.21 3.00 23.35 
Non-exporter  44.44 36.83 29.37 6.59 25.81 8.54 
                 Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001.  
 
 
Turning to the industries, we can observe that firms investing in R & D tend to 
be concentrated in few sectors. For instance, suppliers involved in outsourcing 
and investing in R & D are concentrated in two sectors: textile, clothing and 
leather; and in the machinery and equipment industries. Whereas non 
outsourcing firms investing in R & D tend to concentrate in more traditional 
industries such as food, beverage and tobacco; chemicals, oil and derivatives; 
and coal; and in the machinery and equipment industries (see Table  7.5).  
 
Table  7.5 Percentage of firms investing in R & D by industry 
Industry 1992 1999 2001 
Non-out Out Non-out Out Non-out Out 
I. Food, beverages and tobacco 9.36 1.88 7.17 2.06 6.87 2.28 
II. Textiles, clothing and leather 5.5 12.07 3.68 7.67 3.11 8.21 
III. Wood and wood products 1.65 0.47 0.98 0.79 0.72 0.25 
IV. Paper and printing 2.89 1.1 2.09 0.29 1.64 0.85 
V. Chemicals, oil and derivatives and coal 9.65 2.82 7.14 2.56 5.98 2.2 
VI. Non-metallic mineral products 2.64 0.63 2.04 0.59 1.77 0.76 
VII. Basic metals 1.78 0.63 0.84 0.1 0.64 0.42 
VIII. Machinery and Equipment 13.65 19.28 8.36 15.24 7.7 16.24 
IX. Other manufacturing Industries 0.63 0.47 0.73 0.49 0.38 0.68 
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001.  
 
 
                                                 
45
 One-tailed t-test results indicate that the mean differences are always statistically 
significantly different from 0. In 1992, t(5069)=-5.86, p<0.00 (one-tailed); 1999, t(7427)=-
10.90, p<0.00 (one-tailed); and in 2001, t(8554)=-12.35, p<0.00 (one-tailed). 
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7.2.2. Econometric Model 
 
A firm’s decision to invest in R & D can be influenced by a number of factors. 
We use a simple probit model to test firms’ specific characteristics which can 
be associated with the decision to invest in R & D. The equation to be 
estimated will thus be of the following type:  
it
it
IndustrySize
ensityExportpropOwnershipOutratioDR


54
3210)1&Pr(


 
We want to test whether being involved in outsourcing increases the 
probability of investment in R & D by suppliers. Therefore, outsourcing ratio is 
included as one of our explanatory variables along with other factors that can 
influence the firms’ decision to invest in R & D such as: the share of foreign 
ownership; export propensity; and size. Table  7.6  presents a description of 
the selected variables used in our econometric analysis. 
 
The presence of foreign firms can play a significant role on a host country’s 
own innovation because it can bring directly or indirectly technology transfer 
or R & D activities. However, theoretical and empirical evidence produce 
mixed results suggesting that FDI can increase or decrease R & D depending 
on the specific context. Using firm-level data in Morocco, Haddad and 
Harrison (1993), found that FDI with higher technology will not necessary 
increase domestic R & D capacity. Similarly, Aitken and Harrison (1999) found 
that the impact of FDI on R & D in Venezuela is negative. In China, Fang and 
Mohen (2009) found that foreign firms are less R & D intensive, but when they 
innovate new products, they are more product innovative than domestic 
firms. 
The variable “propensity to export” is included because if exporters want to 
compete successfully in foreign markets, they have to acquire the appropriate 
knowledge and technological capability. For instance, through spill-overs 
arising from lead firms.    
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Firm size measured by the total number of employees is regarded as an 
important factor in explaining R & D activities. Size is included as one of the 
classic Shumpeterian hypothesis states that innovation activity increases more 
than proportionally with firm size (Schumpeter, 1954).  Large firms have 
easier access to finance and can spread the costs of R & D over a larger 
number of sales (Fang and Mohnen, 2009). Numerous studies have found a 
positive relationship between R & D expenditures and size (Martinez-Ros and 
Labeaga, 2002; Shefer and Frenkel, 2005).  
Given size, firms which are subsidiaries may have easier access to financial 
capital necessary for investment. Therefore, the dummy for subsidiary is a 
potential explanatory variable. 
Investment in R & D can vary between industries, therefore to control for 
industry heterogeneity we include 53 industry dummy variables. 
Table  7.6 List of Variables hypothesis 1 
Variable Description 
Investment in R & D  Dummy investment in Research & Development=1 ; 0 otherwise 
Outsourcing Outsourcing ratio. 
Share of foreign Ownership Ratio of foreign ownership 
Export propensity Ratio of total exports to output 
Size of the firm Log total number of employees in the firm 
Subsidiary = 1 if plant is a subsidiary of a foreign firm, 0 otherwise. 
Industry 
Dummy variable =1 if the establishment is in the four-digit CMAP 
classification (Mexican Classification of Activities and Products), 0 
otherwise. 
Source: Author. 
We also present exploratory plots to examine the relationship between R & D 
and the explanatory variables described above in 2001 (See Figure  7.2). The 
most evident and positive relationship is between R & D and size of the firms, 
followed by the dummy variable subsidiary. The other variables seem to have 
a positive, but not strong relationship with R & D. It is particularly interesting 
to note that firms are more likely to invest in R & D the lower their export 
propensity and foreign ownership ratio. The turning point in the ratio for 
investment appears to be around 0.5.  
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Figure  7.2 Relationship between R & D and selected independent variables 
2001 
 
 
   
   
                               
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001.  
 
7.2.3. Results 
 
Table  7.7 reports the main regression results predicting the probability of a 
firm to invest in R & D. 
The general picture of the probit models over the three waves of the survey is 
that they do not perform very well. The probit  formulations of the model is 
not explaining a lot  as the estimate of ρ equal 0.05, 0.074 and 0.075 
respectively for the three waves of the survey. But with significant parameters 
at a 1 percent level of significance (the parameters will be interpreted below). 
Possibly, there are other factors that explain the probability to invest in R & D 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
D
u
m
m
y
 I
n
v
e
s
tm
e
n
t 
in
 R
&
D
0 20 40 60 80 100
Ratio outsourcing
bandwidth = .8
R & D and Outsourcing
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
D
u
m
m
y
 I
n
v
e
s
tm
e
n
t 
in
 R
&
D
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Foreign Ownership ratio
bandwidth = .8
R & D and Foreign Ownership
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
D
u
m
m
y
 I
n
v
e
s
tm
e
n
t 
in
 R
&
D
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Export propensity
bandwidth = .8
R & D and Export propensity
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
D
u
m
m
y
 I
n
v
e
s
tm
e
n
t 
in
 R
&
D
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Interaction between foreing and outsourcing
bandwidth = .8
R & D and foreign outsourcing suppliers
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
D
u
m
m
y
 I
n
v
e
s
tm
e
n
t 
in
 R
&
D
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Interaction between export propensity and outsourcing
bandwidth = .8
R & D and exporters and outsourcing suppliers
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
D
u
m
m
y
 I
n
v
e
s
tm
e
n
t 
in
 R
&
D
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Interaction between foreign & exports
bandwidth = .8
R & D and foreign and exportering firms
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
D
u
m
m
y
 I
n
v
e
s
tm
e
n
t 
in
 R
&
D
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Dummy subsidiary=1; 0 otherwise
bandwidth = .8
R & D and subsidiary firms
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
D
u
m
m
y
 I
n
v
e
s
tm
e
n
t 
in
 R
&
D
0 2 4 6 8 10
Log total number of labour
bandwidth = .8
R & D and size of the firm
204 
 
that our model is not able to capture. In spite of these shortcomings, our 
results can provide a broad idea of the drivers of R & D in Mexico.  
Many of the coefficient estimates have the expected sign and are highly 
significant, while others have fluctuating significance and a different sign (see 
Table  7.7). The results reveal that suppliers who are involved in outsourcing 
have lower probability of investing in R & D. This result is very robust and 
contrary to our expectations, but the variable is significant at the 1 percent 
over the three waves of the survey. This suggests that outsourcing does not 
encourage suppliers involved in outsourcing to invest in R & D. Probably 
because firms are merely concentrated in low-value added activities which do 
not require any R & D such as the production of apparel and the assembly of 
electronics. 
There share of foreign ownership increases the firm’s probability to invest in R 
& D. The variable export propensity does not show consistent results in the 
three regressions. In 1992 export propensity is positive and significant at the 1 
percent level, yet in 1999 it is not significant. In 2001 it is positive and 
significant at the 10 percent. Therefore, we decided to include an interaction 
variable if the firm is foreign and exporter. The coefficient of the va riable is 
very significant in 1992 and 2001. Firms who are exporters and foreign have a 
lower probability of investing in R & D. We also observe that the propensity to 
engage in R & D increases with size. These effects are very significant over the 
three periods and are consistent with previous empirical evidence (Martinez-
Ros and Labeaga, 2002; Shefer and Frenkel, 2005; Fang and Mohnen, 
2009).We excluded the dummy variable subsidiary as it was not significant. 
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Table  7.7 Probit results hypothesis 1 
  1992 1999 2001 
probr_d Probit 
Marginal 
Effects 
Probit 
Marginal 
Effects 
Probit 
Marginal 
Effects 
Constant -1.075*** 
 
-1.488*** 
 
-1.553*** 
 
(0.068) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.051) 
 
Outsourcing -0.323*** -0.127 -0.498*** -0.169 -0.380*** -0.124 
(0.059) 0.022 (0.063) 0.019 (0.062) 0.018 
Foreign and exporter firm -0.703*** -0.28 -0.290* -0.108 -0.475*** -0.169 
(0.184) 0.073 (0.128) 0.048 (0.125) 0.044 
Share of Foreign ownership 0.148* 0.059 0.263*** 0.098 0.320*** 0.114 
(0.0649) 0.025 (0.077) 0.029 (0.078) 0.028 
Export propensity 0.468*** 0.186 0.138 0.051 0.152* 0.054 
(0.122) 0.049 (0.075) 0.028 (0.07) 0.025 
Log size 0.210*** 0.084 0.239*** 0.089 0.240*** 0.085 
(0.014) 0.005 (0.012) 0.004 (0.011) 0.004 
Log. likelyhood -3.20E+03 
 
-4.00E+03 
 
-4.30E+03 
 
Prob. chi-squared 337.936 
 
635.154 
 
700.181 
 
Pseudo r-squared 0.05 
 
0.074 
 
0.075 
 
N 4,901 
 
6,941 
 
7,321 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001. 
Standard errors in the parenthesis 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table  7.8 shows the results of our probit estimation, where we test for 
systematic differences in the investment in R & D across industries. We also 
included other interaction variables such as if the firm is a foreign supplier 
involved in outsourcing, exporter supplier involved in outsourcing, and a 
foreign and exporter firm.  Results are similar and robust as in the previous 
table for the variables outsourcing and size over the three years. In contrast, 
we can observe that when we control for industry specific effects foreign 
ownership is not significant anymore and the interaction variables that we 
include are also not significant. Firms that are subsidiaries have a higher 
probability of engaging in R & D. These effects are significant for the three 
time periods at the 5 and 10 percent level.  
What is interesting to note is that the propensity to invest in R & D is negative 
and significant in labour-intensive industries such as 3118, 3212, 3220 and 
3311. In contrast to other industries such as: high-tech such 3512, 3521, 3522, 
3841 and 3850 these have a higher likelihood of investing in R & D. 
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Table  7.8 Probit model controlling for industry specific effects 
 1992 1999 2001 
probr_d Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx 
Constant -1.219***   -1.479***   -1.632***  0.249 
 (0.071)  (0.058)  (0.054) 0.054 
Outsourcing  -0.243***  -0.096  -0.474***  -0.161  -0.298**  0.098 
 (0.06) 0.023 (0.079) 0.024 (0.093) -0.028  
Share of Foreign assets -0.043  -0.017  0.03 0.011 0.109 0.038 
(0.069) 0.027 (0.083) 0.031 (0.083) 0.029 
Export propensity 0.452*** 0.180 0.168* 0.062 0.118 0.042 
(0.123) 0.049 (0.078) 0.029 (0.083) 0.029 
Log size 0.220*** 0.087 0.235*** 0.087 0.235*** 0.083 
 (0.014) 0.006 (0.013) 0.005 (0.012) 0.004 
Foreign Out. supplier  -0.242  0.362* 0.140 -0.195  -0.066  
  0.074 (0.148) 0.058 (0.174) 0.056 
Exporter out. supplier     0.260 0.096 
     (0.153) 0.059 
Foreign exporter -0.608**  0.038 -0.532**  -0.197  -0.397*  -0.140  
 (0.186) 0.019 (0.172) 0.064 (0.172) 0.061 
Subsidiary 0.096* -0.244  0.171*** 0.064 0.107** 0.038 
 (0.048) 0.053 (0.04) 0.015 (0.038) 0.014 
3112 Manufacture      0.283* 0.106 
of dairy products     (0.114) 0.044 
3113 Canning and preserving foods      0.287** 0.107 
exclude meat and milk     (0.105) 0.041 
3114 Grain mill products, starch     0.308* 0.116 
products and cereals      (0.135) 0.053 
3118 Sugar factories  -0.665***  0.178 -0.558***  -0.178    
And refineries (0.17) 0.061 (0.169) 0.044   
3119 Manufacture of cocoa chocolate and 0.455** 0.246     
Sugar confectionery (0.166) 0.041     
3121 Other human feed products      0.540*** 0.207 
     (0.109) 0.044 
3130 Beverages  0.379 -0.406***  -0.137    
  0.081 (0.091) 0.027   
3212 Fabric mills  0.176 -0.303***  -0.105  -0.273**   
  0.046 (0.084) 0.027 (0.085)  
3213 Textile, fabric finishing and fabric  0.201 -0.269*  -0.094    
of coating mills  0.041 (0.137) 0.044   
3214 Textile   0.188 -0.309*  -0.106    
furnishing mills  0.095 (0.138) 0.043   
3220 Manufacture of wearing apparel  0.182 -0.347***  -0.119  -0.350***  -0.090  
except footwear  0.071 (0.079) 0.025 (0.077) 0.026 
3311 Products of wood and carpentry/  0.187 -0.566***  -0.180  -0.600***  -0.113  
except furniture   0.053 (0.16) 0.041 (0.169) 0.022 
3410 Manufacture of pulp paper and   0.122 -0.297**  -0.103    
paperboard  0.044 (0.099) 0.031   
3512 Basic chemi cals, excludes basi c  0.649*** 0.210 0.600*** 0.235 0.696*** -0.175  
Petro chemicals  (0.12) 0.061 (0.116) 0.045 (0.108) 0.038 
3513 Synthetic or  1.123** 0.152     
artificial fibres (0.36) 0.037     
3521 Pharmaceuticals  0.451*** 0.163 0.600*** 0.235 0.687*** 0.269 
 (0.123) 0.066 (0.124) 0.048 (0.113) 0.042 
3522 Chemical  0.519***  0.444*** 0.173 0.495*** 0.265 
products  (0.113)  (0.103) 0.041 (0.095) 0.044 
3540 Coke, includes other coal and      0.657*** 0.189 
oil derivatives     (0.191) 0.038 
3550 Rubber industry   0.367** 0.142   
   (0.125) 0.050   
3611 Ceramics and Pottery 0.485      
 (0.261)      
3612 Clay for the  0.469*      
construction industry (0.194)      
3691 Cement, lime and plaster/ includes     0.435*** 0.254 
other products based on non -metallic prod.      (0.103) 0.075 
3811 Ceramics and    -0.314*  -0.108    
pottery   (0.15) 0.047   
3814 Other metallic products/ except    -0.248**  -0.087    
machinery and equip.    (0.088) 0.029   
3821 Machinery and equipment for  0.480**      
Specific purposes  (0.146)      
3822 Machinery and equipment for  0.308**      
generic purposes  (0.112)      
3831 Machinery and equipment and      0.310*** 0.165 
Electric accessories     (0.081) 0.041 
3833 Devices and accessories for dome stic use/  0.545**   0.094   
except electronics  (0.173)   0.033   
3841 Automotive 0.387***  0.245** 0.207   
industry (0.097)  (0.084) 0.063   
3850 Instruments and precision equipment manufa cturing 
(includes surgical equipme nt,  
0.416*  0.528***  0.644*** 0.116 
electronics) (0.177)  (0.16)  (0.138) 0.032 
Log. likelihood -3.20E+03   -3.80E+03   -4.20E+03   
Prob. chi-squared 476.561  868.961  962.805  
Pseudo r-squared 0.07  0.102  0.103  
N 4901  6491  7321  
Source: 1992, 1999 and 2001 ENESTYC surveys. 
Standard errors in the parenthesis 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Although outsourcing has not encouraged supplier firms engaged in 
outsourcing to invest in R & D, one questions might be related to the type of R 
& D that has been taken place by the limited number of firms that have 
invested in it. The survey identifies four categories of investment in R & D: a) 
design of new products; b) product quality improvement; c) process 
improvement; and d) design, improvement, production of machinery and 
equipment. Using the GVC approach we can classify the first two categories 
into product upgrading and the last two into process upgrading.  Table  7.9 
shows that both non-outsourcing firms (non-out) and supplier firms involved 
in outsourcing (out) that invested in R & D in Mexico are more likely to invest 
in product upgrading.  This result is consistent with Gerber and Carrillo (2002), 
who found in a case study of Baja California electronics and automotive 
manufacturing cluster than more than one-fifth of plants surveyed were 
engaged in product upgrading.  
Table  7.9 Type of investment in R & D (% of firms) 
Type of Investment 
1992 1999 2001 
Non-out Out Non-out Out Non-out Out 
Product Upgrading  65 63 67 55 67 60 
Design of new products  38 35 37 21 38 36 
Product quality improvement  27 28 30 34 29 24 
Process upgrading  35 37 33 45 33 40 
Process improvement 25 25 26 37 25 29 
Design, improvement, production of 
machinery and equipment 
10 12 7 8 8 11 
          Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001.  
 
 
Our results do not seem to be very positive for Mexico’s industrial 
development, since outsourcing has not encouraged suppliers to invest more 
in R & D.  
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7.3. Hypothesis 2.  Outsourcing encourages in-firm training of supplier firms 
involved in outsourcing 
 
The integration of local suppliers into global production networks has created 
greater pressure, as they face more competition not only with other local 
firms but also with suppliers abroad. To improve their performance and retain 
their supplier status, it is possible that supplier firms benefit from direct 
knowledge transfer from their multinational customers or they increase the 
training programmes.  
FDI literature points out that vertical spill-overs occur through contact 
between multinationals and their local suppliers of intermediate inputs by 
means of technological know-how transfer and staff training (Javorcik and 
Spatareanu, 2005).  Hence, domestic suppliers of intermediate inputs to 
MNCs may capture spill-overs through technical training to meet the 
specifications and requirements established by the lead firms (Gallagher and 
Zarsky, 2007).  
The training of local labour is seen as an expected benefit from the 
relationship between the lead-firms and the supplier firms. In this context, our 
second hypothesis tests the probability that supplier firms involved in 
outsourcing provide more in-firm training than non-outsourcing firms. 
Empirical studies comparing the performance of MNCs and locally-owned 
firms suggest that MNCs offer more training to managers and other types of 
employees than domestic firms do.   
This section begins with an overview of the principal trends in in-firm training 
over the 1992-2001 periods, in terms of the number of firms doing in-plant 
training, varying by size, ownership status, export propensity and industry. A 
formal probit analysis of the key determinants of training, including, export 
propensity, share of foreign ownership, and dummy variables for outsourcing, 
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R & D and subsidiary is provided in section 7.3.2 and section 7.3.3 concludes 
with the main findings. 
 
7.3.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
For the analysis we use the 1992, 1999 and 2001 ENESTYC surveys to show a 
broad picture of the trends in enterprise training in the Mexican 
manufacturing sector. The ENESTYC surveys provide information on a variety 
of training practices such as if the training is provided by the company or by 
external sources; benefits gained from the training, reasons for not doing any 
in-plant training, etc.  
In this section we will focus on the characteristics that are associated with the 
firms’ probability to do in-plant training, particularly we aim to analyse 
whether supplier firms involved in outsourcing do more in-plant training than 
non-outsourcing firms. 
As a proxy for in-plant training we use one of the questions where firms have 
to answer whether or not they have some formal in-plant training program. 
According to Verhoogen (2008) from the patterns of responses, it seems that 
respondents misinterpreted many of the specific questions, or used different 
rules of thumb to guide their answers. Thus, this measure seems to be most 
reliable variable measuring the extent of training.  
Figure  7.3 shows that over the three waves of the survey suppliers involved in 
outsourcing provided more in-firm training than non-outsourcing firms over 
the three waves of the survey. In 1999 and 2001, approximately 80 percent of 
the outsourcing firms surveyed provided in-firm training to their employees. 
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Figure  7.3 Percentage of firms providing in-firm training 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001.  
 
Table  7.10 present figures by firm sizes: large firms with more than 250 
workers; medium firms with 101-250 workers; small firms with 16-100 
workers; and micro firms with less than 15 workers. These results show that 
firms that do in-firm training tend to be larger or medium for suppliers 
involved in outsourcing and for non-outsourcing firms. For instance, in 2001 
57.78 percent of large suppliers involved in outsourcing provided in-plant 
training. We can also observe that small and medium enterprises offered 
limited in-firm training.  Small firms might not provide in-firm training 
probably because of the lack of knowledge about training techniques and 
organisation, training is not affordable (Miyamoto, 2003).  
Table  7.10 Percentage of firms providing in-firm training by size 
Size 
1992 1999 2001 
Non-Out Out. Non-Out Out. Non-Out Out. 
Large 26.30 34.95 25.70 55.46 20.55 57.78 
Medium 20.10 17.24 24.33 18.19 21.37 15.14 
Small 9.41 7.52 11.85 6.29 14.75 6.09 
Micro 1.69 2.51 3.32 0.59 4.03 0.59 
                          Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001. 
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Table  7.11 presents the corresponding training trends with ownership as the 
unit of observation.  The table shows the percentage of firms providing in-
plant training by ownership status. In general we observe that national non-
outsourcing firms train more workers than any of the other group of firms. 
Table  7.11 Percentage of firms providing in-plant training by ownership 
status 
Ownership 
1992 1999 2001 
Non-Out Out Non-Out Out Non-Out Out 
National 44.46 26.96 54.49 33.73 50.95 35.19 
Foreign 13.04 35.27 10.71 46.80 9.75 44.42 
                    Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001. 
 
 
Table  7.12 provides some initial insight trends into the relationship between 
training and export status. With exception of 1992, firms that do not export 
and do not outsource; and firms that do export and are engaged in 
outsourcing are invariably more likely to provide more training than those 
that do not belong any of these groups.  
Table  7.12 Percentage of firms training by export status 
Export 1992  1999  2001  
Status Non-Out Out Non-Out Out Non-Out Out 
Exporter 4.26 3.13 7.08 55.85 6.37 55.58 
Non-exporter 53.24 59.09 58.13 24.68 54.33 24.03 
      Source: Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001.  
 
 
Table  7.13 summarizes data on the percentage of in-firm training at the two-
digit industry level. We see that the training incidence is higher for suppl ier 
firms involved in outsourcing concentrated in the textile; clothing and leather; 
and in the Machinery and equipment industries. Whereas non outsourcing 
firms training their workers are likely to concentrate in more traditional 
industries such as food, beverage and tobacco and chemicals, oil and 
derivatives of coal. 
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Table  7.13 Percentage firms providing in-firm training by industry 
Industry 
1992 1999 2001 
Non-out Out Non-out Out Non-out Out 
I. Food, beverages and tobacco 12.70 2.51 14.41 4.33 13.73 4.23 
II. Textiles, clothing and leather 7.49 20.38 9.61 29.11 8.43 29.44 
III. Wood and wood products 1.94 1.57 2.37 2.36 2.58 1.52 
IV. Paper and printing 4.20 1.25 4.94 1.87 4.39 2.20 
V. Chemicals, oil and derivatives and coal 10.29 3.13 11.70 4.72 10.67 4.91 
VI. Non-metallic mineral products 2.84 0.47 3.23 1.08 3.00 1.02 
VII. Basic metals 1.96 1.41 1.75 0.79 1.36 0.76 
VIII. Machinery and Equipment 15.32 31.35 16.25 34.91 15.66 34.09 
IX. Other manufacturing Industries 0.77 0.16 0.95 1.38 0.87 1.44 
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001.  
 
From previous indicators we may conclude that the majority of the suppliers 
involved in outsourcing  providing training tend to be large, exporters, and 
foreign. Conversely, non-outsourcing firms show a completely opposite trend. 
In the following section, we analyze these trends more formally using a 
regression framework.  
 
7.3.2. Econometric Model  
 
As mentioned earlier, the second hypothesis aims to test whether supplier 
firms involved in outsourcing do more in-firm training than non-outsourcing 
firms. But if we estimate a model including only one independent variable, we 
will incur in omitted variable bias. Therefore, we explore the factors that have 
contributed to the training trends observed above by estimating a 
probabilistic regression model. The explanatory variables are the share of 
foreign ownership, outsourcing ratio, export propensity, size of the firm, a 
dummy if the firm is a subsidiary, a dummy variable if the firm invests in R & D 
and controls for industry heterogeneity. In general, the probability of training 
fuction can be represented by: 


itititit
itititit
DRSubsidiaryIndustrySize
ensityExportpropOwnershipOutratioTraining
&
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
  
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Where subscripts i and t denote firm and time period respectively. For training 
incidence, a 0, 1 indicator variable for whether or not the firm provided any 
training to its employees is used.  
The outsourcing ratio is also included as our hypothesis is that supplier firms 
involved in outsourcing do more in-plant training than non-outsourcing firms. 
Foreign ownership is included as previous empirical evidence in Mexico, 
Indonesia and Malaysia shows that firms with higher foreign equity train more 
than domestic firms (Tan and Batra, 1996; Tan and Lopez-Acevedo, 2003). 
These studies suggest that MNCs are more likely to train their workers for two 
reasons. Firstly, they are less likely to face credit constraints since they have 
more access to foreign capital. Secondly, MNCs are more likely to gain 
information on techniques and organisation of training since they have a 
global range of information.  
Export propensity is included as it may indirectly exert an indirect influence on 
training through improved access to foreign ownership or through higher 
quality standards established by the lead firms. 
A dummy variable to identify whether a firm is a subsidiary or not is included 
as subsidiary firms might receive training from the parent firms in order to 
maintain the same quality and production standards within the entire group.  
We also include the dummy variable “R & D” as sophisticated production 
processes and R & D requires intensive training for workers to adapt to new 
technologies. Previous empirical evidence suggests that there is a positive 
correlation between training and R & D (Tan and Batra, 1996; and Tan and 
Lopez-Acevedo, 2003).  
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7.3.3. Results 
 
Table  7.14 reports the probit results for training for 1992, 1999 and 2001. 
Since probit coefficients can not be interpreted, we report the marginal 
effects that explain the change in the explanatory variables. First consistent 
with cross tabulations, share of foreign ownership, is a statistically significant 
predictor of training over the three waves of the survey. Second, size is 
associated with an increased likelihood of training. This means that larger 
firms are more likely to do in-firm training than smaller firms.  Third, the 
probability of training is positively and significantly related to R & D. This may 
indicate the positive relationship between the use of advanced technology 
used in the production process and the level of skills needed by workers to 
implement the use of technologies. Subsidiary is positively associated with 
training in the three years, but the relationship is significant only at the 10 
percent level for 1999 and 2001.  
Finally, previous tabulations indicated that supplier firms involved in 
outsourcing were more likely to do in-plant training, but when we control for 
other factors, the effect disappears. We can observe that the relationship 
between outsourcing and training is negative and not robust. Therefore, we 
reject our hypothesis that outsourcing encourages in-plant training of the 
supplier firms involved in outsourcing.  
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Table  7.14 Results hypothesis 2  
 1992 1999 2001 
 Prob_train Coefficients Marginal Coefficients Marginal Coefficients Marginal 
  Effects Effects Effects 
Constant -1.612***  -1.754***  -1.482***  
  (0.075)   (0.062)   -0.051   
Outsourcing -0.035 -0.013 -0.138 -0.033 -0.098 -0.028 
  (0.063) 0.024 (0.078) 0.019 (0.073) (0.022) 
Foreign exporter firm -0.181 -0.069 -0.439 -0.100 -0.368 -0.102 
  (0.212) 0.081 (0.24) 0.054 (0.196) (0.055) 
Share of foreign 0.345*** 0.132 0.684*** 0.155 0.420** 0.117 
ownership (0.075) 0.028 (0.172) 0.039 (0.133) (0.037) 
Export  0.17 0.065 -0.079 -0.018 0.039 0.011 
propensity (0.129) 0.049 (0.095) 0.022 (0.087) (0.024) 
Log size 0.322*** 0.123 0.528*** 0.120 0.467*** 0.130 
  (0.015) 0.006 (0.015) 0.004 (0.013) (0.004) 
Subsidiary 0.236*** 0.088 0.119* 0.027 0.114* 0.031 
  (0.053) 0.019 (0.054) 0.012 (0.047) (0.013) 
R & D 0.446*** 0.169 0.611*** 0.127 0.444*** 0.116 
  (0.04) 0.015 (0.051) 0.010 (0.044) (0.011) 
Log. likelihood -2.80E+03   -2.10E+03   -2.90E+03   
Prob. chi-squared 1052.076   2763.804   2701.832   
Pseudo r-squared 0.16   0.391   0.319   
N 4901   6941   7321   
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001. 
Standard errors in the parenthesis 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Does the probability of training over the three waves vary across industries? 
This question can be addressed using dummy variables to control for industry 
specific effects (see Table ‎7.15). Consistent with the trends reported in the 
previous model, the probability of training rises with firm size, foreign owned 
firms, firms that are subsidiaries and firms that invest in R & D. Again 
outsourcing has a negative and not significant relationship with the 
probability of training. The industry results vary across years, and we only 
report the industries that are significant in at least in one of the years. Results 
show that the probability of training is greater and significant over the three 
years of the survey in three industries: basic chemicals (3512); pharmaceutical 
(3521); and electronic equipment (3832). It is also interesting to note that 
from 1992 to 2001 the probability of training is widespread across more 
industries such as 3112, 3117, 3841, 3850, etc.  
Finally, again as mentioned above the probability of training is more likely to 
occur in high-tech industries and traditional industries such as textile and 
apparel.  
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Table ‎7.15 Probit model controlling for industry specific effects 
 1992  1999  2001  
  Coefficients Marginal Coefficients Marginal Coefficients Marginal 
  Effects Effects Effects 
Constant -1.665***  -1.820***  -1.636***  
  (0.076)  (0.064)  (0.055)  
Outsourcing -0.014 -0.006 -0.128 -0.030 -0.037 -0.010 
  (0.064) (0.024) (0.078) (0.019) (0.074) (0.021) 
Foreign exporter  firm  -0.172 -0.066 -0.514* -0.115 -0.394 -0.107 
  (0.212) (0.081) (0.244) (0.054) (0.201) (0.055) 
Share of foreign  0.288*** 0.110 0.649*** 0.145 0.308* 0.084 
ownership  (0.077) (0.029) (0.174) (0.038) (0.137) (0.037) 
Export  0.169 0.065 -0.075 -0.017 0.088 0.024 
propensity  (0.129) (0.049) (0.096) (0.021) (0.088) (0.024) 
Log size 0.327*** 0.125 0.533*** 0.119 0.469*** 0.128 
  (0.016) (0.006) (0.016) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) 
Subsidiary  0.224*** 0.084 0.112* 0.025 0.093 0.025 
  (0.053) (0.019) (0.054) (0.012) (0.048) (0.013) 
R & D 0.438*** 0.165 0.587*** 0.121 0.394*** 0.101 
  (0.04) (0.015) (-0.052) (0.010) (0.045) (0.011) 
3112 Manufacture of dairy 
products 
    0.470** 0.103 
      (0.143) (0.024) 
3117 Edible oils and fats      0.808*** 0.146 
      (0.243) (0.024) 
3118 Sugar factories and refineries  -0.570*** -0.224     
  (0.167) (0.064)     
3120 Other human f eed products      0.267 0.064 
      (0.139) (0.029) 
3130 Beverages  0.462*** 0.161   0.546*** 0.116 
  (0.108) (0.033)   (0.13) (0.020) 
3213 Textile, Fabric Finishing and    0.374* 0.068 0.343* 0.080 
 Fabric Co ating Mi lls   (0.184) (0.026) (0.158) (0.030) 
3230 Leather and fur 
products/exc ept footwear  
  0.496* 0.083   
    (0.205) (0.024)   
3410 Manufacture of pulp paper 
and  
    0.280* 0.067 
 paperbo ard      (0.114) 0.024 
3512 Basic chemicals, excludes 
basic  
0.349** 0.125 0.420* 0.074 0.627*** 0.126 
 petro ch emic als (0.129) (0.042) (0.188) (0.025) (0.157) (0.021) 
3521 Pharmaceutic als 0.357* 0.127 0.731** 0.107 0.779*** 0.144 
  (0.139) (0.045) (0.239) (0.020) (0.193) (0.021) 
3522 Chemical Products     0.424** 0.095 
      (0.133) (0.024) 
3540 Coke, includes other coal      0.703** 0.134 
 and oil derivatives     (0.247) (0.029) 
3550 Rubber Industry   0.462* 0.080 0.414* 0.093 
    (0.191) (0.024) (0.168) (0.030) 
3710 Iron and steel b asic industries      0.665** 0.130 
      (0.213) (0.027) 
3811 Metallic piec es meltin g and 
moulding 
    0.391* 0.089 
      (0.154) (0.028) 
3814 Other metallic p roducts     0.629*** 0.128 
 /exc ept machin ery and equip ment      (0.114) (0.016) 
3822 Machinery and equipment      0.424** 0.095 
 for gen eric purposes      (0.136) (0.024) 
3823 Machinery and equipment  0.481 0.165     
 for offices and informatics  (0.253) (0.075)     
3831 Machinery and equipment    0.301* 0.057 0.275* 0.067 
 and electric accessories   (0.146) (0.023) (0.13) (0.027) 
3832 Electronic equip ment   0.359* 0.128 0.439* 0.077 0.700*** 0.136 
 (radio, tv  and communication)  (0.151) (0.049) (0.204) (0.027) (0.188) (0.023) 
3841 Automotive industry    0.19 0.038 0.393** 0.090 
    (0.143) (0.026) (0.128) (0.024) 
3850 Instruments and precision 
equip. Manuf.  
0.377 0.133 0.409 0.072 0.605*** 0.122 
 include surgic al equip ., excludes 
elec tronics 
(0.198) (0.063) (0.228) (0.031) (0.181) (0.025) 
Log. likelihood  -2.70E+03  -2.10E+03  -2.80E+03  
Prob. chi-squared  1108.962  2805.855  2859.349  
Pseudo r-squared  1.68E-01  0.397  0.337  
N 4901  6941  7321  
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001. 
Standard errors in the parenthesis 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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7.4. Hypothesis 3. Outsourcing promotes better organizational 
techniques of supplier firms involved in outsourcing 
 
This hypothesis is explained by both spill-overs literature and upgrading 
effects of GVC. The GVC literature stresses that firms can upgrade their 
processes by transforming inputs into outputs in a more efficient way, 
through superior technology or reorganising production systems. For 
instance, just-in-time can be a form of process upgrading. In this sense, 
suppliers participating in GVC have to comply with international standards 
and it is through lead firms that supplier firms can acquire organizational 
techniques. 
This section aims to test if outsourcing promotes better organizational 
techniques of the supplier firms. We start by showing trends of the 
organizational techniques implemented by firms; we follow by presenting 
the econometric model. Main empirical findings are presented in section 
7.5.3. 
 
7.4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The ENESTYC contains a question regarding the organizational techniques 
implemented by the firm. The survey identifies ten organizational 
techniques which are listed in Table  7.16. It is important to mention that 
during 1992 only limited number of firms answered to the question. For 
this reason, we omit 1992 in the econometric analysis. 
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The statistics indicate that the most widely used technique by both non-
outsourcing firms and outsourcing suppliers is the Total Quality 
Management (TQM); followed by the establishments of rules and 
procedures. In addition, suppliers involved in outsourcing seem to have 
adopted more organizational techniques compared to non-outsourcing 
firms. 
 
Table  7.16 Organizational techniques implemented in the firm (% of firms) 
Organizational techniques 
1992 1999 2001 
Non-out Out Non-out Out Non-out Out 
1. Just in Time 4.83 9.72 12.68 27.73 13.46 28.51 
2. Statistical control in the 
production process 
8.73 9.25 30.26 41.99 29.32 44.50 
 3. Job Rotation 5.77 7.21 19.59 25.96 21.01 31.30 
4. Quality circles 7.38 6.11 22.61 34.71 23.47 39.85 
5. Total quality management 0.00 0.00 37.48 47.20 41.41 53.81 
6. Rearrangement of the 
equipment, machines and 
improvement of facilities 
10.51 10.66 28.63 39.72 26.97 39.59 
7. Establishment of rules and 
procedures 
0.00 0.00 32.70 41.40 32.45 46.79 
 8. Participation of workers in the 
decision making process 
0.00 0.00 23.42 29.40 25.24 35.28 
 9. Strict supervision of labour 5.41 4.08 25.58 29.40 28.90 34.18 
10. Performance standards 0.00 0.00 25.48 36.09 24.65 40.27 
11.Other 12.81 12.85 4.57 6.88 4.81 9.05 
12. None 44.55 40.13 25.37 16.13 25.48 14.30 
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001.  
 
Similarly, Figure  7.4 presents a scatter of the relationship between the 
number of organizational techniques implemented by the firm and 
selected explanatory variables such as outsourcing ratio, share of foreign 
ownership, export propensity and size of the firm. From the exploratory 
analysis we observe a steady positive and increasing relationship between 
outsourcing and the number of organizational techniques implemented. 
For foreign ownership and size of the firm the trend is clearly positive. 
However, the econometric analysis is going to help us to establish more 
solid evidence on these relationships. 
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Figure  7.4 Relationship between organizational techniques and selected 
independent variables, 2001 
   
  
Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001.  
 
 
7.4.2. Econometric Model  
 
The econometric model includes different independent variables which 
might explain firms’ adoption of organizational techniques. The 
organizational techniques function is estimated using OLS (ordinary least 
squares) as follows: 
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This equation is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) and the 
independent variable is the number of organizational techniques that a 
firm has implemented. To explain the factors that determine whether a 
firm has implemented an organizational technique we include firm 
attributes such as export propensity, ownership of the firm, size, and 
outsourcing ratio. The following section describes our main findings. 
 
7.4.3. Results 
 
After testing and correcting for hetersokedasticity using the White Test,  
Table  7.17 contains the OLS results. The coefficient of outsourcing ratio is 
negative and highly significant at the 5 percent level. This outcome leads us 
to reject our hypothesis that firms involved in outsourcing implement more 
organizational techniques than non-outsourcing firms. There are other 
factors that are more important in determining the adoption of 
organizational techniques like export propensity, foreign ownership, large 
and medium firms. The coefficients of these variables are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. We can also notice that the re 
is a negative and significant relationship between small firms and 
organizational techniques.  
An interaction variable between large supplier firms involved in 
outsourcing is included. For 2001 we can notice that there is a positive and 
significant relationship at the 10 percent. In other words, only large 
suppliers involved in outsourcing increase the number of organizational 
techniques. But, probably this effect is more related to the variable size 
than with outsourcing. 
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A regression that included industry dummies was conducted, but we did 
not include the results as none of the coefficients of the industry dummies 
were significant. 
Table  7.17 Results Hypothesis 3 
Variables 
 1999 2001 
 Coeff. Coeff. 
Constant  2.560*** 2.921*** 
   (0.066) (0.059) 
Outsourcing ratio  -0.348** -0.319** 
   (0.107) (0.116) 
Export propensi ty  0.381** 0.814*** 
   (0.123) (0.125) 
Foreign ownership  0.863*** 0.476*** 
 
 (0.114) (0.116) 
Large fi rms  1.255*** 0.897*** 
   (0.092) (0.089) 
Medium fi rms  0.519*** 0.431*** 
   (0.085) (0.08) 
Small fi rms  -1.910*** -2.032*** 
   (0.072) (0.067) 
Large outsourcing  0.229 0.418* 
 fi rms  (0.178) (0.194) 
No. Obs .  7425 8675 
R-squared  0.2816 0.2578 
  Source: Author’s calculations from ENESTYC, 1992, 1999 and 2001. 
Robust Standard errors in the parenthesis 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
7.5. Conclusions 
 
The expected upgrading and spill-overs effects that Mexican economy 
anticipated as a result of integrating into global production networks have 
not materialised. Our results show that supplier firms involved in 
outsourcing do not invest more in R & D, do not invest more in and do not 
have better organizational techniques. This is in stark contrast to the 
Korean experience, one of the most successful countries that encouraged 
domestic firms to build extensive global networks with foreign firms, 
providing technology via licensing; capital goods and original equipment 
manufacture (OEM) contracts. The Networks developed by Korean firms 
are a major source of technological learning (Kim, 2003). In the case of 
Mexico, we can find that the global production networks have not brought 
benefits for the country and its firms.  
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Chapter 8 Conclusions 
 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
This thesis contributes to the current literature on off-shoring and 
outsourcing by providing evidence of the phenomenon in the context of 
suppliers in a developing country. This research focuses on firm level data 
from the National Survey of Employment, Wages, Technology and Training  
(ENESTyC) covering 52 manufacturing activities at a four-digit level in 1992, 
1999 and 2001. The main research question focused on answering: ““To 
what extent does the integration in global production networks through 
outsourcing and off-shoring benefit producers in developing countries along 
with opening channels for upgrading?”. 
 
Due to the gap in the existing literature addressing the phenomenon from 
the perspective of the supplier firms, we looked at different literature from 
the perspective of the lead firms to identify potential variables that may be 
related to the characteristics of supplier firms in developing countries. We 
have also reviewed the theories of Global Value Chains, Foreign Direct 
Investment and Learning by exporting to identify the possible opportunities 
that outsourcing and off-shoring collaborations can open for developing 
countries in terms of upgrading and spill-over effects. Mixing these 
theoretical and empirical bodies of literature we developed our framework 
to analyse the phenomenon in Mexico.  
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By this research we have contributed in the existing literature in two ways. 
For the first time an effort has been made to present evidence of off-
shoring and outsourcing in Mexico using firm level data in 1992, 1999 and 
2001. This research also enriches the current debate of the effects of 
outsourcing and off-shoring in terms of upgrading and spill-over effects on 
supplier firms in developing countries. 
 
8.2. Principal Research Findings 
 
This section presents the major findings of the research questions raised in 
Chapter 5. 
1. How significant is outsourcing in the Mexican Manufacturing 
Industry? 
To answer this question, we first needed a variable able to capture the 
extent of outsourcing. In the literature review chapter we stressed that 
outsourcing can be measured using macro-data measures such as in Campa 
and Goldberg, (1997); Feenstra and Hanson, (1997); Geishecker and Görg, 
(2003); Hummels, et al, (1997); Athukorala, (2003); Yeats, (2001); Lall, et al, 
(2004); and Kimura et al, (2005), and micro-data at the firm level, like in 
Jones (1998); (Diaz-Mora, 2005); and Tomiura, (2005). Evidence suggests 
that micro-data at the firm level better captures the extent of outsourcing. 
For this reason we gathered data at the firm level.  
The results suggest that outsourcing practices are significant in the 
Mexican Manufacturing industry. In 2000, 31.3 percent of Mexico’s gross 
value of production was produced under outsourcing agreements by 
approximately 13 percent of Mexican supplier firms.  
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Thus, outsourcing practices are significant, but they are concentrated in a 
small number of firms. 
 
2. What are the characteristics of the supplier firms involved in 
outsourcing in the Mexican Manufacturing Industry? 
To answer this question we used a probit model on a large sample of 
detailed firm-level data to test the characteristics of firms involved in 
outsourcing. We present the findings of the descriptive analysis as well as 
summarizing the main findings of our econometric results  in a table.  
Results of the Descriptive Analysis  
Ownership status:  the proportion of domestic firms involved in 
outsourcing is greater than the proportion of national firms for the three 
years of the analysis. More than 40 percent of the supplier firms engaged 
in outsourcing in the three waves of the survey were foreign. 
Export propensity: the GVC approach emphasizes that value chains 
promote inter-firm networks, by which developing-country producers 
through foreign buyers are able to access foreign markets (Bair and Dussel-
Petters, 2006). 
Results suggest that with exception of 1992, firms involved in outsourcing 
as suppliers tend to export more than non-outsourcing firms. In 1999 and 
2001; approximately 60 percent of the firms involved in outsourcing 
exported more than 50 percent of their production.  
Thus at first glance our results are consistent with the GVC approach. 
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Size: the dualistic approach expresses that lead firms in developed 
countries outsource to reduce production costs and to smooth production 
cycles at the expense of small suppliers. In this sense, the dualistic 
approach suggests that primarily small firms assume the role of suppliers in 
the outsourcing relationship.  
In the case of the Mexican Manufacturing industry, this argument does not 
hold and results suggest that more than 70 percent of the suppliers 
involved in outsourcing are large and medium sized firms for the three 
waves of the survey. 
 
Subsidiary status: our findings suggest that a significant proportion of 
suppliers involved in outsourcing are subsidiaries. For instance, in 1992; 
41.38 percent of the suppliers involved in outsourcing were subsidiaries; in 
1999 and 2001, approximately 61 percent of the total number supplier 
firms were subsidiaries. 
Disaggregated figures of subsidiary firms by ownership and exporting 
status show that during 1992 and 2001 more than 40 percent of the 
supplier firms engaged in outsourcing are foreign subsidiaries and between 
39.73 and 42.97 are foreign subsidiaries producing for the export markets.  
Share of imported raw materials: firms with higher outsourcing ratios are 
more likely to have higher shares of imported raw materials used in their 
production. Over the three waves of the survey, more than the 48 percent 
of the supplier firms engaged in outsourcing imported more than 50 
percent of their raw materials  This is expected as a great part of supplier‘s 
subcontracted firms are Maquiladora firms that rely on imported raw 
materials. 
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Skills: during 1992 and 1999 58.2 percent and 49.2 percent of the 
employees of suppliers firms involved in outsourcing were unskilled having 
less than 6 years of schooling. By 2001, we observe a significant increase in 
the years of schooling of the employees working with outsourcing firms as 
52 percent of them had from 7 to 12 years of schooling. However, 
compared to non-outsourcing firms, it seems that suppliers engaged in 
outsourcing contract labour with lower years of education. Probably 
because the activities in which they are concentrated are low-value added 
activities which require minimal skills. 
We also observe that suppliers who outsource are more likely to use lower 
skilled labour and pay lower salaries than non-outsourcing suppliers. 
This is consistent with the labour cost saving motivation of outsourcing 
from the perspective of the contractor. It is also supported by the fact that 
wages are lower for blue-collar workers as compared to wages of blue-
collar workers of non-outsourcing firms.  
Concentration of outsourcing activities by industry:  To control of 
potential unobserved heterogeneity across industries we included industry 
dummy variables. Results show that supplier firms involved in outsourcing 
are concentrated in labour intensive industries such as textile and wearing 
apparel manufacturing, plastic products and basic metals.  
This result is consistent with Hansen et al. (2008), who state that 
outsourcing in developing countries is extensively concentrated in low 
value-added activities related to standardized products and services. 
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Productivity: Labour productivity tends to be considerably lower for the 
suppliers engaged in outsourcing than for the manufacturing firms with 
lower outsourcing ratios. This result is surprising, as we were expecting 
that supplier firms contracted by other firms were more productive than 
non-outsourcing firms. This might indicate that productive firms are not 
interested in engaging in outsourcing or that probably the segments in 
which the subcontracted activities are concentrated are more labour 
intensive. 
 
Econometric Results: Probit model  
 
To test the joint significance of the variables mentioned above, we use a 
probit model. Results show an interesting insight into the characteristics of 
being an outsourcing supplier versus the probability of not being an 
outsourcing supplier in the Mexican manufacturing industry.  
The results are summarized in table Table ‎8.1: 
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Table  8.1 Summary of the Results: Characteristics of outsourcing firms 
Variables 1992 1999 2001 
Foreign 
Positive and 
Significant 
Positive Significant 
Positive 
Significant 
Exports 
Positive and 
Significant 
Positive Significant 
Positive 
Significant 
Productivity 
Negative and 
Significant 
Negative and 
significant 
Negative and 
significant 
Size 
Positive 
Significant 
Positive Significant 
Positive 
Significant 
Age 
Negative and 
significant; 
Positive (when we 
include industry 
dummy variables) 
 
Negative and 
significant 
Positive  (when we 
include industry 
dummy variables) 
Negative and 
significant 
+ (when we 
include 
industry 
dummy 
variables) 
Subsidiary 
Positive and 
significant 
Positive and not 
Significant  
Negative when we 
include industry 
dummy variables 
Positive and 
Significant 
when we 
include 
industry 
dummy 
variables) 
Low Skil l  Labour 
Positive and 
Significant 
Positive and  
Significant 
Positive and 
significant 
Wages (Blue collar worker) 
Negative and not 
significant 
Positive and 
significant when 
we include 
industry dummy 
variables  
Positive and 
significant when we 
do not include 
industry dummy 
variables 
Negative and 
significant 
when we 
include 
industry 
dummy 
variables 
Imported raw materials Not significant 
Positive and 
significant 
Positive and 
significant 
Unions 
 
Positive and 
significant at 1% 
when we include 
industry dummy 
variables 
Positive and 
significant at 
when we 
include 
industry 
dummy 
variables 
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Results suggest that Mexico is specializing in labour intensive activities, 
which are concentrated by Maquiladoras. We can also observe that wages 
are among the main drivers of being subcontracted. This  is consistent with 
Puyana et. al (2005) findings who assert that wages are among the main 
incentives to attract foreign firms to subcontract activities in Mexico. The 
authors also pointed out that the Maquila activities did not have the 
expected impact on industrialization. This argument is also consistent with 
the present findings. In the case of Mexico as it has not increased 
productivity levels, employment, or wages. Besides, due to the regulations 
of the Maquiladoras it has not created linkages with non-maquiladora 
firms. Maquiladoras were supposed to import all the raw materials to get 
advantage of the duty free and until 2001 they were forced to export all 
their production. Therefore, this has not opened channels or promoted 
opportunities for domestic linkages through outsourcing. 
An interesting result regarding the “dummy variable to control for unions” 
is that it is positive and significant before we control for industry specific 
effects. This may suggest that we have low unionised industries rather than 
low unionised firms 
 
Tobit model 
The results of the tobit model show that foreign owned firms and exporters 
outsource more. For instance, in 2001 estimations show that an increase in 
the export propensity ratio by one percentage point, leads to an increase in 
the firms’ outsourcing ratio by 0.257 while holding the other variables in 
the model constant. 
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Does the engagement in outsourcing increases the technology transfer, 
training and improves the organizational techniques of the supplier firms 
involved in outsourcing? 
To answer this question a series of propositions were derived and the 
results are listed below: 
a. Does outsourcing foster R & D activities of supplier firms involved 
in outsourcing? 
The results reveal that suppliers who are involved in outsourcing have 
lower probability of investing in R & D. This result is very robust and 
contrary to our expectations, although the variable is significant at the 1 
percent level over the three waves of the survey. This suggests that 
outsourcing does not encourage suppliers involved in outsourcing to invest 
in R & D. Probably because firms are merely concentrated in low-value 
added activities which do not require any R & D such as the production of 
apparel and the assembly of electronics. 
The share of foreign ownership increases the firm’s probability to invest in 
R & D. The variable export propensity does not show consistent results in 
the three regressions. An interaction variable if the firm is foreign and 
exporter is included and results show that firms who are exporters and 
foreign have a lower probability of investing in R & D. We also observe that 
the propensity to engage in R & D increases with size. These effects are 
very significant over the three periods and consistent with previous 
empirical evidence (Martinez-Ros and Labeaga, 2002; Shefer and Frenkel, 
2005; Fang and Mohnen, 2009).The dummy variable subsidiary was not 
significant. 
Although outsourcing has not encouraged supplier firms engaged in 
outsourcing to invest in R & D, one questions might be related to the type 
of R & D that has been undertaken by the limited number of firms that 
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have invested in it. The survey identifies four categories of investment in R 
& D: a) design of new products; b) product quality improvement; c) process 
improvement; and d) design, improvement, production of machinery and 
equipment. Using the GVC approach we can classify the first two categories 
into product upgrading and the last two into process upgrading shows that 
both non-outsourcing firms (non-out) and supplier firms involved in 
outsourcing (out) that invested in R & D in Mexico are more likely to invest 
in product upgrading.  
Our results do not seem to be very positive for Mexico’s industrial 
development, since outsourcing has not encouraged suppliers to invest 
more in R & D.  
 
b. Does outsourcing encourage in-firm training of supplier firms 
involved in outsourcing? 
To answer this question includes several variables to avoid possible 
omitted variable bias problems. The explanatory variables are the share of 
foreign ownership, dummy of outsourcing, export propensity, size of the 
firm, dummy if the firm is a subsidiary, a dummy variable if the firm invests 
in R & D and controls for industry heterogeneity.  
Results show that the share of foreign ownership is positive and 
statistically significant predictor of training over the three waves of the 
survey. In addition, size is associated with an increased likelihood of 
training. This means that larger firms are more likely to do in-firm training 
than smaller firms. Thirdly, the probability of training is positively and 
significantly related to R & D. This may indicate the positive relationship 
between the use of advanced technology used in the production process 
and the level of skills needed by workers to implement the use of 
technologies. Subsidiary is positively associated with training in the three 
years. 
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We can observe that the relationship between outsourcing and training is 
negative and not robust. Therefore, we conclude that outsourcing does not 
encourage in-plant training of the supplier firms.  
We also used dummy variables to test whether the probability of training 
over the three waves varies across industries? Results show that the 
probability of training rises with firm size, foreign owned firms, firms that 
are subsidiaries and firms that invest in R & D. The industry results vary 
across years, and we find that the probability of training is greater and 
significant over the three years of the survey in three industries: basic 
chemicals (3512); pharmaceutical (3521); and electronic equipment (3832). 
It is also interesting to note that from 1992 to 2001 the probability of 
training is widespread across more industries such as 3112, 3117, 3841, 
3850, etc.  
Thus, the probability of training is more likely to occur in high-tech 
industries and traditional industries such as textile and apparel. 
 
c. Does outsourcing promote better organizational techniques of 
supplier firms involved in outsourcing? 
The spill-over effects and upgrading literature stresses that a firm can 
upgrade their processes by transforming inputs into outputs in a more 
efficient way, through superior technology or reorganising production 
systems. For instance, just-in-time can be a form of process upgrading. In 
this sense, suppliers participating in GVC have to comply with international 
standards and it is through lead firms that supplier firms can acquire 
organizational techniques. 
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Considering this argument we want to test if firms involved in outsourcing 
implement more organizational techniques than non-outsourcing firms. 
Using an OLS model results show that the coefficient of outsourcing ratio is 
negative and highly significant at the 5 percent level. This outcome leads us 
to reject our hypothesis that firms involved in outsourcing implement more 
organizational techniques than non-outsourcing firms. There are however, 
other factors that are more important in determining the adoption of 
organizational techniques such as export propensity, foreign ownership, 
large and medium sized firms. The coefficients of these variables are 
positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. We find that 
there is a negative and significant relationship between small firms and 
organizational techniques.  
An interaction variable between large supplier firms involved in 
outsourcing is included and for 2001 survey where we find that only large 
suppliers involved in outsourcing increase the number of organizational 
techniques. Probably the implementation of organizational techniques is 
more related to the variable size than with outsourcing. 
A regression that included industry dummies was conducted, but the 
coefficients of the industry dummies were not significant. 
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8.3. Lessons from Mexico 
 
Mexico’s trade and FDI liberalisation policies implemented since the mid-
1980s have so far had mixed results. These policies lead to a good export 
performance, but poor economic growth. For instance, from 1980 to 2000 
exports grew at an average rate of 7.9 percent per year. By 2000 exports 
represented 28.7 percent of GDP and manufacturing exports and 
accounted for 87.3 percent of total exports. In this export boom, 
Maquiladora exports played a key role, as they accounted for 47.9 percent 
of manufacturing exports in 2000 (De la Garza Toledo, 2007). However, the 
expansion of exports does not mean that the country increased 
productivity or export content. Puyana, et al. (2005) estimates that an 
increase by one percentage point of Maquila exports is related to a 0.01 
percent increase of productivity. In fact, Palma (2010) asserts that although 
Maquila has absorbed a significant amount of labour, it is associated with 
little or no productivity growth, and that it can only expand on the basis of 
low wages (Moreno Brid and Ros, 2004; Palma, 2009). The problem is that 
exports of the Maquiladora industry have concentrated in basic assembly 
activities rather than in products higher-up in the value chain. This 
situation raises doubts about the ability of the current industrial model to 
generate self-sustained growth.  
Results presented in this thesis show that outsourcing as a strategy for 
development and promotion of economic growth has failed. In fact 
outsourcing is not associated with higher investment in R & D, with higher 
in-plant training and with improved organisational techniques of the 
supplier firms involved in this type of production.  
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While outsourcing practices have been dynamic, they have been 
characterized by a lack of domestic linkages in export oriented activities. 
Maquiladora programme failed to provide incentives for domestic 
companies to become suppliers to exporters, because the programs ’ 
benefits are exclusively to firms that are themselves exporters (Ten Kate, 
et. al. 2000). 
The results presented in this thesis suggest the need to reshape Mexico’s 
industrial policy. Mexico’s industrial development can no longer be based 
on low wages, and Maquiladora production. If Mexico is to succeed the 
industrial policy needs to allow linkages between exporters and domestic 
suppliers to increase the local value added and technology transfer. To 
promote linkages with local suppliers, incentives to allow tax-free entry of 
imported inputs and raw materials for export purposes must be 
reconsidered, and policies to promote technological innovation in 
manufacturing should be designed. 
 
8.4. Limitations of the research 
 
There are two limitations of this study: 
 The data of the ENESTYC makes it impossible to distinguish whether 
the supplier firms that are subsidiaries are operating under vertical 
integrated or arm’s length market transactions. If their production 
corresponds to vertical integration and trade happens through 
intra-firm transactions this type of production can not be 
considered as outsourcing, and we might be over estimating the 
magnitude of the phenomenon. 
 A second limitation is related to potential issues of self selection 
that arise when using cross-section data.  
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8.5. Suggestions for future research 
 
 Use panel data techniques to test selection bias and causality 
problems  
 To do the same analysis using the most recent ENESTYC to see more 
recent trends. Especially to see the impacts of the world financial 
crisis in the Maquiladora firms. 
 To include qualitative research techniques because from our 
results, we can have a general overview of off-shoring and 
outsourcing, but it will be good to expand the research to 
understand more deeply the relationships entailed in the 
outsourcing agreement. 
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APPENDIX 1. Summary of Methodologies on the measurements of outsourcing 
AUTHOR DATA METHODOLOGY 
Campa and 
Goldberg 
(1997) 
 Data for 20 manufacturing industries 
at the two-digit SIC level in each 
country with annual data from the 
early 1970’s to the mid 1990s for four 
countries (United States, Canada, 
Japan and United Kingdom). 
 The series are constructed from the 
industry production input-output 
tables and industry-by-industry import 
shares. 
 
 It is important to highlight that the aim of the paper is to study the external orientation of the manufacturing 
industries and not outsourcing. However, one of the measures proposed to measure the external orientation (share 
of imported inputs into production) can be used as a proxy for outsourcing (Feenstra, 1998). 
 In the methodology the series are created with input-output tables for each sector of each country which provide 
information on the weight of each industry as an input into the final output of another industry. The component 
input shares are combined with the fraction of that component input industry that is imported. 
 The imported input share of an industry indexed by i and is given by: 
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  
Where: 
i = index representing the output industry 
j = index representing the production input industry 
i
tm = share of imports consumed by industry j  in period t ; 
i
tj
i
tqp , = the value of inputs form industry j  used in the production of industry i  in period t. 
 
Feenstra and 
Hanson 
(1997) 
 The authors combine data on imports 
of final goods with data on total input 
purchases. 
 The data includes US imports and 
exports by four-digit (broad measure) 
and two-digit (narrow measure) SIC 
manufacturing industry for the period 
1971-1994. The trade data is combined 
with data on material purchases from 
the Census of manufacturers. The 
Census data shows the value of 
intermediate inputs that each four-
digit manufacturing industry 
purchased from every other 
manufacturing industry.  
 
 In the methodology outsourcing is measured combining data on imports of final goods with data on total input 
purchases. 
 Two different measures of outsourcing are proposed: 
Broad Measure of Outsourcing 
 









j
j
j
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Where: 
jiIP =Input purchases of good j  by industry i . 
jM = Imports of good j . 
jC = Consumption of good j  
Narrow Measure of Outsourcing 
The narrow measure of outsourcing is obtained by restricting the four-digit subscript i  and j  in (1) to be within the same two-
digit SIC industry. 
263 
 
AUTHOR DATA METHODOLOGY 
Hummels, Ishii 
and  Yi 
(2001) 
 OECD Input-output database which 
includes sector-level data on inputs 
(distinguishes foreign and domestic 
sources), value added, gross output, 
and exports. The data set covers 10 
OECD countries, the main G7 nations 
plus Australia, Denmark, and the 
Netherlands for several years between 
1968 and 1990.  
 In addition the study includes four 
emerging market countries (Ireland, 
Korea, Taiwan and Mexico). Input-
output tables are used for Ireland, 
Korea and Taiwan. For Mexico, the 
data is taken from “Maquiladoras” and 
includes imported inputs, gross output 
and exports.  
 The authors use a narrow measure of vertical specialization or outsourcing that measures the value of imported 
input content (or foreign value-added) embodied in good s that are exported. For country k  and good or sector i , 
outsourcing is defined as follows: 
 
xExports
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
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Geishecker and 
Görg 
(2003) 
 The industry level data on foreign 
outsourcing was obtained from input-
output tables by the German Federal 
Statistics Office. 
 For the narrow definition of 
outsourcing intermediate inputs are 
represented by the main diagonal of 
the input-output matrix for imports. 
 Intermediate inputs corresponding to 
the wide definition are obtained from 
the column sum of imported 
intermediate inputs from 
manufacturing industries. 
 The authors propose two measures of outsourcing similar to the narrow and  wide definitions proposed by Feenstra 
and Hanson (1997): 
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Where: 
j  denotes the respective two-digit manufacturing industry )( Jj  
IMP value of imported intermediate inputs from a foreign industry 
Y = industry’s output value 
Narrowly defined outsourcing only captures an industry’s imported intermediate inputs from the same industry abroad whereas 
widely defined outsourcing integrates all imported intermediate, manufacturing goods of an industry. 
Athukorala, P 
(2003) 
 United Nations trade in parts and 
components data based on the SITC 
(Rev, 3) at the 5-digit level for two 
sectors SITC 7 (Machinery and 
Transport Equipment), and SITC 8 
(Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles) 
for East Asian economies. The data 
contains 225 five-digit products (168 
within the SITC 7 and 57 for the SITC 8) 
 The methodology basically consists on a systematic separation and description trade in parts and components from 
total trade flows using UN trade data. 
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AUTHOR DATA METHODOLOGY 
Yeats, A. (2001); 
Ng. F and Yeats, 
(2003) 
 The first source of the data is the UN 
trade data of the Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC 
7 Revision 2) at the three, four and 
five-digit level for OECD countries from 
1978 to 1995. 
 A second source of information is data 
compiled in connection with the use of 
special OECD tariff provisions, which 
provide for preferential access for the 
re-entry of domestically produced 
components assembled abroad. 
 Outsourcing is measured by comparing trade in parts and components (P & C) with that in final products. 
Lall, et al (2004) 
 Trade in parts and components at the 
four-digit SITC (Rev 2) level from 1990 
to 2001 for the electronics and 
automotive industry in East Asia and 
Latin America. 
 Three alternative measures to capture the extent of outsourcing are proposed: 
 The first methodology is slightly similar to the one proposed by Yeats (2001) and Ng. and Yeats, (2003), since it 
compares trade in parts and components with trade in final products. However, the difference stems from the level 
of aggregation used. For instance, Ng. and Yeats include finished telecom products in their category of parts and 
components (SITC 764), while Lall uses SITC 7648 since the author considers this category as the correct for parts and 
components. In addition, the authors take only 7599 to capture parts and components of office and machines, but 
Lall argues that they should had also included 7591 (Parts and accessories for machines of headings 7511 or 7518). 
 The author recognizes that separating finished products from P & C does give only a partial indication of the 
phenomenon. For this reason, two more measures are proposed as a proxy for outsourcing: export performance and 
exports of finished products vs. parts and  
 The export performance measure cannot distinguish outsourcing from other exports but provides an envelope 
indicator of electronics and auto global production networks. The author argues that it is well known that 
multinational corporations (MNCs) production networks account for a great part of production and exports in both 
industries (electronics and auto), therefore there is a great probability that a significant share of trade is related to 
outsourcing. 
 Finally, the author points that the proposed measure of outsourcing using exports of finished products vs parts and 
components is questionable, since it excludes processing of given products and misses the full dimension of 
outsourcing. 
Kimura et al. 
 (2005) 
 Harmonized System (HS) data for 
general machinery (HS84); electric 
machinery (HS 85), transport equip.(HS 
86-89) and precision machinery (HS 
90-92) at the 6-digit-level. 
 The author provides a general overview of the global trends of outsourcing. The analysis consists in the comparison 
of machinery parts and components trade as a share of total exports and imports. 
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APPENDIX 2. Correlation Tables 
Table 2.1 Correlations of suppliers with outsourcing ratios greater than 60 percent, 1992. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
1. Ratio Outsourcing 1                        
2. Foreign 0.19 1                       
3. Exports -0.30 0.08 1                      
4. Log.  Productivity -0.17 -0.08 -0.02 1                     
5. Per-capita wages directors -0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.24 1                    
6. Per-capita wages white collar 0.04 0.23 0.02 0.22 0.28 1                   
7. Per-capita wages blue collar -0.08 0.08 -0.05 0.24 0.22 0.37 1                  
8. Size -0.02 0.30 0.13 -0.05 0.04 0.07 -0.07 1                 
9. Age -0.08 -0.23 -0.05 0.08 0.19 -0.04 0.13 0.01 1                
10. Subsidiary 0.18 0.58 -0.04 -0.07 -0.02 0.18 0.01 0.20 -0.13 1               
11. Quality control . . . . . . . . . . .              
12. Imported raw materials (%) 0.17 0.79 0.09 -0.08 0.01 0.20 0.03 0.25 -0.26 0.41 . 1             
13. Union . . . . . . . . . . . . .            
14. Investment in  R & D -0.10 0.16 0.08 0.04 -0.02 0.07 0.06 0.09 -0.12 0.07 . 0.13 . 1           
15. Low skilled labour 0.03 -0.03 0.08 -0.26 -0.08 -0.20 -0.18 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 . -0.01 . -0.10 1          
16. Medium skilled labour -0.02 0.03 -0.08 0.21 0.10 0.16 0.12 0.01 -0.04 0.02 . 0.01 . 0.10 -0.96 1         
17. High skilled labour -0.06 0.02 -0.03 0.23 -0.03 0.17 0.23 0.00 0.02 0.02 . 0.00 . 0.02 -0.42 0.14 1        
18. Foreign subsidiary 0.19 0.79 0.00 -0.08 -0.01 0.16 0.01 0.26 -0.21 0.83 . 0.61 . 0.14 -0.04 0.03 0.02 1       
19. Manual equipment 0.02 0.09 0.03 -0.04 -0.07 0.08 0.02 -0.08 -0.11 -0.01 . 0.04 . -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.03 1      
20. Machines and tools -0.01 -0.21 0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.16 -0.06 -0.03 0.07 -0.08 . -0.09 . -0.15 0.19 -0.15 -0.18 -0.17 -0.51 1     
21. Automated equipment -0.01 0.14 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.11 . 0.07 . 0.12 -0.21 0.18 0.16 0.11 -0.13 -0.48 1    
22. Numerical control 0.06 0.05 -0.03 -0.06 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.03 . 0.01 . 0.11 -0.02 0.01 0.06 0.08 -0.16 -0.20 -0.07 1   
23. Computerized numerical control 0.01 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.12 -0.03 0.10 -0.08 0.19 . 0.17 . 0.13 -0.13 0.10 0.12 0.22 -0.11 -0.20 0.01 0.07 1  
24. Robots 0.04 0.10 0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.09 -0.01 0.04 . 0.13 . 0.04 -0.09 0.08 0.06 0.06 -0.02 -0.09 0.05 -0.01 0.05 1 
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Table 2.2 Correlations of suppliers with outsourcing ratios greater than 60 percent, 1999. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
1. Ratio Outsourcing 1                        
2. Foreign 0.39 1                       
3. Exports 0.71 0.37 1                      
4. Log.  Productivity 0.23 0.27 0.32 1                     
5. Per-capita wages directors 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.24 1                    
6. Per-capita wages white collar 0.07 0.13 0.00 0.25 0.28 1                   
7. Per-capita wages blue collar 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.31 0.21 0.68 1                  
8. Size 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.04 0.00 0.01 1                 
9. Age -0.54 -0.36 -0.84 -0.30 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.12 1                
10. Subsidiary 0.37 0.45 0.31 0.15 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.22 -0.26 1               
11. Quality control 0.18 0.31 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.09 0.27 -0.08 0.39 1              
12. Imported raw materials (%) 0.40 0.42 0.37 0.12 -0.06 0.04 0.02 0.11 -0.32 0.32 0.23 1             
13. Union -0.15 -0.23 -0.13 -0.17 -0.03 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 0.15 -0.13 -0.13 -0.17 1            
14. Investment in  R & D 0.09 0.11 0.03 -0.06 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.05 -0.04 0.18 0.18 0.01 -0.04 1           
15. Low skilled labour 0.07 0.03 0.12 -0.04 -0.04 0.03 -0.05 0.04 -0.15 0.00 -0.07 0.08 -0.15 -0.02 1          
16. Medium skilled labour -0.06 -0.06 -0.10 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.14 -0.02 0.04 -0.08 0.15 -0.01 -0.97 1         
17. High skilled labour -0.03 0.09 -0.10 0.15 0.05 0.03 0.10 -0.07 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.09 -0.29 0.04 1        
18. Foreign subsidiary 0.35 0.82 0.32 0.24 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.18 -0.31 0.75 0.37 0.38 -0.25 0.16 0.02 -0.04 0.07 1       
19. Manual equipment 0.03 -0.08 0.05 -0.16 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.10 -0.05 -0.08 -0.19 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.10 -0.08 -0.12 -0.07 1      
20. Machines and tools -0.08 0.01 -0.06 0.08 -0.05 0.01 0.05 -0.08 0.05 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 -0.02 -0.05 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.41 1     
21. Automated equipment 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.03 0.08 0.15 0.04 0.05 0.06 -0.12 0.09 0.11 0.03 -0.34 -0.52 1    
22. Numerical control 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.09 0.14 -0.02 -0.04 0.04 -0.05 0.03 0.09 0.11 -0.12 -0.19 -0.07 1   
23. Computerized numerical control 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.06 -0.20 -0.23 -0.09 0.04 1  
24. Robots 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.06 0.08 0.06 -0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 1 
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Table 2.3 Correlations of suppliers with outsourcing ratios greater than 60 percent, 2001. 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
1. Ratio Outsourcing 1                        
2. Foreign 0.25 1                       
3. Exports 0.59 0.22 1                      
4. Log. Productivity 0.22 0.24 0.41 1                     
5. Per-capita wages directors 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.14 1                    
6. Per-capita wages white collar 0.08 0.19 0.08 0.25 0.22 1                   
7. Per-capita wages blue collar 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.44 0.18 0.24 1                  
8. Size 0.09 0.21 0.09 0.29 0.22 0.10 0.09 1                 
9. Age -0.03 -0.07 -0.17 -0.12 0.11 0.05 0.01 0.00 1                
10. Subsidiary 0.25 0.49 0.12 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.07 0.23 0.00 1               
11. Quality control 0.08 0.26 0.06 0.20 0.14 0.20 0.12 0.24 0.10 0.31 1              
12. Imported raw materials (%) 0.25 0.35 0.25 0.26 0.08 0.25 0.11 0.13 -0.09 0.25 0.22 1             
13. Union -0.13 -0.30 -0.08 -0.07 0.01 -0.13 -0.08 -0.03 0.07 -0.14 -0.07 -0.23 1            
14. Investment in  R & D -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.07 -0.06 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.01 -0.06 1           
15. Low skilled labour -0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.10 -0.12 -0.05 -0.12 -0.12 0.00 0.00 -0.19 -0.03 -0.09 -0.10 1          
16. Medium skilled labour 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.08 0.11 -0.02 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.10 0.08 -0.97 1         
17. High skilled labour 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.20 0.17 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.25 0.03 -0.03 0.09 -0.32 0.07 1        
18. Foreign subsidiary 0.22 0.86 0.19 0.23 0.12 0.19 0.07 0.25 -0.01 0.73 0.32 0.32 -0.23 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.07 1       
19. Manual equipment 0.04 -0.02 0.05 -0.06 -0.01 -0.09 -0.12 -0.12 -0.06 -0.10 -0.18 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.07 -0.04 -0.13 -0.01 1      
20. Machines and tools -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.07 -0.08 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.09 0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.02 -0.09 -0.05 -0.43 1     
21. Automated equipment -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.14 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.14 -0.02 -0.37 -0.47 1    
22. Numerical control 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.08 -0.01 -0.04 0.07 -0.11 0.09 0.08 -0.01 -0.17 -0.13 -0.10 1   
23. Computerized numerical control 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.18 0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 0.04 0.08 0.13 -0.16 -0.24 -0.12 0.09 1  
24. Robots 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 -0.01 0.00 0.05 0.04 -0.03 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.01 -0.04 0.12 0.08 -0.09 -0.11 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 1 
 
